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Abstract 
 
Maintaining high economic growth rate is arguable the central challenge for China’s 
macroeconomic policy in the coming decade. The development of innovation, 
especially in business sectors, is critical for China to meet that challenge. Therefore, 
it is important to understand the innovation activities in Chinese enterprises. 
However, due to high adjustment costs and the high uncertainty of innovation 
activities, innovative firms generally suffer more from asymmetric information than 
their counterparts who do not engage in innovation activities, which cause lending 
bias and herding behavior in the market. In addition, because of “political pecking 
order” in China, firm with different ownership (state-owned, foreign-owned, private-
owned, and collective-owned) will behave differently and their ownership level will 
also directly and indirectly affect firms’ innovation activities.  
This thesis, using the firm-level data from the NBS (National Bureau of Statistics of 
China) over the period 2000−2007, investigates the effects of financial constraints, 
herding behavior, and various ownerships on firms’ innovation activities form both 
macroeconomics and microeconomics perspectives. 
Specifically, the first empirical chapter of this thesis investigates the extent to which 
financing constraints affect the innovation activities. Based on a variety of 
specifications and estimation methods, we document that Chinese firms’ innovation 
activities are constrained by the availability of internal finance. Specifically, private 
firms suffer the most, followed by foreign firms, while state-owned and collective 
enterprises are the least constrained. Moreover, the availability of internal finance 
represents a particularly binding constraint on the innovation activities of small firms, 
located in the coastal provinces, with low political affiliation, and fewer state shares, 
as well as for sole proprietorship firms.  
Next, Chapter Four investigates the extent to which Chinese firms display herding 
behavior in their innovation activities, and then assess the impact of this behavior on 
corporate productivity. Based on a variety of different specifications, we find strong 
evidence in favor of herding in Chinese firms’ innovation activities. In particular, 
private, small firms, with no political affiliation are more likely to herd. We also find 
that innovation herding has a negative effect on productivity.  
The final empirical chapter of this thesis investigates the extent to which state and 
foreign ownership affect firms’ innovation activities. We firstly find a significant 
positive effect of joint ventures on innovation activity. Moreover, our results display 
an inverse U-shaped relationship between state ownership and product innovation. 
Foreign-affiliated firms, especially foreign-affiliated joint-venture firms, are more 
likely to innovate than domestic firms, but their innovation propensity and intensity 
both diminish as foreign ownership increases. We also report strong evidence that, 
conditional on absorptive capacity, the relationship between foreign ownership and 
product innovation becomes positive for foreign-affiliated joint-venture firms. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
China has achieved remarkable economic success over the last several decades due 
to its reforming and opening-up policy since 1978. Its GDP (gross domestic product) 
has grown by an average of 9 percent a year for the past 20 years, which lifted more 
than 600 million people out of poverty. Can this economic growth rate and poverty 
reduction speed, as well as the social and environmental progress, be maintained and 
comprehended? This is the central challenge that China has faced historically, and 
still faces today. The development of innovation, especially in business enterprises, 
plays a major role for China to meet that challenge. As proposed by a large number 
of literature, innovation has been generally viewed as a central element of 
endogenous growth models, and has been widely considered as a key driver of 
economic growth (Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992).  
The Chinese government has always attached great importance to the positive 
role of innovation on economic performance, and has made a range of policy to 
promote innovation. In recent years, with China’s rapid economic growth, the 
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Chinese government has been showing even greater interest in innovation. In 2006, 
after several years of intensive investigation and consultation, the government 
officially released “The Medium- and Long-term Strategic Plan for the Development 
of Science and Technology (2006−2020)” (the 2006 S&T program) and “The 
Decision on Implementing the Medium- and Long-term Strategic Plan for the 
Development of Science and Technology and Improving Indigenous Innovation 
Capability” (the Decision), which aimed at strengthening China’s scientific and 
technological (S&T) progress, and achieve an innovation-oriented society by 2020. 
The guidelines are expressed in 16 Chinese characters: indigenous innovation (zizhu 
chuangxin), leapfrogging in key areas (zhongdian kuayue), S&T supporting 
economic and social development (zhicheng fazhan), and S&T leading the future 
(yinling weilai). The first pillar, indigenous innovation, is the central theme of the 
new policy, which codifies the determination to reduce China’s dependence on 
foreign technology. Specifically, it refers to enhancing original innovation, 
integrated innovation, and re-innovation based on assimilation and absorption of 
imported technology. The notion of indigenous innovation is complemented in the 
2006 S&T program by a greater emphasis on the role of business enterprises in 
technological innovation. Both the 2006 S&T program and the Decision called for a 
“leading role” for enterprises in technological innovation. In stating the guiding 
principles of S&T system reform, the 2006 S&T program identifies “a technological 
innovation system led by enterprises” as the “point of breakthrough”. The Decision 
elaborates on how indigenous innovation is to be achieved: 
“The key to increasing indigenous innovation capacity is to strengthen 
the leading role of enterprises in technological innovation to build up a 
technological innovation system that is led by enterprises, guided by the 
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market, and characterized by collaboration of industries, HEIs and 
research institutes. More effective measures must be taken to create a 
more conductive environment that enables enterprises to play a leading 
role in R&D expenditure technological innovation activities as well as 
the application of results of innovation. ” 
These policies demonstrate the importance in understanding the role of 
enterprises in conducting technological innovation, and motivate us to investigate 
China’s innovation activities at the firm level. As Chinese enterprises generally 
characterized as varying ownership types (state-owned, foreign-owned, private-
owned, and collective-owned), different ownership structures (joint ventures, and 
fully owned), and distributed in diverse regions (eastern/coastal region, central 
region, and western region), it is therefore interesting to consider the importance of 
firm heterogeneity in innovation actives. And China provides us an ideal laboratory 
to conduct this research. 
 
1.2. The motivation of this study 
Although having made great economic progress in recent years, the biggest 
challenge for China to develop innovation is its underdeveloped market and the 
laggard financial system. Especially, the government continues to play an influential 
role in the allocation of key resources, which may cause distortion in the market. As 
proposed by Modigliani and Miller (1958), in a perfect capital market, firm’s 
investment activities should be irrelevant to its financing decisions. However, a large 
number of factors, such as taxes, transaction costs, and most importantly information 
asymmetries, can lead to imperfections in the capital market.  A pioneered 
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framework conducted by Fazzari et al. (1988) tests for the financial constraints by 
looking at the sensitivity of cash flow to investment.  Their results show that internal 
finance is an important determinant of US firms’ fixed investment. Subsequently, a 
branch of literature has adapted this approach to examine the impact of financial 
constraints on fixed investment in other countries (Hoshi et al., 1991; Hubbard et al., 
1995; Konings et al., 2003; Poncet et al. 2010). The other branch of literature has 
extended the study beyond fixed investment to analyze the impact of financial 
constraints on other on other firms’ activities, such as innovation investment (Hall, 
1992; Brown and Petersen et al., 2009; Brown et al., 2009). However, very few 
studies have attempted to focus this on China, which motivate us to investigate the 
extent to which financing constraints affect the innovation activities in the context of 
Chinese firms, as well as to explore firms’ heterogeneity.  
In addition, innovation should be a firm-level idiosyncratic activity in a perfect 
market. Firms should make innovation decisions individually by considering their 
financial capacity (e.g. the amount of free cash flow available to them), assessing 
their willingness to undertake risky activities, and taking into account the value of 
and social demand for new products. However, due to high adjustment costs and the 
high uncertainty of innovation activities (Hall, 1992; Hall and Lerner, 2010), 
innovative firms generally suffer more from asymmetric information than their 
counterparts who do not engage in innovation activities. It is therefore often difficult 
for the managers of innovative firms to assess the value of potential new projects. In 
other words, private information on specific innovation projects is limited. Yet, it is 
reasonable to believe that managers are aware of the average innovation investment 
made by other firms in the same industry, which can be viewed as public information. 
Given that private information is limited, one strategy for managers is to mimic the 
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behavior of their peers, based on public information. Because of the underdeveloped 
market in China, it is interesting to test whether firms’ innovation activities tend to 
some degree to “move with the market” or “follow the general market trend”.  
Moreover, China’s reforms have not only promoted economic development but 
also led to significant changes in ownership structures as represented in firms’ 
increasingly diversified ownership forms, such as a fall in state ownership and a rise 
in foreign and private ownership (Jefferson and Singh, 1998). These changes may 
affect firms’ innovation through issues of corporate governance, managerial 
discretion, resource allocation, risk distribution, and international cooperation (Li et 
al., 2008; Dong and Gou, 2010), which may further impact firms’ activities, such as 
innovation investment.  This motivates us to investigate firms’ innovation activities 
across different ownership types and at different ownership levels. 
 
1.3. The purpose of this study 
The understanding the effects of financial constraints, herding behavior, ownership 
and firms’ innovation activities is an important issue from both macroeconomics and 
microeconomics perspectives. Specifically, a good understanding of the effect of 
financial constraints and firms’ innovation activities would provide valuable 
information about the mechanism through which monetary policy affect real 
economic activities and the understanding of macroeconomic dynamics. Moreover, 
herding behavior helps us to realize how market uncertainty affects investment 
behavior in innovation activities and what is the impact of this behavior on real 
economic productivity. In addition, the analysis of ownership emphasizes the 
importance of ownership reform on technological upgrading in a macro-market. 
6 
 
Furthermore, from a microeconomics perspective, the study of the effects of 
financial constraints, herding behavior, and ownership also contributes to the 
understanding of firms’ corporate finance, behavior finance, corporate governance 
and the importance of firm heterogeneity in firms’ innovation activities.  
 
1.4. A broad definition of innovation  
There are many definitions on innovation in literature. Narrowly, it can be explained 
as the creation of technology that is new to the world. Nelson and Rosenberg (1993) 
define innovation more broadly as “to encompass the processes by which firms 
master and get into practice product designs and manufacturing processes that are 
new to them, if not to the universe or even to the nation”. In certain cases, adoption 
of a technology that is only “new to the firm” could appear too far from the notion of 
“innovation”. However, on balance, when performance in economic development is 
the central concern, it is the broadly defined concept of innovation that matters more 
(Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993). 
This study adopts the broad definition to cover two distinct sets of innovation 
activity by firms. The first set is new products from a firm perspective. According to 
the NBS, new products are defined as “those [products] new to the Chinese market, 
which either adopt completely new scientific principles, technologies, or designs or 
are substantially improved in comparison with existing products in terms of 
performance and functionality, through significant changes in structure, materials, 
design, or manufacturing processes” (China Statistical Yearbook, 2006). A firm’s 
new products are subject to local governments’ certification, which is generally valid 
for up to three years. New product sales have been widely used in recent research 
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papers to represent firms’ innovation activities. As they represent the output of firms’ 
innovation activities, they are believed to be a more suitable measure than R&D, 
which is simply an input into the innovation process (Criscuolo et al., 2005; Girma, 
Gong and Gorg, 2008). In addition, the McKinsey survey (McKinsey & Co., 2008) 
suggests that product innovation is the indicator most used by companies to track 
innovative performance. Moreover, according to recent changes in the Chinese 
accounting system, R&D expenditure is only directly disclosed after 2005 (Li, Chen 
and Shapiro, 2010), while new product sales are available throughout our sample 
(with the exception of 2004). We therefore use new product sales to total assets or 
total sales to measure firms’ innovation activities, and call this variable product 
innovation. But we will still use R&D expenditures as a robustness test, which is 
also the second set measure of innovation activity.  
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Chapter 2 
An overview of China’s innovation 
 
 
 
2.1. China’s national innovation system 
The concept of the NIS (national innovation system) encompasses the set of political 
and other factors that determine a society’s ability to define creatively and achieve 
increasingly ambitious cultural, social and economic goals. The history of China, 
like that of any other nation, can be analyzed from this perspective. In contemporary 
economic thinking, an innovation system is defined as the purposeful combination of 
market and non-market mechanisms to optimize the production, deployment and use 
of new knowledge for sustainable growth, through institutionalized processes in the 
public and private sector.  
The evolution of China’ national innovation system during the pre-reform 
period (1949-1978) can be divided into five stages: 
 1949−1952: the first four-year stage was a period of reconstruction or 
recovery. The Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and many industrial 
research institutes were founded during that time. 
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  1953−1957: China’s first Five-Year-Plan was released in this period. This 
stage was characterized by massive technology transfers from the former 
Soviet Union, which also provide China with a model for organizing research. 
China’s innovation system during this period could be characterized by a 
“compartmentalized, even fragmented” approach, whereby institutes such as 
the CAS were designated to undertake research while universities were 
devoted to education. Meanwhile, technological R&D activities were 
separated from industries. A major event of this second stage was the drafting 
of China’s first long-range S&T program “The 12-year Plan for Scientific 
and Technological Development (1956-1967)”, which included 12 major 
industrial fields of technology, such as atomic energy, radio electronics, 
transistors, automation, computing techniques, aeronautics, and optics and 
precision instruments. In addition, the program specified 57 major tasks for 
basic research. The plan’s objectives were completed by 1962, five years 
ahead of schedule, despite interruptions caused by the Great Leap Forward 
(1958–1960). 
 1958−1960: during the Great Leap Forward, constituting the third stage, 
China’s leadership attempted to break away from the influence of the Soviet 
model, which emphasized the development of heavy industry and large 
enterprises. The leadership attempted to accelerate growth in both agriculture 
and industry, and in both large and small enterprises, using moderns as well 
as indigenous methods. In reforming its S&T system, the Chinese 
government encouraged research activities as the provincial and sub-
provincial levels. It also emphasized the relevance of research to economic 
production, in order to strengthen the link between the two. However, 
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because of its unrealistic goals and strategies, the Great Leap Forward failed, 
the S&T activities were badly disrupted.  
 1961−1965: the fourth stage was characterized by adjustment and recovery 
form economic recession in the early 1960s after the Sino-Soviet rift, and the 
subsequent withdrawal of Soviet technical advisors, China accelerated its 
indigenous S&T efforts, particularly in military-related fields. The Chinese 
leadership returned to some of the approaches used in its first Five-Year-Plan, 
while emphasizing the applicability of scientific research. During this period, 
China also drafted its second S&T program (1963–1972), which included 
374 major projects, 333 of which could be characterized as applied industrial 
technologies. The program emphasized self-reliance and indigenous efforts in 
developing technologies, which was related to China’s separation from the 
former Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the program also stated that “science and 
technology is the key to modernizing agriculture, industry, national security, 
and science and technology (Four Modernizations)”. 
 1966−1977: the fifth and final pre-reform stage was among the most chaotic 
periods (the Cultural Revolution) in the history of the People’s Republic of 
China. Except in military-related fields, R&D activities were seriously 
disrupted. Many intellectuals were denounced as “stinking number nine” (or 
the group with the lowest social status in the nine classes) and tortured 
physically and mentally. A number of scientific research institutions were 
eliminated or downsized, and various groups of S&T personnel were 
disbanded. In 1965, a year before the Cultural Revolution, the CAS 
administered 106 governmental laboratories employing 22,000 scientists and 
engineers. In contrast, in 1973 the number of government laboratories and 
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scientists under the CAS had fallen to 53 and 13,000 respectively. An 
authoritative source on the history of China’s science reported that all major 
S&T accomplishments during this period were related to national defence − 
for example, atomic and hydrogen bombs, missiles, and satellites. 
To summarize, the government was the driving force of innovation as well as 
economic performance during China’s pre-reform era, which clearly separate from 
industrial enterprises and universities. The development of military technologies was 
China’s priority in that period, while innovation in civilian industries were largely 
ignored and poorly managed. These problems set the stage for reforms in the decades 
that followed. The evolution of China’ national innovation system after reform can 
be divided into five stages: 
 1978−1984: the period can be seeing as a spontaneous trial stage. At the 
National Science Conference in March 1978, Deng Xiaoping made a series of 
speeches articulating the idea that “science and technology are a productive 
force” in an effort to initiate restoration of S&T infrastructure destroyed 
during the Cultural Revolution. During the conference, China announced it 
“National Plan for the Development of S&T (1978–1985)”, which 
emphasized basic research. Soon after the conference, the R&D facilities 
damaged by the Cultural Revolution were rapidly revitalized. In 1978, the 
National S&T Commission resumed operations, and by 1979 the number of 
CAS-administered governmental laboratories rose to 129, while S&T 
personnel increased to 24,000. Scientific experts resumed leadership in 
governmental laboratories and the principle of excellence was restored as the 
basis for assignment and promotion of S&T personnel. Restoration of order 
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was the key objective of the period 1978–1980. Soon, China’s leaders 
realized that restoration of the former R&D system and increases of state 
investment in S&T, particularly in basic research, were insufficient to 
stimulate economic growth. Experiments in reforming the S&T system began 
in the early 1980s. The focus was on reorienting R&D activities from 
military to civilian products. In 1982, the central government explicitly stated 
that “economic development must rely on science and technology, and 
science and technology must be oriented toward economic development”. 
Another indication that closer attention was being paid to the relationship 
between research and production was the integration of S&T planning into 
the Sixth Five-Year-Plan (1981–1985), the first such effort in China.  
 1985−1994: the year 1985 signalled the beginning of massive S&T reforms, 
with the announcement of the central government’s “Decision on Reforms of 
the Science and Technology System” – one of the most important documents 
guiding China’s S&T reforms. The key initiative was creation of a 
technology market, intended to link R&D with industrial activities more 
efficiently. From 1985 to 1991, the focus of reforms was on merging 
governmental laboratories with industrial enterprises. The purpose was to let 
host enterprises control the R&D activities of research institutes with which 
they were merged. In early 1987, the State Council issued the “Stipulations 
for Deepening Reforms of the Science and Technology System”. However, 
only a handful of governmental laboratories were merged with industrial 
enterprises, despite the preferential policies and recommendations from the 
central government. Frustrated by unsuccessful reforms in linking 
governmental laboratories with industrial enterprises, the central government 
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elected to spin off new technology enterprises from governmental 
laboratories and universities – a new arrangement that quietly gained strength. 
In mid-1988, the central government initiated new policies, summarized in 
the “Torch Program”, to promote such spinoffs. High-tech spinoff enterprises 
have become one of the most active parts of China’s economy. 1 In the year 
1987, China embarked upon the “863 Program” which adopted a bidding 
rather than consignment system. The government invited proposals from the 
public, and hired experts in different fields to review and select projects 
slated for funding. As such, competition was introduced intro the process, in 
sharp contrast to the previous approach, which allocated research funding 
according to the number of employees in the institutes. Consequently, the 
innovation system became increasingly fair and efficient. Reforms in the 
1990s were characterized by a shift in approach from the previous emphasis 
on technology transfer to a focus on innovation, whereby enterprises are 
considered the center of industrial technological development. In 1993, the 
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) issued the 
“Decision on Various Issues to Build a Socialist Market Economy”. In the 
area of S&T policy, the Decision proposed that industrial enterprises become 
the primary force for technological innovation. This was the first time that 
Chinese government documents had specified this point.  
 1995−2005: after the National Science and Technology Conference in 1995, 
the government issued the “Decision on Accelerating Scientific and 
Technological Development”, which reemphasized the importance of 
strengthening linkages between R&D and economic development, and 
                                                          
1  Successful examples include the Fanzhen Group of Beijing University, the Ziguang Group of 
Tsinghua University, and the Legend Group of CAS. 
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repeated the call for industrial enterprises to become the principal force for 
technological innovation. One strategy was to promote the merger of 
governmental laboratories with large industrial enterprises, which had largely 
failed in 1987. However, these initiatives were not immediately adopted, 
even after the government reinforced and refined the points in its “Decision 
to Further Reform the S&T System during the Ninth Five-Year Plan” in 1996. 
The 1997 Asian financial crises led the government to shift its focus to 
avoiding a crisis in China. After the crisis period had passed, government 
officials began to realize the importance of innovation in economic 
development. In 1999, the Chinese government convened the National 
Technological Innovation Conference and issued the “Decision on 
Strengthening Technological Innovation, Developing High-Tech Firms, and 
Realizing Commercialization of New Technologies”. The aim of this 
decision is to recognize the intricate relationship among reforms in the 
economy, education, S&T, and innovation, and finally create a national 
innovation system. And the central government proceeded to reduce its direct 
involvement in economic affairs. In a related move, 242 applied research 
laboratories hitherto administered by relative ministries were transferred to 
R&D units in existing state-owned industrial enterprises or to new state-
owned technology enterprises charged with conducting R&D in addition to 
standard business activities. This approach differed from the previous ones in 
promoting innovation in non-state owned, medium and small industrial 
enterprises, whereas the previous efforts focused on large state-owned 
enterprises. In addition, numerous auxiliary programs were initiated to 
support the reform, such as experiments in the use of venture capital and the 
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creation of a Technology Development Fund, as well as the creation of a 
stock market for high-tech enterprises, similar to the NASDAQ. 
 2006−now: after the National Science and Technology Conference in 2006, 
the central government released “The Medium- and Long-term Strategic Plan 
for the Development of Science and Technology (2006−2020)” and “The 
Decision on Implementing the Medium- and Long-term Strategic Plan for the 
Development of Science and Technology and Improving Indigenous 
Innovation Capability”. These two documents signified that China was 
adopting an innovation-driven development model. The Plan and the 
Decision propose guidelines for the development of S&T: the overall 
objective, goals and tasks; key areas and priority research issues; and policies 
and measures to implement them. The guidelines are expressed in 16 Chinese 
characters: indigenous innovation (zizhu chuangxin), leapfrogging in key 
areas (zhongdian kuayue), S&T supporting economic and social development 
(zhicheng fazhan), and S&T leading the future (yinling weilai).2 The overall 
objective is to build an innovation-oriented society by 2020. Specifically, 
certain indicators are proposed, e.g. by 2020, the ratio of gross expenditure 
on R&D to GDP should reach or exceed 2.5%; S&T should contribute 60% 
to economic development; the degree of reliance on foreign technology 
should drop to 30%; and the international citations of Chinese-authored 
scientific publications should rank among the top five worldwide. The Plan 
defines 11 key research areas and 68 priority issues in these areas, 16 major 
special programmes, frontier technology programmes in eight key technology 
research areas, and 18 basic research topics. To implement the guidelines, 
                                                          
2 Source: “China outlines strategic tasks for building innovation-oriented country” , People’s Daily 
Online, http://english.people.com.cn/200601/09/eng20060109_233919.html 
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objectives and tasks mentioned above, the Plan proposes to implement 
measures relating to fiscal policy, public technology procurement, intellectual 
property rights (IPR) and standards, civil and military collaboration, 
international and domestic collaboration, and public understanding of science.   
[Insert Table 2.1 here] 
To summarize, a few new trends can be identified from the evolution of the 
reforms after 1980s. Specifically, there is a shift of innovation subject in emphasis 
from government to individual enterprises. In addition, there is a broadening of the 
early focus on large and medium-sized state-owned enterprises to encompass small 
and non-state enterprises.  
 
2.2. The scale and achievements of China’s innovation 
China has dramatically scaled up its investment in R&D over the past ten years. Data 
recently released by the NBS on S&T activities permit a look into the structure of the 
innovation in more detail. In Figure 2.1, we observe that China’s gross expenditure 
on R&D (GERD) increased sharply, with more than 1,000 billion yuan, 10 times 
than it’s in 2000 (nearly 90 billion yuan). R&D expenditure to GDP ratio also 
increased consistently from 0.9% to 1.98% during this period. This growth is even 
more impressive considering that China’s GDP has simultaneously grown by close 
to 9% per year on average.  
[Insert Figure 2.1 here] 
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The high annual rate of growth of R&D spending is a clear manifestation of s 
strong catch-up movement relative to Japan, Russian Federation, European Union, 
United Kingdom, and United State (Figure 2.2).  
[Insert Figure 2.2 here] 
A closer look at the data in Table 2.2 suggests that China has made great 
progress not only on R&D expenditure, but also has a significant increase on R&D 
personnel in basic research, in applied research, and in experimental development. 
This can be seen as a consequence of the reforms in the education sector. In addition, 
the total fund raising for S&T activities increased 4 times from 2000 to 2008, but 
enterprises are still mainly finance by themselves. China also made a significant 
achievement in scientific papers issued, publications, and the number of patents, 
which can be seen as the strengthening of the intellectual property rights legislation. 
 [Insert Table 2.2 here] 
From the perspective of ownership, Table 2.3 presents the various statistics on 
innovation activities, including R&D, new products, and patents. The most 
significant feature is that private enterprises are now playing an important role in 
China’s innovation, following by foreign affiliated firms, yet state-owned and 
collective-owned enterprises are no longer put in a leading position.  
[Insert Table 2.3 here] 
When focusing on industries in Table 2.4, we observe that more than 50% of 
innovation activities are concentrated in the following 6 high-tech sectors: the 
manufacture of chemical raw material and chemical products; the manufacture of 
general purpose machinery; the manufacture of special purpose machinery; the 
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manufacture of transport equipment; the manufacture of electrical machinery & 
equipment; and the manufacture of communication equipment, computer and other 
electronic equipment.  
[Insert Table 2.4 here] 
Chinese enterprises invest in broadly defined innovation in a number of ways. 
Besides R&D spending, the most notable way is through technology import. China’s 
industrialization since 1949 has relied heavily on the import of foreign technology. 
This situation has been changed since 2004 (see Panel A in Figure 2.3). For the first 
time, China’s total value of exports of high-tech products exceeded its imports of 
high-tech products, and this gap is growing larger in recent years, showing the 
increasing of China’s indigenous innovation capacity. Meanwhile, export of high-
tech products is taking an increasing proportion in total value of exports (see Panel B 
in Figure 2.3). These efforts contribute to the change of “Made in China” model to 
“Create in China” model. 
[Insert Figure 2.3 here] 
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Figure 2.1: China’s R&D expenditure, 2000−2012 
 
Sources：National Bureau of Statistics 
 
Figure 2.2: R&D intensity in 2012 and annual average growth rate of R&D 
intensity, 2008−2012 
 
Sources：National Bureau of Statistics and OECD 
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Figure 2.3: Total value of exports/imports of high-tech products, 2000−2012 
Panel A: 
 
 
Panel B: 
 
Sources：National Bureau of Statistics 
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Table 2.1: The evolution of China’s national innovation system 
 
The pre-reform period 
(1949−1977) 
The experimentation phase 
(1978−1984) 
Structural reform of the 
S&T system 
(1985−1994) 
Deepening of the S&T 
reform 
(1995−2005) 
Toward a firm-centered 
innovation system 
(2006−now) 
Key innovation 
policy 
●“The 12-year Plan for 
Scientific and 
Technological 
Development (1956-
1967)”  
● “National Plan for the 
Development of S&T 
(1978–1985)”  
● “Decision on Reforms of 
the Science and 
Technology System” 
● “Stipulations for 
Deepening Reforms of the 
Science and Technology 
System” 
● “Torch Program” 
● “863 Program” 
● “Decision on 
Accelerating Scientific and 
Technological 
Development” 
● “Decision to Further 
Reform the S&T System 
during the Ninth Five-Year 
Plan” 
● “Decision on 
Strengthening 
Technological Innovation, 
Developing High-Tech 
Firms, and Realizing 
Commercialization of New 
Technologies” 
● “The Medium- and 
Long-term Strategic Plan 
for the Development of 
Science and Technology 
(2006−2020)” 
● “The Decision on 
Implementing the Medium- 
and Long-term Strategic 
Plan for the Development 
of Science and Technology 
and Improving Indigenous 
Innovation Capability” 
Evolution of the 
innovation system 
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Universities                         Firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   Public labs 
 
 
 
University                  Government 
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Context 
Reconstruction, recovery, 
and adjustment of the 
economy 
Launch of the reform of the 
economic system 
The reform of the 
economic system expands 
into the S&T sphere 
Fast economic growth, 
pressure from technology-
based competition in 
domestic and international 
markets 
Mounting concerns 
regarding the sustainability 
of the current growth 
trajectory 
Type of learning 
Learning from the Soviet 
model; 
Learning from self-
reflection and criticism 
Learning by doing bottom-
up experimental reforms 
Learning by designing and 
implementing top-down 
systemic institutional 
reforms 
Accelerated learning from 
international good practices 
fostered by WTO 
membership and 
observership in OECD 
CSTP 
Toward endogenous 
institutional learning and 
evidence-based policy 
making, including 
international benchmarking 
Policy focus 
Remove conceptual/ 
ideological barriers to S&T 
development 
Address the shortcoming of 
the Soviet model of an 
S&T system, especially the 
lack of science-industry 
links. Initial reform of the 
university system 
Reform public research 
organizations (PROs), 
including the university 
system and the conversion 
of public labs specialized 
in applied research intro 
business entities 
Enhance firms’ innovation 
capabilities & 
commercialization of 
public research 
Complete the shift from a 
PRO-centered innovation 
system to a firm-centered 
one. Better mobilize S&T 
for achieving sustainable 
development 
Funding instruments 
Direct public institutional 
support 
Initial experimental 
changes of institutional 
funding, by relaxing the 
control of funding channels 
Reduced public 
institutional support to 
applied research in public 
labs. Launch of the first 
large public competitive 
support programmes 
Further differentiation of 
the public support system 
through the launch of new 
programmes. Emergence of 
new publicly sponsored 
funding channels, e.g. 
venture capital 
Improved mix of 
instruments to support 
more efficiently both 
market-led and mission-
oriented S&T development 
and innovation 
Source: MOST and OECD 
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Table 2.2: Key indicators of China’s innovation progress, 2000−2012 
Indicators 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
R&D personnel              
Full-time Equivalent of R&D Personnel (100 
man-year) 9,221 9,565 10,351 10,948 11,526 13,648 15,025 17,362 19,654 22,913 25,540 28,830 32,470 
Full-time Equivalent of R&D Personnel, Basic 
Research (100 man-year) 795 788 840 897 1,107 1,154 1,313 1,381 1,540 1,646 1,737 1,932 2,122 
Full-time Equivalent of R&D Personnel, 
Applied Research (100 man-year) 2,197 2,260 2,473 2,603 2,786 2,971 2,997 2,860 2,894 3,153 3,356 3,528 3,838 
Full-time Equivalent of R&D Personnel, 
Experimental Development (100 man-year) 6,230 6,517 7,039 7,449 7,633 9,523 10,714 13,121 15,220 18,114 20,446 23,373 26,509 
R&D expenditure              
Expenditure on R&D (100 million yuan) 896 1,042 1,288 1,540 1,966 2,450 3,003 3,710 4,616 5,802 7,063 8,687 10,298 
Expenditure on R&D, Basic Research  (100 
million yuan) 
47 56 74 88 117 131 156 175 221 270 324 412 499 
Expenditure on R&D, Applied Research  (100 
million yuan) 
152 185 247 311 400 434 489 493 575 731 894 1,028 1,162 
Expenditure on R&D, Experimental 
Development (100 million yuan) 
697 802 967 1,141 1,449 1,885 2,358 3,043 3,820 4,801 5,844 7,247 8,638 
Expenditure on R&D, Government Funds (100 
million yuan) 
  398 461 524 645 742 914 1,089 1,358 1,696 1,883 2,221 
Expenditure on R&D, Self-raised Funds by 
Enterprises (100 million yuan) 
  708 925 1,291 1,643 2,074 2,611 3,312 4,163 5,063 6,421 7,625 
R&D Financing              
Total Fund Raising for S&T activities (100 
million yuan) 
2,347 2,589 2,938 3,459 4,328 5,251 6,197 7,695 9,124     
Total Fund Raising for S&T activities from 
Government Funds (100 million yuan) 
593 656 776 839 986 1,213 1,368 1,704 1,902     
Total Fund Raising for S&T activities from 
Self-raised Funds by Enterprises (100 million 
yuan) 
1,296 1,458 1,677 2,054 2,771 3,440 4,107 5,189 6,370     
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Total Fund Raising for S&T activities from 
Loans from Financial Institutions (100 million 
yuan) 
196 191 202 259 265 277 374 384 405     
R&D Achievement              
Scientific Papers Issued      94 106 114 119 136 142 150 152 
Publication on S&T      40,120 42,918 43,063 45,296 49,080 45,563 45,472 46,751 
Number of Major Achievements in S&T (unit) 32,858 28,448 26,697 30,486 31,720 32,359 33,644 34,170 35,971 38,688 42,108 44,208 51,723 
Number of National Invention Prizes Awarded 
(unit) 
23 14 21 19 28 40 56 51 55 55 46 55 77 
Number of National Scientific and 
Technological Progress Prizes Awarded (unit) 
250 191 218 216 244 236 241 255 254 282 273 283 212 
Number of Patents Application Accepted 
(item) 
170,682 203,573 252,631 308,487 353,807 476,264 573,178 693,917 828,328 976,686 1,222,286 1,633,347 2,050,649 
Number of Patents Application Accepted, 
Inventions (item) 
51,747 63,204 80,232 105,318 130,133 173,327 210,490 245,161 289,838 314,573 391,177 526,412 652,777 
Number of Patents Application Granted (item) 105,345 114,251 132,399 182,226 190,238 214,003 268,002 351,782 411,982 581,992 814,825 960,513 1,255,138 
Number of Patents Application Granted, 
Inventions (item) 
12,683 16,296 21,473 37,154 49,360 53,305 57,786 67,948 93,706 128,489 135,110 172,113 217,105 
Note: Indicator of total fund raising for S&T activities, indicator of total fund raising for S&T activities from government funds, indicator of fund raising for S&T activities 
from self-raised funds by enterprises, and Indicator of fund raising for S&T activities from loans from financial institutions were abolished in 2009. 
Sources：National Bureau of Statistics 
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Table 2.3: Key indicators of China’s innovation on the perspective of ownership, 2012 
 R&D New products Patents 
 
Full-time 
Equivalent of 
R&D 
Personnel 
(man-years) 
Expenditure 
on R&D (10 
million yuan) 
Number of 
R&D 
Projects 
(item) 
Number of 
new products 
(unit) 
Expenditure 
on New 
Products 
Development 
(10 million 
yuan) 
Output Value 
of New 
Products (10 
million yuan) 
Sales 
Revenue of 
New 
Products (10 
million yuan) 
Export Sales 
Revenue of 
New 
Products (10 
million yuan) 
Number of 
Patent 
Applications 
(piece) 
Number of 
Invention 
Patents 
Applications 
(piece) 
Number of 
Patents In 
Force (piece) 
Industrial Enterprises above 
Designated Size 2,246,179 72,006 287,524 323,448 79,985 1,008,905 1,105,298 218,942 489,945 176,167 277,196 
Domestic Funded Enterprises 1,651,158 54,370 223,459 247,015 57,916 661,591 727,129 90,874 379,211 135,421 209,301 
State-owned Enterprises 162,963 5,621 20,092 20,468 5,510 78,092 73,886 3,955 30,790 11,248 16,376 
Collective-owned Enterprises 11,351 752 2,471 1,945 588 8,042 12,245 2,660 2,750 876 1,280 
Cooperative Enterprises 6,671 239 1,320 2,862 222 2,923 2,730 386 1,397 451 777 
Joint Ownership Enterprises 2,847 114 225 258 108 1,937 1,615 54 415 175 142 
State Joint Ownership 
Enterprises 1,944 97 133 117 83 1,094 1,304 43 224 100 59 
Limited Liability Corporations 662,323 22,247 83,470 90,011 22,686 255,339 284,222 35,483 117,620 48,843 79,977 
State Sole Funded Corporations 126,402 4,521 13,737 12,941 4,478 49,167 52,525 6,546 13,942 5,412 7,829 
Share-holding Corporations Ltd. 371,179 12,456 41,490 45,631 13,694 169,244 181,808 27,306 78,416 33,008 53,543 
Private Enterprises 419,112 12,465 72,299 83,612 14,625 141,787 165,428 20,534 144,168 39,626 55,726 
Other Enterprises 14,712 476 2,092 2,228 482 4,226 5,196 496 3,655 1,194 1,480 
Enterprises with Funds from 
Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan 258,541 6,724 26,417 30,947 8,124 98,746 110,068 32,377 51,434 17,426 28,136 
Hong Kong/Macao/Taiwan Joint-
venture Entreprises 106,372 2,836 12,059 14,098 3,301 43,941 48,377 10,932 21,480 5,729 10,962 
Hong Kong/Macao/Taiwan 
Cooperative Enterprises 3,138 79 625 824 117 511 689 202 785 175 825 
Enterprises with Sole Fund from 
Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan 132,163 3,294 11,875 13,781 4,102 46,354 52,277 19,142 25,963 10,396 14,590 
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Hong Kong/Macao/Taiwan 
Share-holding Corporations Ltd. 15,441 474 1,596 1,919 557 7,219 7,730 1,779 3,065 1,085 1,671 
Foreign Funded Enterprises 336,479 10,913 37,648 45,486 13,946 248,562 268,100 95,691 59,300 23,320 39,759 
Foreign Joint-venture Enterprises 153,078 5,765 19,311 23,373 7,016 153,884 155,721 26,594 31,858 11,256 15,601 
Foreign Cooperation Enterprises 5,152 157 676 740 170 1,410 2,006 490 865 288 380 
Enterprises with Sole Foreign 
Fund 159,290 4,360 15,745 19,086 5,923 82,264 101,112 66,093 24,283 10,696 21,639 
Foreign-funded Share-holding 
Corporations Ltd. 18,075 602 1,789 2,161 798 10,826 8,938 2,490 2,233 1,061 2,095 
Notes: Industrial enterprises above designated size means firms with annual revenue from principal business of 20 million yuan and above, which is effective since January 
2011. Data for the indicator of Output Value of New Products only update to year 2011. 
Sources：National Bureau of Statistics 
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Table 2.4: Key indicators of China’s innovation on the perspective of industry, 2011 
 R&D New products Patents 
 
Full-time 
Equivalent 
of R&D 
Personnel 
(man-years) 
Expenditure 
on R&D (10 
million 
yuan) 
Number of 
R&D 
Projects 
(item) 
Number of 
new 
products 
(unit) 
Expenditure 
on New 
Products 
Developmen
t (10 million 
yuan) 
Output 
Value of 
New 
Products (10 
million 
yuan) 
Sales 
Revenue of 
New 
Products (10 
million 
yuan) 
Export Sales 
Revenue of 
New 
Products (10 
million 
yuan) 
Number of 
Patent 
Applications 
(piece) 
Number of 
Invention 
Patents 
Applications 
(piece) 
Number of 
Patents In 
Force 
(piece) 
Industrial Enterprises above Designated 
Size 19,391 599,381 232,158 266,232 68,459 1,008,905 1,005,827 202,231 386,075 134,843 201,089 
Mining and Washing of Coal 508 14,513 4,057 1,470 504 11,255 11,156 843 1,917 505 606 
Extraction of Petroleum and Natural Gas 324 8,213 3,610 1,043 304 364 593 2 2,337 698 954 
Mining of Ferrous Metal Ores 19 413 191 67 31 318 323  301 162 204 
Mining of Non-ferrous Metal Ores 31 1,392 373 81 38 681 669 2 193 88 71 
Mining and Processing of Non-metal Ores 34 727 350 224 39 542 535 5 145 70 118 
Processing of Food from Agricultural 
Products 252 9,207 3,545 3,947 1,197 14,780 14,677 1,259 4,350 1,689 1,613 
Manufacture of Foods 196 6,261 2,917 3,007 683 6,741 6,814 931 3,870 1,512 1,435 
Manufacture of Beverage 200 6,934 2,742 2,628 717 8,088 7,834 215 2,174 600 1,239 
Manufacture of Tobacco 35 1,597 884 800 164 14,975 14,929 32 1,145 381 490 
Manufacture of Textile 509 13,602 6,767 7,822 1,652 33,325 32,539 6,164 12,711 1,854 1,962 
Manufacture of Textile Wearing Apparel, 
Footwear, and Caps 172 2,895 1,141 1,452 402 8,574 8,076 953 3,565 345 686 
Manufacture of Leather, Fur, Feather & Its 
Products 80 1,544 585 1,049 209 5,276 5,078 1,265 2,008 214 377 
Processing of Timbers, Manufacture of 
Wood, Bamboo, Rattan, Palm, and Straw 
Products 46 1,447 758 821 161 2,606 2,465 374 1,914 541 583 
Manufacture of Furniture 50 903 808 1,134 130 2,579 2,549 879 3,298 303 1,102 
Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products 153 5,589 1,602 1,512 635 10,133 10,182 1,074 2,243 619 809 
Printing, Reproduction of Recording Media 82 1,901 1,047 1,081 219 2,818 2,795 212 1,281 365 578 
Manufacture of Articles for Culture, 
Education and Sport Activities 79 1,370 1,239 1,690 172 2,096 2,080 954 4,463 555 1,229 
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Processing of Petroleum, Coking, 
Processing of Nuclear Fuel 136 6,254 1,827 1,578 608 11,207 11,571 37 1,055 632 1,228 
Manufacture of Chemical Raw Material and 
Chemical Products 1,320 46,992 18,038 17,353 4,461 65,922 64,329 6,666 18,436 9,417 11,917 
Manufacture of Medicines 935 21,125 15,022 16,440 2,331 24,918 23,170 2,424 11,115 6,968 10,506 
Manufacture of Chemical Fibber 144 5,876 1,202 1,563 848 13,540 12,846 1,375 2,231 560 733 
Manufacture of Rubber 182 6,313 2,812 3,310 810 10,407 10,969 2,791 2,814 849 999 
Manufacture of Plastic 285 7,264 3,956 9,438 919 9,623 9,209 1,670 7,735 2,055 3,393 
Manufacture of Non-metallic Mineral 
Products 531 13,972 6,004 6,238 1,375 15,027 14,524 1,900 9,136 2,715 6,366 
Manufacture and Processing of Ferrous 
Metals 818 51,265 7,514 7,371 5,369 68,573 68,352 5,867 8,381 2,911 4,119 
Manufacture and Processing of Non-ferrous 
Metals 447 19,019 4,360 4,041 1,785 35,428 34,104 3,253 6,519 2,456 4,651 
Manufacture of Metal Products 402 11,129 5,617 6,520 1,275 15,980 15,548 2,953 12,699 2,575 4,780 
Manufacture of General Purpose Machinery 1,547 40,667 22,938 27,985 5,004 59,312 59,294 7,453 33,060 8,637 13,464 
Manufacture of Special Purpose Machinery 1,465 36,566 18,396 22,362 4,580 46,175 44,792 5,094 32,022 10,300 16,358 
Manufacture of Transport Equipment 2,201 78,525 24,994 31,329 9,735 196,815 200,879 21,613 38,829 9,267 12,071 
Manufacture of Electrical Machinery & 
Equipment 2,053 62,401 27,792 32,603 7,684 115,091 109,980 23,161 57,713 16,667 24,052 
Manufacture of Communication Equipment, 
Computer and Other Electronic Equipment 3,180 94,105 26,552 34,672 12,358 169,691 182,268 96,386 71,890 40,980 62,159 
Manufacture of Measuring Instrument and 
Machinery for Cultural Activity & Office 
Work 616 12,087 7,990 9,802 1,483 15,121 14,584 3,160 14,059 4,319 6,759 
Manufacture of Artwork, Other 
Manufacture 124 2,427 1,877 2,016 268 3,866 3,881 1,221 3,396 612 863 
Production and Supply of Electric Power 
and Heat Power 213 4,281 2,344 1,569 265 6,610 1,800 45 6,716 2,256 2,415 
Production and Distribution of Gas 4 123 65 48 11 185 172  63 8 48 
Production and Distribution of Water 12 183 141 86 12 23 23  197 111 116 
Notes: Industrial enterprises above designated size means firms with annual revenue from principal business of 20 million yuan and above, which is effective since January 
2011. We use the data in 2011 for this table because most of the indicators are only update to year 2011.  
Sources：National Bureau of Statistics 
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Chapter 3 
To what extent do financing constraints affect 
Chinese firms’ innovation activities? 
 
 
 
In this chapter, we investigate the extent to which financing constraints affect the 
innovation activities of over 120,000 unlisted Chinese firms over the period 2000-
2007. Based on a variety of specifications and estimation methods, we document that 
Chinese firms’ innovation activities are constrained by the availability of internal 
finance. Specifically, private firms suffer the most, followed by foreign firms, while 
state-owned and collective enterprises are the least constrained. Moreover, the 
availability of internal finance represents a particularly binding constraint on the 
innovation activities of small firms, located in the coastal provinces, with low 
political affiliation, and fewer state shares, as well as for sole proprietorship firms. 
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3.1. Introduction 
Innovation is a central element of a large number of endogenous growth models and 
has been widely considered as a key driver of economic growth (Romer, 1990; 
Aghion and Howitt, 1992). One feature of innovation, its positive “spillovers”, 
suggests that its privately optimal level is lower than the optimal level from the point 
of view of the society. Given the high adjustment costs and uncertainty that 
characterize it, another key feature of innovation is that it is subject to binding 
financing constraints. This forces a gap between the cost of internal and external 
finance, which depresses innovation activities, and, consequently, restricts firm 
growth. 
 Due to its successful economic transition in the past three decades, China has 
become a major global participant. In this environment, its innovation system has 
undergone considerable changes and its innovation performance has improved 
remarkably. According to OECD reports (2009 and 2010), gross expenditure on 
R&D (GERD) in China increased consistently from 0.73% of GDP in 1991 to 1.5% 
in 2008. This growth is even more impressive considering that China’s GDP has 
simultaneously grown by close to 9% per year on average, and can be seen as a 
consequence of the reforms in the education sector and the strengthening of the 
intellectual property rights legislation. The business sector’s share of total R&D 
expenditure has also dramatically increased, from 30% in 1994 to 70% in 2008. 
Considering it is the second largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
the world (since 2004), China has become an attractive country for future R&D 
investment, and foreign companies have established hundreds of new R&D centers 
in China in recent years. Furthermore, according to a report of the Chinese Ministry 
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of Commerce, China has become a large exporter of high-tech products, which 
accounted for 28.9% of its total exports in 2011.  
However, China’s innovation activities still face considerable challenges. 
Firstly, China strongly depends on foreign technology. In 2003, foreign-invested 
enterprises were responsible for 85.4% of China’s total volume of high tech exports3. 
As a result, Chinese firms lack core competitiveness and their economic returns are 
yet to be improved because of weak indigenous innovation capability. Moreover, 
R&D expenditure as a share of value added remains low in China compared to other 
countries. Chinese manufacturing sector R&D expenditures made up only 1.9% of 
total value added in 2004, compared to 7–11% in France, Germany, Japan, Korea, 
the UK, and the US. In high-tech industries, this ratio in Chinese firms was only 
4.6%, compared with around 20% in Korea and close to 30% in Japan, the UK, and 
the US. In addition, the share of total R&D expenditure allocated to basic research in 
China is small —only 6%, compared with 14% in both Korea and Russia, and 25% 
in both the United States and Europe4.  
To promote the further development of innovation, and especially indigenous 
innovation, firms should increase their R&D expenditure, which can be achieved 
through government financial support. In 2006, the Chinese government put forward 
a policy called “The National Medium- and Long-Term Program of Science and 
Technology Development (2006-2020)”, which aimed at strengthening China’s 
scientific and technological (S&T) progress, and achieve an innovation-oriented 
society by 2020. The most important aspects of this program can be summarized in 
                                                          
3 Source: National Research Center for Science and Technology for Development, China Science and 
Technology Indicators 2004 (Beijing: Science and Technology Publication House, 2005) 
4 Source: “China High-Tech Industry Statistics 2006”, China Science and Technology Statistics (STS) 
website: http://www.sts.org.cn/ 
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three points. First, China committed to increasing R&D expenditure relative to GDP 
to 2.5% by 2020. Second, it committed to strengthening indigenous innovation, 
reducing dependence on foreign technology. Third, enterprises and the business 
sector would be the central driving force of the innovation process, instead of the 
Ministry of Science and Technology 5.  
Although this policy aims at generating positive incentives for Chinese firms’ 
innovation activities, financial constraints have long been considered as the major 
obstacle for business innovation, especially in transition economies like China. 
Considering China’s relatively poorly developed financial market and state-
dominated financial system, we believe that capital and resources are possibly 
misallocated across firms owned by different agents. Specifically, state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) get preferential support from central government and state-
dominated banks, finding it easier to obtain finance. However, this lending bias sets 
up political obstacles for private firms and prevents them from accessing external 
finance, despite their higher efficiency and faster growth. Huang (2003) describes 
this phenomenon as a “political pecking order” in the Chinese credit market. 
In this chapter, we aim at investigating the relationship between Chinese firms’ 
innovation activities and the possible existence of financing constraints. We first 
assess whether financing constraints affect Chinese firms’ innovation activities, 
focusing on four ownership types: SOEs, foreign, private, and collective firms. 
Second, we test the extent to which firm heterogeneity in the terms of firm size, 
location, political affiliation, percentage of state shares, and organization type is 
linked with financing constraints binding to different degrees. 
                                                          
5 See Table 3.A1 in the Appendix for details on the implementation of this programme. 
 
 
33 
 
We contribute to the literature along the following three dimensions. First, for 
the first time in the Chinese context, we test the extent to which financing constraints 
affect firms’ innovation activities. Second, we estimate our regression based on a 
very large database, compiled by Chinese National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) over 
the period of 2000−2007. Our database is made up of 120,753 unlisted firms from 31 
provinces or province-equivalent municipal cities, which provide up to 745,548 firm-
level observations. Third, we take into account various aspects of firm heterogeneity.  
Based on a variety of different specifications and estimation methods, we 
document that Chinese firms’ innovation activities are constrained by the availability 
of internal finance. Specifically, private firms suffer the most, followed by foreign 
firms, while SOEs and collective firms are the least financially constrained. 
Moreover, the availability of internal finance represents a particularly binding 
constraint for the innovation activities of small firms, located in the coastal areas, 
with low political affiliation and fewer state shares. Last, joint ventures are less 
likely to face financial constraints than sole proprietorships.  
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the 
literature on financing constraints and R&D investment. Section 3.3 introduces our 
database, and present summary statistics. Section 3.4 puts forward our hypotheses. 
Section 3.5 illustrates our models and estimation methodology. Section 3.6 describes 
our main empirical results, while robustness tests are presented in Section 3.7. 
Section 3.8 concludes. 
 
3.2. Literature review  
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3.2.1. Uniqueness of innovation activities 
Compared with fixed investment, innovation has the following unique features. First, 
innovation activities at the firm level generally face high adjustment costs. In 
practice, about 50% of innovation spending is made up of wages and salaries of 
research personnel, including highly skilled workers, educated scientists, engineers 
and other specialists. These types of employees are also characterized by substantial 
hiring, firing and training costs (Hall and Lerner, 2010). Grabowski (1968) 
documents that the supply of research workers is not perfectly elastic. These workers 
cannot therefore be arbitrarily fired during downturns and subsequently rehired. 
Perhaps more importantly, other serious losses would emerge if fired specialists were 
rehired by the firm’s competitors. Not only would the training spending become 
sunk, but the rival would imitate inventions and benefit from the transmission of 
valuable knowledge (Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994). Pakes and Nitzan (1983) 
point out that firms which make original inventions should provide high wages for 
highly skilled workers to ensure their retention and avoid setting up a rival. 
Bernstein and Nadiri (1989) suggest that the marginal adjustment costs of R&D 
capital are consistently larger than those of physical investment for most industries. 
Bernstein and Mohnen (1998) conclude that considerable adjustment costs exist in 
both the US and Japanese innovation intensive sectors. 
The second important characteristic of innovation activity is its high degree of 
uncertainty, generating from its lack of collateral value, irreversibility, long-term 
returns, and market influence. According to Hall (1992), innovation patents, such as 
new designs or prototypes, cannot be easily used as collateral, because these 
innovation processes are likely to be firm-specific and their technology is still under- 
developed. Furthermore, the costs incurred to undertake innovation activities are 
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normally entirely irreversible, since they are aimed at purchasing experiment-
specific equipment and materials, and paying the wages of research personnel (Dixit 
and Pindyck, 1994). In addition, due to a series of processes characterizing R&D 
(investigation, preparation, incubation, illumination, verification and application), 
innovation activities are generally considered as long-term projects. Firms are 
uncertain about how much effort and materials are ultimately needed to complete 
each project (Pindyck, 1993). Finally, market demand or acceptance should also be 
considered as uncertain (Tyagi, 2006). Thus, based on this extreme uncertainty, 
external financiers, like banks and stock market investors, are reluctant to invest their 
funds in innovation projects.  
 
3.2.2. Market inefficiencies in financing innovation 
Innovation is very likely to suffer from market inefficiencies deriving from 
information asymmetry problems, as the firm carrying out innovation has more 
information than outside investors on the probability of success and the expected 
returns of its projects. Anton and Yao (2002) argue that firms are reluctant to fully 
reveal their potential innovation plans to avoid competitors’ imitation. Moreover, 
accounting rules on R&D expenditure further contribute to information asymmetry 
(Aboody and Lev, 2000). This makes it hard for external investors to trace 
changeable information on the value of innovation6. Asymmetric information creates 
an imbalance of power in transactions, which leads to high costs of external 
financing. Thus, the lender would require higher returns due to the uncertainty of the 
                                                          
6 Since financial variables should be routinely reported in financial reports, outsiders are periodically 
informed about the changes in value of most tangible assets and physical investment. In contrast, 
R&D expenditures are generally recorded as final expense in financial statements. 
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borrower’s payback capability. This implies the supply and the demand of loans 
cannot reach equilibrium at the market interest rate. Additionally, the absence of 
organized innovation markets exacerbates the information asymmetries associated 
with innovation projects. Hence, the market price cannot fully reflect information on 
the value of innovation projects (Griliches, 1995). 
Adverse selection occurs in financing innovation projects when borrowers and 
lenders suffer from asymmetric information problems. Since innovation ideas are not 
easily observed, outside lenders cannot know beforehand whether an innovation 
project is a cherry or a lemon7. Harhoff (2000) point out that this will force some 
potential investors to leave the innovation market due to high risk. In addition, loan 
size could be below the optimal demand by the borrowers. Finally, standard 
solutions provided to adverse selection problems, such as signaling, reputation and 
financial intermediation, are likely to fail in the case of innovation firms (Takalo and 
Tanayama, 2010). 
Asymmetric information also generates moral hazard problems, resulting in 
conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers. Hall and Lerner (2010) 
analyze two potential co-existing types of principal-agent conflicts. The first derives 
from the fact that managers may divert funds towards their private benefit. 
Restrictions on available cash flow may be an efficient method to reduce this 
problem. However, this may force managers to finance innovation externally at a 
higher cost (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The second conflict is that managers are 
normally risk averse, especially in dealing with uncertain innovation activities. They 
try to avoid long-term variance- increasing innovation projects, which might be 
                                                          
7 A Cherry usually indicates a high quality goods, whereas a Lemon denotes a poor quality good 
(Akerlof, 1970). 
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beneficial from a shareholders’ viewpoint. The use of long-term incentive contracts 
can be regarded as an optimal solution to reduce the costs of transacting under 
asymmetric information (Holmstrom, 1989). Lerner and Wulf (2007) find that long-
term incentives lead to either better R&D decisions or more skilled R&D managers 
and, in turn, more-heavily cited patents. 
 
3.2.3. Financing innovation externally 
Previous studies suggest that debt finance is not a favorite source of financing for 
innovation-intensive firms (Chiao, 2002; Bah and Dumontier, 2001; Hall, 1994). 
Several reasons may explain why this is the case. First, banks are generally risk 
averse and prefer to finance low risk projects. Second, firms can obtain debt finance 
from banks on the condition that they have enough collateral used as pledge (Berger 
and Udell, 1990). Innovative firms cannot satisfy these two conditions because of 
their high risk and limited collateral value. Third, innovation-intensive firm with 
high leverage are more likely to suffer from financial distress (Opler and Titman, 
1994), which puts bank off lending to them. Fourth, a stable stream of cash flow is 
one of the most important requirements for obtaining bank loans, and is difficult to 
achieve for innovation-intensive firms, due to the high adjustment costs they face. 
Debt finance is therefore not an appropriate source for financing innovation, even 
though it is useful to finance physical investment. In line with these arguments, Hall 
(1992) finds a significantly negative correlation between leverage ratios and R&D 
investment. Similarly, Hall (2002) reports that R&D-intensive firms normally exhibit 
lower debt ratios than that of other firms. Finally, Brown et al. (2012) confirm debt 
plays no effect in financing innovation activities. 
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Compared to cash flow and debt, equity-based finance is believed to be the 
most costly source of financing since investors require a higher expected rate of 
return to compensate for the “lemon” risk. However, in practice, innovative firms 
prefer to issue stocks to finance investment for the following reasons. First, 
shareholders achieve enormous profits if the innovation succeeds. Second, 
shareholders can monitor managers internally, which could reduce moral hazard 
problems. Third, there are no collateral requirements. Finally, stock issues do not 
magnify problems associated with financial distress (Brown et al., 2012). These 
advantages of equity finance imply that external stock issues may be an efficient way 
of financing innovation. In an empirical study of 38 countries, Kim and Weisbach 
(2008) suggest that equity plays an important role in raising capital for investment, 
and the effect is stronger for R&D spending than fixed investment. A significant 
effect of stock issue in financing innovation can also be found in Brown and Petersen 
(2009), Brown et al. (2009) and Brown et al. (2012). 
Recently, evidence shows that other external funds, such as venture capital 
(Gompers, 1995; Cochrane, 2005) and FDI (Girma et al., 2008; Li et al., 2010) are 
alternative sources for financing innovation activities. 
 
3.2.4. Empirical tests on the effects of financing constraints on innovation 
activities 
Several authors have tested for the existence of financing constraints by examining 
the effect of a change in cash flow on firms’ activities. If a firm is financially 
constrained and its cash flow drops, it will have to cut back its investment, inventory 
accumulation, and other activities, as it is unable to access the more expensive 
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external financing. If, on the other hand, the firm is financially healthy, a drop in its 
cash flow should not affect its investment behavior, as it can always replace the lost 
internal finance with bank loans or other forms of external finance. This 
methodology for testing the presence of liquidity constraints was pioneered by 
Fazzari et al. (1988), who focused on corporate fixed investment. Subsequent studies 
have supported this argument (Hubbard, 1998; Bond and Van Reenen, 2007).  
 Recently, this idea has been used in testing the effects of financing 
constraints on innovation activities (Hall, 1992; Brown et al., 2009). Specifically, 
several researchers have investigated the presence of financing constraints on 
innovation activities in different markets, such as the US, the UK, Japan, France, 
Germany and other European countries. Most of these studies use firm-level data and 
analyze the sensitivity of R&D expenditure to cash flow. For instance, Hall (1992) 
uses a large sample of publicly traded manufacturing US firms from 1973 to 1987 
and identifies a significantly positive association between R&D investment and cash 
flow based on a dynamic accelerator model. A similar relationship is found by 
Himmelberg and Petersen (1994), who use a panel of 179 small firms in high-tech 
industries in the US, and by Harhoff (2000), who focuses on a panel dataset of 
German manufacturing firms and an Euler equation model. Similar results are also 
obtained for other countries, such as Ireland (Bougheas et al., 2003), Belgium 
(Cincera, 2002), and the Netherlands (Tiwari et al., 2007). In addition, Hall et al. 
(1999) and Mulkay et al. (2001) find that R&D investment is more sensitive to cash 
flow in the US than in France and Japan.  
More recently, Brown et al. (2009) analyze the financing of R&D by using US 
firm-level data over the period 1990-2004. Based on the results from the estimation 
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of an Euler equation, they find that the financial variables are significantly associated 
with the innovation activities of young firms. Brown and Petersen (2009) report that 
investment-cash flow sensitivities remain relatively strong for R&D investment even 
if they largely disappear for physical investment and decline for total investment. 
Brown and Petersen (2011) analyze cash holdings and R&D smoothing in the US 
manufacturing firms over the period 1970-2006. They find that firms most likely to 
face financing constraints rely on cash reserves to smooth their R&D expenditures.  
By contrast, a handful of papers support the idea that firms’ innovation 
activities are financially unconstrained. Bhagat and Welch (1995) demonstrate that 
past operating cash flow is not significantly correlated with current R&D spending in 
the US, the UK, Canada, Europe and Japan. Using an Error Correction model, Bond 
et al. (2003) find that cash flow appears not to be important for the level of R&D 
spending neither for German firms nor for British firms. For the UK, they find that 
the sensitivity of cash flow to fixed investment for non-R&D participating firms is 
greater than that for R&D performing firms. 
 
3.3. Hypotheses 
3.3.1. General hypothesis 
Previous research found significant effects of financing constraints on innovation 
activities in developed countries such as the US, the UK, and other European 
countries. However, to the best of our knowledge, no paper has tested for the 
presence of these effects in the Chinese context. In recent years, a few papers have 
started to study the effects of financing constraints on Chinese firms’ fixed 
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investment and growth (Héricourt and Poncet, 2009; Guariglia et al., 2011; Poncet et 
al., 2010). Due to the imperfection and underdevelopment of the Chinese capital 
market, we believe that Chinese firms’ innovation activities are likely to suffer from 
significant asymmetric information problems. We therefore hypothesize that: 
H1: Due to the underdevelopment and imperfection of the Chinese capital market, 
Chinese firms’ innovation activities are likely to be constrained by the 
availability of internal financing. 
 
3.3.2. Hypothesis on firm ownership 
Guariglia et al. (2011) find that the growth of private firms’ assets is most affected 
by the availability of internal cash flow, while that of SOEs and collective firms is 
least affected. This argument is supported by other recent research which focuses on 
corporate fixed investment, such as, for instance, Naughton (2007), Héricourt and 
Poncet (2009), and Poncet et al. (2010). A lending bias has long existed in China due 
to the state-dominated financial system. Since their establishment in the late 1970s, 
the “Big Four” state-owned commercial banks have always been dominant players in 
the Chinese financial market8. Before 1998, according to the credit quota system, 
banks were only allowed to allocate loans to state firms, thus private firms were not 
legally recognized by formal financial markets. Although this credit quota system 
was abolished by the People’s Bank of China (PBC) in 1998, the lending bias has 
not been fully alleviated and still has some effects on financing. As a result, we 
                                                          
8 The “Big Four” consist of the following four specialized state-owned banks: the Bank of China 
(BOC), the Agriculture Bank of China (ABC), the Construction Bank of China (CBC), and the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). 
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would expect SOEs to continuously take advantage of superior financing 
accessibility, therefore suffering less or not at all from financial constraints.  
Although Héricourt and Poncet (2009) and Poncet et al. (2010) find little effects 
of financing constraints on foreign firms’ fixed investment, Guariglia et al. (2011) 
find foreign firms’ growth is significantly constrained by cash flow. They explain 
this considering that, as documented in World Bank (2006), fully foreign owned 
firms operating in China have limited access to domestic direct finance, and have to 
finance much of their investment from abroad. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H2: The effect of financing constraints on innovation activities is likely to be larger 
and more significant for private firms and foreign firms than for SOEs and collective 
firms. 
 
3.3.3. Hypothesis on firm heterogeneity 
3.3.3.1. Size 
Size has been widely used as a proxy for external financial constraints on firms’ 
fixed investment (Guariglia, 2008), and for innovation activities (Hall and Lerner, 
2010; Czarnitzki and Hottenrott, 2011). It is suggested that investment by small 
firms is significantly constrained by accessibility to external finance because these 
firms are particularly susceptible to information asymmetry effects. Small firms are 
also disadvantaged as they cannot exploit scale economies and have fewer overall 
physical assets that could serve as collateral compared to large capital intensive 
companies. Thus, they have fewer funds to finance their innovation projects. In 
addition, bank financing may be limited for innovation projects of small firms 
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because of their high default risk. We therefore expect more significant effects of 
financing constraints on innovation activities in small firms than large firms, i.e.: 
H3a: Small firms’ innovation activities are more likely to be subject to financial 
constraints than those of their large counterpart. 
 
3.3.3.2. Location 
Due to the technological advancements and open-door policy, firms located in 
China’s eastern regions experienced fast growth in the past three decades, giving rise 
to a divergence in development between the coastal and inner regions. In order to 
balance the development in different regions, the Chinese government implemented 
the “China’s Go-West Campaign” and the “Rise of Central China” policy. Firms 
operating in central and western areas may benefit from financial incentives from 
these policies. In contrast, firms in the eastern regions are more likely to be severely 
financially constrained, due to high competition for a limited pool of funds 
(Guariglia et al., 2011). Therefore, we believe firm’s innovation activities will be 
more financially constrained for firms located in the coastal region. This leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
H3b: The innovation activities of firms located in the coastal region are more 
likely to be financially constrained than those of firms located in the western or 
central regions. 
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3.3.3.3. Political connections and percentage of state shares 
Guanxi is a concept which means drawing a web of connections in personal or 
business relations. In recent years, it has permeated every corner of the Chinese 
society. Due to the social embeddedness of business relations in China, guanxi can 
not only help to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of daily business operations, 
but also represent an essential informal governance mechanism that helps create 
social and economic value for organizations. Firms affiliated with the central or 
provincial governments have good guanxi with the government, and may benefit 
from obtaining funds as the banking system is dominated by the state. In addition, 
Gu et al. (2008) find firms can improve market access, growth and performance 
through guanxi networks, and better performance makes it easier for these firms to 
obtain external finance, making them less financially constrained. Similarly, firm 
with some percentage of state ownership may also have better guanxi relationships 
with the government, and may benefit from this, thus facing less financial constraints. 
This leads to the following hypothesis:  
H3c: The innovation activities of firms that are not affiliated with the central or 
local governments and have no state ownership are more likely to be financially 
constrained than those of politically affiliated firms with some degree of state 
ownership. 
 
3.3.3.4. Organizational structure 
Joint-ventures serve as a vehicle combining the organizationally-embedded learning 
between firms. Product innovation can be seen as an outcome of joint ventures’ 
combinative capabilities, reflecting how well they collaborate in improving 
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operational efficiency and effectiveness, and in building new competences (Kogut 
and Zander, 1993). Joint ventures generally exhibit better performance (Greenaway 
et al., 2014) and are more likely to export (Manova et al., 2011) than sole 
proprietorship firms. There are several joint-ventures in China, taking advantage of 
shared resources and information, regulatory permits and approvals, tax deductions, 
risk distribution, cultural difference, and financing opportunities. In addition, a joint 
venture partnership is often considered because it is less expensive for foreign firms 
to enter the Chinese market through the formation of a joint-venture than by building 
from scratch. Joint-ventures are therefore likely to be less financial constraints than 
sole proprietorship firms. We therefore hypothesize that: 
H3d: Joint venture firms are less likely to face financial constraints on their 
innovation activities than sole proprietorship firms. 
 
3.4. Data and summary statistics 
3.4.1. Sample construction 
This study uses data taken from the annual accounting reports, maintained and 
compiled by the NBS (National Bureau of Statistics of China) over the period 
2000−2007. The census database provides information for large- and medium-sized 
Chinese industrial firms with annual sales of more than five million Yuan (about 
$650,000). The advantage of a firm-level dataset is that it eliminates aggregation 
problems in estimation. Additionally, moving beyond a representative firm 
framework, it is possible to take firms’ heterogeneity into account (Bond and Van 
Reenen, 2007).  
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Regarding the measure of ownership, the NBS data contains six different types 
of investors defined on the basis of their paid-in-capital: the state; foreign investors 
(excluding ones from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan); investors from Hong Kong, 
Macao and Taiwan; legal entities; individuals; and collective investors9. Foreign 
investors from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan include “Round-Tripping” FDI10. 
Legal entities are a form of corporate ownership, which mixes state legal persons and 
private legal persons. Managed by local governments, collective firms are typically 
owned collectively by communities in rural areas (known as Township and Village 
Enterprises or TVEs) or urban area (known as Urban Collective Enterprises or 
UCEs). We group our firms into four categories, namely state owned; foreign owned 
(merging firms from Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and firms from other parts of the 
world together); privately owned (which include legal entities and individual firms); 
and collectively owned. Specifically, these four categories are classified based on 
majority (at least 50%) average ownership shares11. 
In order to ensure the reliability of our analysis, we first drop observations 
which make little sense, such as those with a negative value of sales and negative 
new product sales. Observations with negative values of total assets minus total fixed 
assets; observations with negative values of total assets minus liquid assets; and 
observations with negative values of accumulated depreciation minus current 
                                                          
9 We prefer to classify ownership based on the fraction of capital paid- in by the various groups in 
every year, rather than using registration codes. One reason for the choice is that there are substantial 
delays in updating firms’ registration codes, which in fact makes these codes unreliable. Another 
reason is that firms might have an incentive to falsely register as foreign firms, in order to take 
advantage of the benefits granted to these firms. 
10 “Round-Tripping” FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) indicates that part of FDI to China belonging to 
the return of Chinese capital. In order to take advantage of benefits, such as tax preferential policy, 
property rights protection, loose exchange controls and competitive financial services, domestic 
capital goes abroad and is later re-invested back, registered as foreign invested capital in the form of 
FDI (Huang, 2003; Xiao, 2004). 
11 Our results were robust to using a 100% rule to define ownership. According to such rule, a firm is 
defined as, for instance, foreign if 100% of its capital is paid-in by foreign agents. Results using this 
alternative way of defining ownership are not reported for brevity, but available upon request. 
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depreciation are also taken out of our sample. Second, we exclude firms without 
complete records on our main regression variables. Third, in order to control for 
extreme values, we drop outliers, defined as the 1% and 99% tails of the distribution 
of our main regression variables12. After the above adjustments, our final panel data 
set includes 745,548 firm-level observations, covering 120,753 unlisted firms over 
the period 2000−2007.  
We define innovation activities as the ratio of a firm’s sales of new products to 
total assets. According to the NBS, new products are defined as “those [products] 
new to the Chinese market, which either adopt completely new scientific principles, 
technologies, or designs or are substantially improved in comparison with existing 
products in terms of performance and functionality, through significant changes in 
structure, materials, design, or manufacturing processes” (China Statistical Yearbook, 
2006). A firm’s new products are subject to local governments’ certification, which 
is generally valid for up to three years. New product sales have been widely used in 
recent research papers to represent firms’ innovation activities. As they represent the 
output of firms’ innovation activities, they are believed to be a more suitable 
measure than R&D, which is simply an input into the innovation process (Criscuolo 
et al., 2005; Girma, Gong and Gorg, 2008). In addition, the McKinsey survey 
(McKinsey & Co., 2008) suggests that product innovation is the indicator most used 
by companies to track innovative performance. Moreover, according to recent 
changes in the Chinese accounting system, R&D expenditure is only directly 
disclosed after 2005 (Li, Chen and Shapiro, 2010)13, while new product sales are 
available throughout our sample (with the exception of 2004). We therefore use new 
                                                          
12 For new product sales, we only trim 99% tails of the positive values because this variable is 
censored at zero. 
13 All our results are robust to using R&D expenditures as the measure of innovation activity (see 
Table 3.8). 
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product sales to total assets to measure firms’ innovation activities, and call this 
variable product innovation.  
Table 3.1 presents the distribution of the innovation participation rate by year, 
industry, and ownership type. We observe that on average, only around 10% of our 
firm-year observations are involved in innovation activities, i.e. have non-zero new 
product sales. This can be explained considering the high adjustment costs and 
uncertainty that characterize innovation activities. However, the innovation 
participation rate in SOEs is much higher than in other groups of firms, reaching to 
15.91%. This is because SOEs generally operate in important industries and key 
areas which relate to national security. Thus, their innovation is essential for 
updating national industries and improving Chinese competitiveness. In addition, 
SOEs are supported by the government and can easily obtain money from state 
banks, or finance form external capital market. The innovation participation rate in 
foreign firms is much lower (6.85%), probably because of the relatively weak 
innovation environment in China, and of less developed capital markets and 
restrictions of market admittance for foreign firms. Private firms’ average innovation 
participation rate is 10.94%, which is higher than that of foreign firms, but lower 
than that of SOEs. This shows their enthusiasm for innovation, but suggests that, at 
the same time, financing constraints may create obstacles for their innovation 
activities. The innovation participation rate is visibly low in collective firms (5.68% 
on average), probably because this type of firms are controlled by local government 
in rural areas or urban areas, and their main interest lies is maintaining local 
employment levels instead of increasing competition against other firms. 
[Insert Table 3.1 here] 
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Looking at innovation participation rates over time, we initially observe a 
decline from 10.08% in 2000 to 7.86% in year 2003. The innovation participation 
rate then rises to reach 12.33% in 2006 and 12.19% in 2007. The initial decline in 
innovation can be explained by the effects of the collapse of the Information 
Technology Bubble, which took place in 2000. The innovation incentive policies 
after 2003 may explain the subsequent recovery of the innovation participation rate. 
We observe a similar trend for SOEs, foreign, private and collective firms. However, 
private firms’ participation rate increases the most. This is symptomatic of strong 
growth in private firms.  
Looking at the distribution of the innovation participation rate by industry, we 
observe that innovation activities are concentrated in high-tech industries, such as 
Chemical & Plastic, Machinery & Equipment, Electrical Equipment, and Transport 
Equipment (with rates of 11.90%, 17.09%, 16.35%, and 18.18%, respectively). The 
innovation participation rates in other industries are all below 10%. In addition, 
SOEs and collective firms prefer innovating in Electrical Equipment, and foreign 
firms prefer Machinery & Equipment, while private firms innovate more in 
Transport Equipment.  
 
3.4.2. Summary statistics 
Table 3.2 presents descriptive statistics (sample means and medians) for firms with 
new products, and firms without. We observe that non-innovative firms have a 
higher average sales to assets ratio (166.44%) and a higher average cash flow ratio 
(8.29%) than their non-innovative counterparts (for which the corresponding figures 
are 124.39% and 7.60%). New long-term debt issues are both small and not 
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statistically different for the two groups. However, innovative firms are generally 
larger and older, in terms of average total assets (410.51 million of yuan) and 
average age (16.88 years), compared to non-innovative firms (for whom the 
corresponding figures are 80.96 million of yuan and 10.98 years). This can be 
explained considering that large and old firms are more likely to be financially 
unconstrained, thus have more capacity to participate in innovation. Moreover, 
innovative firms have faster sale growth (14.48%), assets growth (11.02%), and 
employee growth (2.16%), compared to 12.11%, 10.09%, and 1.71% for non-
innovative firms. This indicates their huge potential. Because of large number of 
highly skilled workers, innovative firms have higher labor productivity (372.74%) 
and higher wages per employee (16.66), compared to figures of 308.66% and 13.53 
for non-innovative firms.  
[Insert Table 3.2 here] 
As regards to financial variables, the leverage ratio is slightly but still 
significantly higher in innovative firms: 58.63% compared to 57.73% for the non-
innovative firms. This reveals a higher borrowing capacity for innovative firms, 
which may be due to their larger size. In addition, the higher liquidity ratio (6.49%) 
characterizing innovative firms, suggests they are more financially healthy than their 
non-innovative counterparts, whose liquidity ratio is only 5.89%. The difference in 
the coverage ratio between innovative and non-innovative firms is not statistically 
significant.  
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In terms of China-specific variables, innovative firms prefer to locate in the east, 
and they are characterized by more state shares and high political affiliation than 
their non-innovative counterparts.14 
Table 3.3 provides a comparison of our main variables across firms owned by 
different agents. Despite being small in terms of average total assets (75.99 million 
of yuan) and young (9.66 years), private firms exhibit the highest new products sales 
to assets ratio, sales to assets ratio, sales growth, and assets growth, respectively 
5.26%, 179.26%, 13.75%, and 12.11%. This indicates that private firms are not only 
the most active in the Chinese economy, but also shows their enthusiasm for 
innovation activities.15 Their high new products to assets ratio is possibly supported 
by the high cash flow ratio (8.50%) that these highly productive firms have been able 
to accumulate. Private firms’ labor productivity is 298.32, which is much greater 
than that of SOEs (179.10). It is interesting to note that private firms are the only 
group with a positive new long-term debt issue ratio (0.11%). This reflects that they 
have to borrow external funds to support their innovation activities when their 
internal cash flow is exhausted.  
[Insert Table 3.3 here] 
Foreign firms also exhibit a high cash flow to total asset ratio (8.71%), but a 
negative new long-term debt issue ratio (-0.04%), probably because they prefer to 
access external finance from their home country. In addition, they are the youngest 
                                                          
14 See the Appendix for complete definitions of all variables. It should be notes that a higher value of 
the political affiliation figure indicates lower political affiliation. 
15 According to the key indicators of China’s innovation on the perspective of ownership in 2012 (see 
page 25), private enterprises have higher number of R&D projects, number of new products, and 
number of patent applications than state-owned enterprises, collective-owned enterprises, and foreign 
funded enterprises. All these evidence indicates that private firms have the highest innovative 
activities in China. However, due to high levels of asymmetric information and agency costs, and due 
to high competition for a limited pool of funds, private firms are more likely to be severely financially 
constrained. 
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group in China, with average age of 8.24 years. Most of foreign firms entered China 
after 1990s and started to participate in innovation activities even later. However, 
their high labor productivity (429.11) indicates that they are the most efficient in 
China. This is due to their more advanced management practices and technology. In 
addition, their high wage per employee (19.91) is likely to attract more people, 
explaining their high employee growth of 5.04%. As regards to financial variables, 
foreign firms exhibit the highest liquidity (15.52%) and coverage ratio (27.46%), 
indicating they are more financially healthy.  
SOEs are typically large (with average total assets of 392.56 million of yuan) 
and old (with average age of 28.61 years). They display high leverage (68.42%), 
negative liquidity (-5.91%), and a low coverage ratio (0.93%), which indicate they 
are likely to benefit from soft budget constraints.  
In terms of China-specific variables, private and foreign firms are more likely to 
locate in the coastal area, while most SOEs are in the central core. Compared to 
foreign firms, private firms have a higher percentage of state shares and are more 
likely to be politically affiliated. Collective firms, managed by local government, 
behave similarly to SOEs, with respect to most of the variables in the table. 
 
3.5. Models and methodology  
3.5.1. Baseline models 
We explore the impact of financial variables on innovation activities (new product 
sales) based on an Euler equation similar to that used by Brown et al. (2009) and 
Brown et al. (2012). This approach is a modified version of the fixed investment 
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model used by Whited (1992), Bond and Meghir (1994), and Bond et al. (2003). The 
Euler equation is a structural model, explicitly derived from the dynamic 
optimization “Euler condition” for imperfectly competitive firms that accumulate 
productive assets under the assumption of symmetric, quadratic adjustment costs. 
Bond et al. (2003) report a significant advantage of this specification “under the 
maintained structure, the model captures the influence of current expectations of 
future profitability on current investment decisions; and it can therefore be argued 
that the current or lagged financial variables should not enter this specification 
merely as proxies for expected future profitability”.  
In the absence of financing constraints, the Euler equation leads to the 
following empirical specification: 
𝑛𝑝𝑎𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑛𝑝𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑛𝑝𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽3𝑠𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑐𝑓𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑑𝑏𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 
         +𝑣𝑖 + 𝑑𝑡 + ε𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                 (3.1) 
where npai,t is new product sales normalized by total assets for firm i in period t; sai,t 
is the firm’s sales to total assets; cfai,t, the firm’s cash flow to total assets; and  dbtai,t, 
the firm’s long-term debt issue to total assets. vi represents the firm-specific 
component of the error term; dt denotes a time-specific component; and εi,t is an 
idiosyncratic component. 
The empirical model above is the same as that estimate in Brown et al. (2009), 
Brown et al. (2012), and Martinsson (2010), except for the fact that we replaced 
stock issue with long-term debt issues to capture firms’ external finance. This is 
because our data consists of unlisted firms, which do not issue equity.  
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The parameters in Equation (3.1) can be interpreted as functions of the 
parameters of the original optimization problem, which underlies the Euler equation 
(see Brown et al., 2009). The structural model implies that the coefficient on lagged 
new products to assets ratio (β1) should be positive and slightly larger than 1. Under 
the assumption of quadratic adjustment cost in the Euler condition, the coefficient on 
lagged new products squared (β2) should be negative and slightly lower than -1. The 
lagged sales to assets ratio (β3) should have a positive coefficient under perfect 
competition. The lagged cash flow to assets ratio appears in the specification to 
account for the cost of other factors of production, under constant returns to scale, 
under the assumption that the marginal products of other factors equal their costs. As 
such, cash flow enters the specification even without financing constraints, but the 
structural model implies that, in the absence of financing constraints, the coefficient 
β4 has a negative sign. Observing a positive instead of a negative β4 coefficient could 
therefore be an indicator of the presence of liquidity constraints. Finally, the external 
debt coefficient (β5) should enter non-significantly.    
For robustness, we subsequently augment the baseline Euler specification by 
adding contemporaneous terms. The modified Euler equation is: 
𝑛𝑝𝑎𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑛𝑝𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑛𝑝𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽3𝑠𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑠𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑐𝑓𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑐𝑓𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 
              + 𝛽7𝑑𝑏𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑑𝑏𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑑𝑡 + ε𝑖,𝑡                                          (3.2)  
We include contemporaneous cash flow which is the standard measure of internal 
financing in the financing constraints literature. Considering the correlation between 
sales and cash flow, we also add contemporaneous sales as an additional control for 
firm demand, in order to avoid possible omitted variable bias. Moreover, we add 
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contemporaneous long-term debt issues as an additional control for firms’ external 
financing.  As in Equation (3.1), all the variables are scaled by total assets. 
 
3.5.2. Estimation methodology 
A noteworthy feature of our data is that a large number of Chinese firms in the 
sample do not have new products. A firm either innovates (in which case, npai,t>0) or 
it does not (in which case npai,t=0). Thus, our dependent variable can only be 
partially observed. This feature would lead an OLS regression to deliver inconsistent 
parameter estimates because the sample is not representative of the whole population. 
We therefore use the Tobit model in estimation (Tobin, 1958). The model is 
estimated by a maximum likelihood method, which yields consistent estimators for 
the model parameters. In order to control for unobserved heterogeneity and potential 
endogeneity of cash flow, we also use random effects Tobit estimator and an IV 
Tobit estimator.  
The coefficients obtained from Tobit estimation cannot be directly interpreted 
as the effect of changes in the independent variables on the dependent variable. 
Instead, they should be interpreted as the combination of a probability effect and a 
quantity effect. We first generate the marginal effect of the explanatory variables on 
the probability that a firm will have positive new product sales. We then calculate 
the marginal effect of a change in the explanatory variable on expected new product 
sales, given that the observation has not been censored. These marginal effects take 
into account the censored nature of the response variable. 
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3.6. Empirical results  
3.6.1. Regression results for the full sample 
Table 3.4 shows regression results of the baseline (Equation 3.1) and augmented 
(Equation 3.2) specifications of the Euler equation for the full sample by using 
different estimators: the pooled Tobit, random effects Tobit and IV Tobit. A total of 
263,272 observations are left-censored, which indicates these firms have no sales 
generated from new products. Only 33,923 observations are uncensored, revealing 
the relatively low level of innovation capacity of Chinese firms16. Focusing on the 
baseline specification, we focus on the coefficient and marginal effects associated 
with the lagged cash flow term. According to the Euler equation theoretical model, 
we should observe a negative relationship between new product sales and lagged 
cash flow under the assumption of perfect capital markets without credit constraints. 
However, if lagged cash flow is significantly positively related to new product sales, 
this suggests firms’ innovation activities are subject to financial constraints. Our 
regression results consistently show that the lagged cash flow estimates in the 
baseline specification are all positive and statistically significant. This finding does 
not conform to the predictions of the structural model. This suggests that, in line 
with our Hypothesis 1, Chinese firms’ innovation activities are constrained by the 
availability of internal finance. As regards to marginal effects, a unit standard 
deviation rise in the cash flow ratio increases the probability of firms being involved 
in new product sales by 0.016%, 0.028%, and 0.050%, respectively when using the 
pooled Tobit, random effects Tobit, and IV Tobit estimators. On the other hand, 
taking the censored nature of our response variable into account, one standard 
                                                          
16 There are fewer observations in those specifications in which the IV Tobit model in used because 
we instrument current sales and current financing variables using their own values lagged twice. 
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deviation increase in the cash flow ratio enhances new product sales respectively by 
1.316%, 2.295%, and 4.068%.  
[Insert Table 3.4 here] 
Focusing on the coefficients of the other regressors, we note that in baseline 
Euler equation, the coefficients on lagged new product sales are all significantly 
greater than 2, indicating fast growth of innovation in China. The coefficients on 
lagged new product sales squared are negative and statistically significant, but 
greater than predicted by the Euler condition. The coefficients on lagged sales are 
significantly negative, while the predicted sign should be positive. Finally, the 
coefficients on the lagged long-term debt issues are not significant, suggesting debt 
is not a preferred channel to finance Chinese firms’ innovation activities.  
By inspecting the augmented specification, the coefficients of contemporaneous 
cash flow are all significant and positive, but the lagged cash flow estimates are 
poorly determined. This is consistent with the findings in Brown, Fazzari and 
Petersen (2009). However, the sums of all cash flow terms are still significantly 
positive, suggesting an economically important effect of cash flow on innovation 
activities. As for marginal effects, the probability effects (for the latent dependent 
variable) are 0.025%, 0.041%, and 0.056%, and the quantity effects (for uncensored 
observations) are 2.099%, 3.441%, and 4.732%, when using the pooled Tobit, 
random effects Tobit, and IV Tobit estimators, respectively. These findings can be 
viewed as the first evidence that Chinese firms’ innovation activities are financially 
constrained, providing support for our Hypothesis 1. This indicates that Chinese 
firms are generally constrained by their internal finance, and it is difficult and 
expensive for them to obtain financial support externally. The gap between the cost 
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of internal and external finance may depress innovation activities, and, consequently, 
restricts firm growth. We next look at whether the estimation of innovation activities 
and cash flow differ for firm owned by different agents. 
 
3.6.2. Regression results for firms owned by different agents 
Table 3.5 presents estimation results of the baseline specification of the Euler 
equation (Equation 3.1) for firms owned by different agents, namely SOEs, foreign, 
private, and collective firms. The coefficient on lagged new products, lagged new 
products squared,  lagged sales, and lagged long-term debt issues in different groups 
are similar to those obtained using the full sample. However, the lagged cash flow 
estimates are different. Specifically, the coefficient is significantly positive for 
foreign and private firms, but not for SOEs and collective firms. These results 
indicate that foreign and private firms’ innovation activities are subject to financing 
constraints, whereas SOEs and collective firms are not. We also observe that the 
lagged long-term debt issue estimates are poorly determined for all ownership 
groups. 
[Insert Table 3.5 here] 
Considering that they benefit from tax incentives for innovation spending, 
direct grants aimed at specific innovation activities, and government subsidies, SOEs 
are likely to have sufficient funds to support their innovation activities. This explains 
why their innovation activities are less financially constrained than those of other 
firms. In addition, despite the banking reforms in the last 30 years, the state 
dominated banking system continues to lend to state-owned enterprises, regardless of 
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performance. This prevents SOEs to go bankrupt and avoids mass unemployment. 
Further evidence on this is given by Boyreau-Debray (2003) who state that, although 
SOEs only account for less than one quarter of industrial output, they absorb three 
quarters of lending from banks in the late 1990s. This lending bias again reflects the 
fact that the Chinese government uses bank credit as a political instrument to 
stimulate the state sector. Similarly, the lagged cash flow coefficient is insignificant 
and poorly determined also for collective firms, given their close relationship with 
local governments.  
The coefficients on the lagged cash flow are significantly positive and 
precisely determinate for foreign and private firms, indicating that their new product 
sales are restricted by the availability of internal finance. By inspecting the marginal 
effects on the lagged cash flow coefficients using the pooled Tobit estimator, we 
observe that a unit standard deviation rise in the cash flow ratio increases the 
probability of a firm being involved in innovation by 0.025% and 0.057% for foreign 
and private firms, respectively. In addition, a unit standard deviation increase in the 
cash flow ratio enhances new product sales of firms selling new products by 3.063% 
for foreign firms and by 4.808% for private firms. These results indicate that private 
firms’ new product sales display higher sensitivities to cash flow than those of 
foreign firms. Private firms’ innovation activities are therefore more constrained by 
the availability of internal finance than those of foreign firms. Together with the 
insignificance of the lagged cash flow coefficients for SOEs and collective firms, our 
findings suggest that private firms’ innovation activities are the most like to face 
financing constraints, followed by foreign firms, while SOEs and collective are the 
least financially constrained. These results are robust to using the random effects 
Tobit estimator and the IV Tobit estimator, and provide support for our Hypothesis 2.  
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Table 3.6 presents estimates of the augmented specification of the Euler 
equation (Equation 3.2). To economize on space, we only report the sums of the 
coefficients on the financial variables. Consistent with the findings in Table 3.5, the 
coefficients on the sum of the cash flow terms are significantly positive for foreign 
and private firms, and the marginal effects, larger for the latter. Specifically, a unit 
standard deviation rise in the cash flow ratio increases the probability of private firm 
being involved in innovation by 0.070%, 0.084%, and 0.092%, using the pooled 
Tobit, random effects Tobit, and IV Tobit estimators, respectively, compared to 
0.046%, 0.051%, and 0.062% for foreign firms. In addition, a unit standard deviation 
rise in the cash flow ratio enhances new product sales of innovating firms by 5.846%, 
6.944%, and 7.426% for private firms when using the corresponding estimators, 
compared to 5.639%, 6.318%, and 6.765% for foreign firms. This, again, indicates 
private firms are more constrained by the availability of internal finance.  
[Insert Table 3.6 here] 
It is interesting to note that the coefficients on the sum of cash flow are 
significant and positive for SOEs when using the pooled Tobit estimator and the 
random effects Tobit estimator. This is probably because we consider the 
contemporaneous cash flow effect in the augmented specification, and this variable 
may be endogenous. When using the IV Tobit estimator to control for endogeneity, 
this significance disappears. In addition, whichever the estimator used, the sum of 
the cash flow coefficients is not significant for collective firms. This suggests that 
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SOEs and collective firms are the least financially constrained, in line of our 
Hypothesis 2.17 
In summary, our results confirm the presence of a “lending bias” and “political 
pecking order” in the Chinese capital market. Given the lower efficiency of SOEs, 
we believe that these firms are still subject to “soft budget constraints”, and can 
easily obtain external funds to support their innovation activities. A similar situation 
applies to collective firms because of their strong relationship with local 
governments. However, private firms suffer more from high levels of asymmetric 
information and agency costs, thus they are the most restricted in their access to 
finance. Considering their higher productivity and more active involvement in 
innovation, we believe private firms are discriminated by the Chinese financial 
system. In terms of foreign firms, on the one hand, they face some degree of 
financial constraints, suggesting their innovation investment suffers from the 
underdevelopment of the Chinese capital market. On the other hand, their financial 
constraints are relatively lower than those of private firms, probably due to financial 
support from their parent companies. 
 
3.6.3. Exploring firms’ heterogeneity 
Given its large size, our sample is likely to be characterized by considerable firm 
heterogeneity. We next investigate whether the sensitivities of new product sales to 
cash flow vary for different types of firms. To this end, we estimate the augmented 
specification of the Euler equation (Equation 3.2) for the firms classified by size, 
location, political affiliation, percentage of state shares, and organizational style. Our 
                                                          
17 The results were robust to using interaction variables instead of dividing by sub-groups. These 
results are available on request.  
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classification criteria are described in detail in the Appendix. All results are obtained 
using the IV Tobit estimator and presented in Table 3.718. 
[Insert Table 3.7 here] 
With reference to size, the regression results for small firms show a positive 
and significant (at 1% level) sensitivity of new product sales to the cash flow 
coefficient. The corresponding sensitivity is only significant at the 10% level for 
medium-sized firms, and insignificant for large firms. The elasticity suggests that a 
one unit standard deviation rise in cash flow increase the probability of small firms 
being involved in innovation by 0.040%. For those small firms who are already 
involved in innovation, a one unit standard deviation rise in cash flow is associated 
with a 8.442% increase in new product sales. Both of these two marginal effects for 
small firms are larger than the corresponding ones in medium-sized and large firms. 
These findings provide support for Hypothesis 3a. 
It is worth noting that the coefficient on lagged new product sales of small 
firms is greater than that of medium and large firms, indicating faster growth of 
innovation. This can be explained considering that small firms are becoming the 
most active participants in innovation in China due to high returns from new 
products. Even though small firms are characterized by growth and huge potential, 
their innovation activities are more financially constrained by the availability of their 
internal finance than those of larger firms. This conclusion is in line with findings in 
the German market (Czarnitzki and Hottenrott, 2011), the US market (Brown, 
Fazzari and Petersen, 2009), and the UK and European markets (Martinsson, 2010).  
                                                          
18 All results were robust to estimating the baseline Euler equation model and to using a pooled or 
random-effects Tobit estimator. 
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Table 3.7 also shows regression results for different regions in China: the East 
(or Costal), Central Core, and West (or Hinterland). The higher value of the 
coefficient on lagged new product sales in the East reflects its relatively faster 
growth of innovation. The sum of the cash flow coefficients is positive and 
significant at the 1% level for the East, while it is only significant at the 5% level for 
the Central region, and poorly significant for the West. Moreover, the marginal 
effects on the sum of the cash flow terms are much greater in the East than in the 
Center and the West, no matter if we focus on the probability effect (whereby the 
marginal effects are 0.044%, 0.007%, and -0.086%, respectively, in Eastern, Central, 
and Western regions regions) or the quantity effect (with effects of 9.406%, 0.769%, 
and -4.296% in the three regions). This suggests that a rise in cash flow increases 
firms’ new product sales by more in the coastal region. Therefore, in line with 
Hypothesis 3b, firms’ innovation activities are more financially constrained in 
Eastern China than in the rest of the territory.  
The effects of political affiliation effects are also explored in Table 3.7. Firms 
are divided into three groups: firms with no political affiliation, with medium 
political affiliation (i.e. affiliation at levels lower than central and provincial 
governments), and with high political affiliation (i.e. affiliation with central or 
provincial governments). We observe that the sum of the cash flow coefficients is 
significant for firms with no political affiliation, but poorly determined for firms 
with medium or high political affiliation. Therefore, in line with Hypothesis 3c, the 
innovation activities of firms with no political affiliation are more financially 
constrained by the availability of internal finance than those of their affiliated 
counterparts.  
 
 
64 
 
Focusing on state shares, the sum of the cash flow coefficients is positive and 
significant for firms without state ownership, and poorly determined for firms with a 
positive percentage of state shares. In line with Hypothesis 3c, this indicates that the 
innovation activities of firms without state shares are more like to suffer from 
financing constraints than those of firms with positive state ownership. 
Finally, Table 3.7 presents estimation results for joint-venture firms and sole 
proprietorship firms. Joint-venture firms are defined as a collaboration or association 
of any two or more firms owned by different agents, undertaken for mutual profit. 
Sole proprietorship firms, on the other hand, are owned by a single agent. In our 
sample, 14.44% of joint-ventures participate in innovation activities. This ratio is 
larger than that of the average of the full sample (10.46%), and larger than that of 
sole proprietorship firms (9.20%). From the regression results, we observe that the 
sum of the cash flow coefficients is significantly positive for sole proprietorship 
firms, but poorly determined for joint-ventures, indicating the innovation activities 
of the former group are more constrained by the availability of internal finance. We 
believe many firms with innovation activities that are unable to obtain conventional 
financing may team up with other firms to find substitute financing. This conclusion 
confirms our Hypothesis 3d. 
In summary, applying the IV Tobit estimator to the augmented specification of 
the Euler equation, we find the availability of internal finance represents a binding 
constraint for small firms, coastal firms, and firms who have low political affiliation 
and fewer state shares. Moreover, joint-ventures are less likely to face financial 
constraints that sole proprietorship firms. These conclusions support our Hypotheses 
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3a, 3b, 3c, and 3d, and indicate an imbalance of financial resources allocation in the 
Chinese capital market. 
 
3.7. Robustness tests  
3.7.1. Alternative measurement of innovation activities 
We use the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets as an alternative measure of 
innovation activities. The regression results are present in Table 3.8. Obviously, 
there are fewer observations because R&D expenditures in our database are only 
recorded over the period 2005-2007. It is interesting to note that the coefficients on 
the long-term debt issues are significant when the pooled and random-effects Tobit 
estimators are used, but not when the IV Tobit estimator is used. The coefficients on 
the lagged cash flow in the baseline Euler equation and the sum of the cash flow 
coefficients in the augmented Euler equation are all positive and significant. These 
results are consistent with our findings based in new product sales, indicating 
Chinese firms’ R&D expenditures are financially constrained by the availability of 
internal finance. 
[Insert Table 3.8 here] 
 
3.7.2. Including the change of cash holdings 
Brown and Petersen (2011) argue that firms most likely to face financing frictions 
rely extensively on cash holdings to smooth R&D expenses. Specifically, due to high 
adjustment costs for innovation activities, firms which undertake a non-trivial 
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amount of innovation should be concerned about maintaining a smooth path of 
innovation. One way for smoothing innovation is to build and utilize precautionary 
cash holdings. Firms facing financial constraints may actively use cash holdings to 
smooth their innovation activities. If the change of cash holdings (∆CashHoldings) is 
included together with other sources of financing in the regression, it should attract a 
negative coefficient since reductions in cash holdings free liquidity for innovation. 
For firms not facing financing constraints, the coefficient on ∆CashHoldings should 
be approximately zero.  
Table 3.9 shows the estimates of the baseline and augmented Euler equation, 
which includes ∆CashHoldings as an additional variable. Focusing on the coefficient 
on lagged ∆CashHoldings in the baseline Euler equation and the sum of the 
∆CashHoldings coefficients in the augmented Euler equation, we observe that both 
are negative, although not all of them are significant. Additionally, the coefficients 
of the lagged cash flow or the sum of the cash flow coefficients are still positive and 
significant, indicating Chinese firms’ innovation activities are financially constrained 
by the availability of internal financing, even after controlling for changes in cash 
holdings. 
[Insert Table 3.9 here] 
 
3.7.3. Exploring firm’s heterogeneity in the private firms’ sample 
As private firms represent our largest group (61% of our sample), we investigate 
whether the sensitivities of new product sales to cash flow still vary for different 
types of private firms. We use the same classification schemes, the same augmented 
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specification of the Euler equation, and the same IV Tobit estimator as in Section 
3.6.3. The regression results are presented in Table 3.10 and are consistent with our 
previous findings. Specifically, even within the private firms sub-sample, the 
coefficients on cash flow are still positive and significant for small firms, coastal 
firms, and firms with low political affiliation, no state share, and sole proprietorship. 
Consistent with what we had found for the full sample, this indicates that the 
innovation activities of these particular types of firms are constrained by the 
availability of internal finance. 
[Insert Table 3.10 here] 
 
3.8. Conclusion 
The effects of financial constraints on corporate fixed investment have been 
substantially discussed since Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen’s (1988) pioneering 
paper, which suggested, for the first time, that the sensitivity of investment to cash 
flow can be seen as an indicator of the presence of financing constraints. Recently, 
the literature on financial constraints has been extended beyond fixed investment to 
analyze the impact of financial constraints on other corporate activities, such as 
inventory investment, employment, and export participation. Due to the crucial 
effect of innovation on economic growth, much attention has been paid to R&D 
investment in developed countries such as the US, the UK, and Europe. Only a few 
studies have attempted to study the impact of financial constraints in the context of 
China, but most of them focused on fixed investment or firm growth. Our study fills 
 
 
68 
 
a gap in the literature testing the impact of financial constraints on Chinese firms’ 
innovation activities.  
We use a very large firm-level dataset over the period 2000−2007, which 
consists of 120,753 unlisted firms from 31 provinces or province-equivalent 
municipal cities. Based on a wide range of specification and estimation methods, we 
document that Chinese firms’ innovation activities are subject to financial constraints. 
Private firms suffer the most, followed by foreign firms, while SOEs and collective 
firms are the least financially constrained. Moreover, the availability of internal 
finance represents a binding constraint for small firms, coastal firms, and firms who 
have low political affiliation and fewer state shares. Last, joint-ventures are less 
likely to face financial constraints than sole proprietorships.  
These findings confirm the presence of “lending bias” and “political pecking 
order” in the Chinese capital market. Despite being the most active innovation 
participant over the period examined, private firms have been discriminated against 
by the Chinese capital market. As for foreign firms, their innovation activities have 
also been constrained by the imperfection and underdevelopment of the Chinese 
capital. By contrast, thanks to the support these firms get from state banks and local 
governments, SOEs and collective firms’ innovation activities are not constrained by 
the availability of internal finance.  
Our research complements “The National Medium- and Long-Term Program 
of Science and Technology Development (2006-2020)”. Specifically, our findings 
suggest that policies should be established to alleviate financing obstacles to support 
the development of innovation activities in small private firms, coastal firms, and 
firms with low political affiliation, fewer state shares, and sole proprietorship. To 
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this end, non-banking financial institutions, such as securities, insurance, trust and 
finance companies, could be set up.  
Further research needs to be undertaken in the following directions. First, as 
our regressions are only based on the Euler equation model, it would be interesting 
to test whether the results are robust to using other models, such as the error-
correction model (Bond et al., 2003; Guariglia, 2008). Second, one could test 
whether the results also hold for listed firms. Third, it would be interesting to 
investigate whether similar results apply in other developing countries. 
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Table 3.1: Distribution of the innovation participation rate (measured as the 
percentage of observations with positive new product sales) by year, industry 
and ownership type 
 
 Full sample SOEs Foreign Private Collective 
Year      
2000 10.08 16.14 6.12 10.78 5.43 
2001 9.25 15.45 6.73 9.30 5.50 
2002 8.60 15.18 5.10 8.99 4.70 
2003 7.86 14.30 5.05 8.10 4.14 
2005 11.37 16.78 7.76 11.99 7.66 
2006 12.33 16.88 8.08 13.44 7.35 
2007 12.19 17.73 8.80 13.29 5.19 
      
Industry      
Metal & metal products 7.67 18.03 5.59 7.65 4.01 
Nonmetal products & petroleum processing 6.71 6.62 7.51 6.97 3.85 
Chemicals & plastic 11.90 20.10 7.38 12.81 6.51 
Machinery & Equipment 17.09 29.24 11.65 17.13 8.58 
Electrical equipment 16.35 37.11 9.95 18.27 11.37 
Transport equipment 18.18 26.52 10.93 19.40 5.96 
Food & tobacco 9.56 12.28 7.69 9.67 7.53 
Textile 6.03 18.67 3.20 6.69 4.66 
Leather & timber & furniture 5.11 3.61 3.53 6.00 3.67 
Mining & Logging 3.76 2.69 4.64 4.23 2.13 
      
Average 10.26 15.91 6.85 10.94 5.68 
 
Notes: The innovation participation rate is calculated as the percentage of observations with positive new 
products. The ownership classification is based on the majority average ownership shares (at least 50%). The 
year 2004 is missing because the variable of new products is not available in that year. 
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Table 3.2: Sample means and medians (in parentheses) 
 
 Full sample 
New products 
=0 
New products 
>0 
Diff 
Main regression variables     
New products/Total assets 4.56 0.00 44.47 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Sales/Total assets 162.44 166.44 124.39 0.00 
 (118.47) (55.92) (111.67)  
Cash flow/Total assets 8.17 8.29 7.60 0.00 
 (5.61) (2.46) (6.60)  
New long-term debt/Total assets 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.24 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
General firm characteristics     
Assets 112.83 80.96 410.51 0.00 
 (19.83) (32.87) (35.16)  
Age 11.48 10.98 16.88 0.00 
 (8.00) (30.00) (8.00)  
Sale growth 12.23 12.11 14.48 0.00 
 (10.78) (6.14) (10.54)  
Assets growth 9.81 10.09 11.02 0.00 
 (4.78) (-0.16) (4.98)  
Employee growth 1.85 1.71 2.16 0.00 
 (0.00) (-1.31) (0.67)  
Labor productivity 313.74 308.66 372.74 0.00 
 (167.15) (77.42) (202.53)  
Wage per employee 13.73 13.53 16.66 0.00 
 (10.69) (8.92) (14.78)  
Financial variables     
Leverage 57.94 57.73 58.63 0.00 
 (58.94) (66.51) (47.38)  
Liquidity 5.82 5.89 6.49 0.00 
 (6.22) (-2.40) (15.65)  
Coverage 12.00 11.90 12.21 0.94 
 (2.81) (1.10) (3.10)  
China-specific variables     
Region 1.36 1.35 1.47 0.00 
 (1.00) (2.00) (1.00)  
Percentage of state shares 9.29 8.73 15.14 0.00 
 (0.00) (100.00) (0.00)  
Political affiliation 71.63 71.98 61.43 0.00 
 (90.00) (40.00) (90.00)  
     
Observation 745,548 571,303 65,339  
 
Notes: Assets are expressed in millions of yuan. All other variables except age, region and political affiliation are 
expressed in percentage terms. All variables were deflated using provincial ex-factory producer price indices. The 
last column (Diff) presents p-values from an independent samples mean-equality test between the positive new 
products group and the no new products group. See Appendix for complete definitions of all variables. 
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Table 3.3: Sample means and medians (in parentheses) 
 
 SOEs Foreign Private Collective Diff1 Diff2 Diff3 
Main regression variables        
New products/Total assets 3.20 3.77 5.26 2.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.000) (0.00)    
Sales/Total assets 81.22 143.96 179.26 167.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (55.92) (111.67) (132.43) (117.93)    
Cash flow/Total assets 3.84 8.71 8.50 8.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (2.46) (6.60) (5.77) (5.67)    
New long-term debt/Total assets -0.13 -0.04 0.11 -0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
General firm characteristics        
Assets 392.56 128.37 75.99 43.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (32.87) (35.16) (16.31) (16.11)    
Age 28.61 8.24 9.66 16.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (30.00) (8.00) (7.00) (13.00)    
Sale growth 8.25 11.71 13.75 7.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (6.14) (10.54) (12.16) (7.73)    
Assets growth 1.78 8.61 12.11 6.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (-0.16) (4.98) (6.64) (1.90)    
Employee growth -4.82 5.04 2.42 -1.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (-1.31) (0.67) (0.00) (0.00)    
Labor productivity 179.10 429.11 298.32 258.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (77.42) (202.53) (173.83) (140.90)    
Wage per employee 11.86 19.91 12.41 10.79 0.00 0.24 0.00 
 (8.92) (14.78) (10.23) (9.11)    
Financial variables        
Leverage 68.42 47.73 59.24 60.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (66.51) (47.38) (61.00) (61.10)    
Liquidity -5.91 15.52 4.20 7.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (-2.40) (15.65) (4.43) (7.87)    
Coverage 0.93 27.46 10.59 5.82 0.01 0.00 0.00 
 (1.10) (3.10) (3.12) (2.54)    
China-specific variables        
Region 1.83 1.08 1.38 1.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (2.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00)    
Percentage of state shares 87.26 1.41 1.99 1.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (100.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Political affiliation 37.81 78.69 75.75 63.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (40.00) (90.00) (90.00) (63.00)    
        
Observation 59,922 138,356 457,715 59,982    
 
Notes: Assets are expressed in millions of yuan. All other variables except age, region and political affiliation are 
expressed in percentage terms. All variables were deflated using provincial ex-factory producer price indices. The 
last three columns present p-values from an independent samples mean-equality test between the SOEs group and 
the foreign group (Diff1); between the SOEs group and the private group (Diff2); and between the foreign group 
and the private group (Diff3). See Appendix for complete definitions of all variables. 
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Table 3.4: Baseline and augmented Euler equation for the full sample 
 
 Baseline Euler Equation Augmented Euler Equation 
 
Pooled 
Tobit 
Random 
effects 
Tobit 
IV Tobit 
Pooled 
Tobit 
Random 
effecst 
Tobit 
IV Tobit 
npat-1 2.608*** 2.060*** 2.584*** 2.603*** 2.151*** 2.570*** 
 (0.023) (0.017) (0.016) (0.023) (0.017) (0.017) 
npat-12 -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sa    0.023*** 0.031*** -0.198*** 
    (0.004) (0.003) (0.025) 
sat-1 -0.072*** -0.065*** -0.081*** -0.094*** -0.093*** 0.102*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.022) 
cfat    0.136*** 0.169*** 0.468** 
    (0.037) (0.035) (0.230) 
cfat-1 0.077** 0.140*** 0.231*** -0.013 0.040 -0.127 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.053) (0.039) (0.037) (0.152) 
 [0.016] [0.027] [0.050]    
 {1.316} {2.295} {4.068}    
dbtat    0.066 0.066 -0.218 
    (0.041) (0.040) (0.670) 
dbtat-1 0.010 0.016 -0.111 0.018 0.027 -0.042 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.240) (0.039) (0.039) (0.117) 
sum(cfa)    0.123*** 0.209*** 0.340*** 
    (0.035) (0.035) (0.088) 
    [0.025] [0.041] [0.056] 
    {2.099} {3.441} {4.732} 
sum(dbta)    0.084 0.093 -0.260 
    (0.062) (0.061) (0.778) 
Pseudo R2 0.132   0.132   
Rho  0.384   0.387  
Wald test of 
exogeneity 
  67.45   86.03 
(p-value)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Observations       
   Left-censored 263,273 263,273 188,779 263,273 263,273 188,779 
   Uncensored 33,923 33,923 26,296 33,923 33,923 26,296 
 
Notes: The dependent variable npa (new products/total assets) is a censored variable which takes its real 
value if the firm has positive new products output (uncensored observations), and zero otherwise (left-
censored observations). Outliers in all regression variables are trimmed at the 1% and 99% level. We 
estimate the baseline and augmented Euler equations using the pooled Tobit, random effects Tobit and IV 
Tobit estimators. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Time dummies, industry dummies and time-
industry interaction terms are included in all specifications but not reported in this results table. Pseudo 
R2 is McFadden’s pseudo R-squared in pooled Tobit regression. Rho is the percent contribution to the 
total variance of the panel-level variance component in random effects Tobit regression. We instrument 
sales and all financing variables using their own values lagged twice (t-2) in the IV Tobit regression. P-
values of the Wald test of exogeneity are shown in parentheses. The numbers in square brackets are 
marginal effects on the probability of being uncensored, and in curly brackets are marginal effects on 
uncensored observations. See Appendix for complete definitions of all variables. 
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Table 3.5: Baseline Euler equation differentiating firms on the basis of ownership 
 Pooled Tobit Random effects Tobit IV Tobit 
 SOEs Foreign Private Collective SOEs Foreign Private Collective SOEs Foreign Private Collective 
npat-1 1.722*** 3.002*** 2.576*** 3.050*** 1.452*** 2.418*** 2.182*** 2.596*** 1.673*** 3.001*** 2.528*** 2.945*** 
 (0.053) (0.067) (0.027) (0.115) (0.030) (0.054) (0.021) (0.083) (0.029) (0.055) (0.020) (0.088) 
npat-12 -0.003*** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.003*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.003*** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.007*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sat-1 -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.085*** -0.050*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.080*** -0.040*** -0.062*** -0.058*** -0.097*** -0.067*** 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.003) (0.011) (0.006) (0.009) (0.003) (0.010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.004) (0.014) 
cfat-1 0.082 0.209** 0.270*** -0.132 0.066 0.208** 0.326*** -0.049 0.300 0.629*** 0.487*** 0.105 
 (0.060) (0.086) (0.042) (0.134) (0.054) (0.089) (0.041) (0.133) (0.194) (0.162) (0.070) (0.216) 
 [0.052] [0.025] [0.057] [-0.016] [0.038] [0.024] [0.067] [-0.006] [0.047] [0.028] [0.045] [0.012] 
 {1.586} {3.063} {4.808} {-1.756} {1.225} {2.492} {5.604} {-0.639} {1.405} {3.156} {5.774} {0.943} 
dbtat-1 0.045 -0.085 0.006 0.056 0.028 -0.016 0.014 0.058 -0.727 0.960 0.110 -1.185 
 (0.041) (0.181) (0.045) (0.210) (0.045) (0.167) (0.047) (0.175) (0.548) (1.491) (0.264) (0.985) 
Pseudo R2 0.190 0.136 0.128 0.148         
Rho     0.406 0.399 0.346 0.398     
Wald test of exogeneity         21.70 11.71 59.55 11.25 
(p-value)         (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.011) 
Observations             
   Left-censored 19,695 53,417 157,133 22,514 19,695 53,417 157,133 22,514 12,693 38,949 114,824 15,104 
   Uncensored 3,854 4,207 22,768 1,338 3,854 4,207 22,768 1,338 2,633 3,362 18,090 962 
 
Notes: The dependent variable npa (new products/total assets) is a censored variable which takes its real value if the firm has positive new products output (uncensored observations), 
and zero otherwise (left-censored observations). Ownership groups are classified based on the majority average ownership shares. Outliers in all regression variables are trimmed at the 
1% and 99% level. We estimate the baseline Euler equation using the pooled Tobit, random effects Tobit and IV Tobit estimators. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Time dummies, industry dummies and time-industry interaction terms are included in all 
specifications but not reported in this results table. Pseudo R2 is McFadden’s pseudo R-squared in pooled Tobit regression. Rho is the percent contribution to the total variance of the 
panel-level variance component in random effects Tobit regression. We instrument sales and all financing variables using their own values lagged twice (t-2) in the IV Tobit regression. 
P-values of the Wald test of exogeneity are shown in parentheses. The numbers in square brackets are marginal effects on the probability of being uncensored, and in curly brackets are 
marginal effects on uncensored observations. See Appendix for complete definitions of all variables and criteria of all classifications.  
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Table 3.6: Augmented Euler equation differentiating firms on the basis of ownership 
 Pooled Tobit Random effects Tobit IV Tobit 
 SOEs Foreign Private Collective SOEs Foreign Private Collective SOEs Foreign Private Collective 
npat-1 1.717*** 2.991*** 2.570*** 3.049*** 1.434*** 2.403*** 2.172*** 2.592*** 1.634*** 2.977*** 2.505*** 2.939*** 
 (0.052) (0.067) (0.027) (0.114) (0.030) (0.054) (0.021) (0.083) (0.118) (0.056) (0.021) (0.097) 
npat-12 -0.003*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.003*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.003*** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.007*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sa 0.020* 0.018 0.024*** 0.009 0.029*** 0.029** 0.031*** 0.014 -0.209 -0.126 -0.234*** -0.285*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.005) (0.015) (0.006) (0.012) (0.004) (0.014) (0.429) (0.077) (0.032) (0.104) 
sat-1 -0.067*** -0.062*** -0.108*** -0.058*** -0.065*** -0.062*** -0.108*** -0.051*** 0.121 0.048 0.117*** 0.211** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.006) (0.018) (0.008) (0.013) (0.005) (0.015) (0.407) (0.064) (0.027) (0.092) 
sum(cfa) 0.150** 0.385*** 0.328*** -0.157 0.162*** 0.446*** 0.404*** -0.075 0.935 1.004*** 0.719*** -0.167 
 (0.065) (0.097) (0.046) (0.147) (0.060) (0.101) (0.045) (0.146) (1.100) (0.322) (0.114) (0.349) 
 [0.096] [0.046] [0.070] [-0.019] [0.095] [0.051] [0.084] [-0.009] [0.083] [0.062] [0.092] [-0.076] 
 {2.915} {5.639} {5.846} {-2.087} {3.016} {6.318} {6.944} {-0.980} {2.647} {6.765} {7.426} {-1.249} 
sum(dbta) 0.064 -0.285 0.097 0.127 0.020 -0.272 0.132* 0.078 -1.290 4.581 0.521 -5.427* 
 (0.058) (0.264) (0.075) (0.299) (0.071) (0.263) (0.076) (0.283) (6.206) (4.977) (0.835) (3.149) 
Pseudo R2 0.190 0.136 0.128 0.148         
Rho     0.420 0.402 0.349 0.398     
Wald test of exogeneity         26.05 8.75 73.02 12.04 
(p-value)         (0.000) (0.033) (0.000) (0.007) 
Observations             
   Left-censored 19,695 53,417 157,133 22,514 19,695 53,417 157,133 22,514 12,693 38,949 114,824 15,104 
   Uncensored 3,854 4,207 22,768 1,338 3,854 4,207 22,768 1,338 2,633 3,362 18,090 962 
Notes: The dependent variable npa (new products/total assets) is a censored variable which takes its real value if the firm has positive new products output (uncensored observations), 
and zero otherwise (left-censored observations). Ownership groups are classified based on the majority average ownership shares. Outliers in all regression variables are trimmed at the 
1% and 99% level. We estimate the augmented Euler equation using the pooled Tobit, random effects Tobit and IV Tobit estimators. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Time dummies, industry dummies and time-industry interaction terms are included in all 
specifications but not reported in this results table. Pseudo R2 is McFadden’s pseudo R-squared in pooled Tobit regression. Rho is the percent contribution to the total variance of the 
panel-level variance component in random effects Tobit regression. We instrument sales and all financing variables using their own values lagged twice (t-2) in the IV Tobit regression. 
P-values of the Wald test of exogeneity are shown in parentheses. The numbers in square brackets are marginal effects on the probability of being uncensored, and in curly brackets are 
marginal effects on uncensored observations. See Appendix for complete definitions of all variables and criteria of all classifications. 
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Table 3.7: Augmented Euler equation estimated using the IV Tobit estimator: differentiating firms on the basis of size, region, political 
affiliation, percentage of state shares, and organization style in the full sample 
 Size Region Political Affiliation State shares Organization style 
 Small Medium Large East Central West No Medium High No Yes SP JV 
npat-1 3.563*** 2.818*** 1.837*** 2.594*** 2.196*** 2.491*** 2.755*** 2.403*** 1.590*** 2.750*** 1.864*** 2.617*** 2.205*** 
 (0.084) (0.030) (0.016) (0.021) (0.042) (0.048) (0.026) (0.028) (0.025) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.028) 
npat-12 -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.003*** -0.007*** -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sa -0.228** -0.067 -0.001 -0.224*** -0.115** -0.032 -0.163*** -0.247*** -0.138** -0.174*** -0.234*** -0.198*** -0.120** 
 (0.098) (0.044) (0.034) (0.032) (0.052) (0.074) (0.036) (0.045) (0.064) (0.032) (0.038) (0.029) (0.053) 
sat-1 0.098 0.018 -0.014 0.093*** 0.055 0.012 0.055* 0.151*** 0.082 0.067** 0.163*** 0.093*** 0.044 
 (0.080) (0.037) (0.029) (0.027) (0.044) (0.068) (0.030) (0.040) (0.057) (0.027) (0.034) (0.025) (0.047) 
sum(cfa) 2.066*** 0.292* -0.032 0.972*** 0.333** -0.162 1.119*** 0.123 0.046 0.861*** -0.018 0.641*** 0.257 
 (0.337) (0.166) (0.108) (0.117) (0.156) (0.284) (0.139) (0.140) (0.132) (0.118) (0.115) (0.107) (0.171) 
 [0.040] [0.006] [-0.099] [0.044] [0.007] [-0.086] [0.044] [0.013] [0.033] [0.040] [-0.002] [0.029] [0.021] 
 {8.442} {0.654} {-4.987} {9.406} {0.769} {-4.296} {4.983} {1.049} {0.113} {4.104} {-0.070} {3.005} {1.408} 
sum(dbta) -3.405 1.277 0.245 -0.033 0.932 -2.289 -0.705 -0.018 0.800 -0.525 0.157 0.030 0.104 
 (2.724) (1.282) (0.958) (1.043) (1.261) (1.704) (1.070) (1.301) (1.715) (0.969) (1.050) (0.867) (1.808) 
Wald test of exogeneity 18.06 8.12 4.30 77.26 10.96 12.73 42.72 42.90 8.76 47.24 57.20 61.54 10.84 
(p-value) (0.000) (0.044) (0.231) (0.000) (0.012) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.033) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) 
Observations              
   Left-censored 45,559 97,629 45,584 144,688 24,881 19,203 118,363 60,956 9,453 156,182 32,590 155,611 32,699 
   Uncensored 2,696 10,182 13,413 18,694 3,878 3,719 14,452 8,124 3,715 18,511 7,780 19,588 6,655 
 
Notes: The dependent variable npa (new products/total assets) is a censored variable which takes its real value if the firm has positive new products output (uncensored observations), 
and zero otherwise (left-censored observations). Outliers in all regression variables are trimmed at the 1% and 99% level. We estimate the augmented Euler equation using the IV Tobit 
estimator. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Time dummies, industry 
dummies and time-industry interaction terms are included in all specifications but not reported in this results table. We instrument sales and all financing variables using their own values 
lagged twice (t-2) in the IV Tobit regression. P-values of the Wald test of exogeneity are shown in parentheses. The numbers in square brackets are marginal effects on the probability of 
being uncensored, and in curly brackets are marginal effects on uncensored observations. See Appendix for complete definitions of all variables and classification criteria. 
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Table 3.8: Robustness test on the full sample: using an alternative measurement 
of innovation activities (i.e. R&D expenditures/total assets, labeled as rda) 
 Baseline Euler Equation Augmented Euler Equation 
 
Pooled 
Tobit 
Random 
effects Tobit 
IV-Tobit 
Pooled 
Tobit 
Random 
effects Tobit 
IV-Tobit 
rdat-1 2.196*** 1.968*** 2.178*** 2.189*** 1.960*** 2.150*** 
 (0.027) (0.019) (0.017) (0.027) (0.019) (0.018) 
rdat-12 -0.151*** -0.142*** -0.150*** -0.150*** -0.141*** -0.148*** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
sa    -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.009*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
sat-1 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
cfat    0.013*** 0.014*** 0.052*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) 
cfat-1 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.025*** 0.006*** 0.007*** -0.017*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) 
 [0.181] [0.124] [0.179]    
 {0.424} {0.294} {0.458}    
dbtat    0.008*** 0.008*** -0.051** 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.023) 
dbtat-1 0.005*** 0.004*** -0.014* 0.006*** 0.006*** -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
sum(cfa)    0.019*** 0.021*** 0.035*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
    [0.155] [0.169] [0.177] 
    {0.363} {0.402} {0.473} 
sum(dbta)    0.014*** 0.014*** -0.054** 
    (0.002) (0.003) (0.027) 
Pseudo R2 0.171   0.171   
Rho  0.293   0.294  
Wald test of 
exogeneity 
  156.11   130.34 
(p-value)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Observations       
   Left-censored 150,097 150,097 140,374 150,097 150,097 140,374 
   Uncensored 28,193 28,193 26,841 28,193 28,193 26,841 
 
Notes: The dependent variable rda (R&D expenditures/total assets) is a censored variable which takes its 
real value if the firm has positive R&D expenditures (uncensored observations), and zero otherwise (left-
censored observations). There are fewer observations because the data for R&D expenditures is only 
available from 2005 to 2007. Outliers in all regression variables are trimmed at the 1% and 99% level. 
We estimate the baseline and augmented Euler equations using the pooled Tobit, random effects Tobit and 
IV Tobit estimators. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Time dummies, industry dummies and time-
industry interaction terms are included in all specifications but not reported in this results table. Pseudo 
R2 is McFadden’s pseudo R-squared in pooled Tobit regression. Rho is the percent contribution to the 
total variance of the panel-level variance component in random effects Tobit regression. We instrument 
sales and all financing variables using their own values lagged twice (t-2) in the IV Tobit regression. P-
values of the Wald test of exogeneity are shown in parentheses. The numbers in square brackets are 
marginal effects on the probability of being uncensored, and in curly brackets are marginal effects on 
uncensored observations. See Appendix for complete definitions of all variables. 
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Table 3.9: Robustness test on the full sample: including the change of cash 
holdings (i.e. ∆cash holdings/total assets, labeled as ∆cha) 
 Baseline Euler Equation Augmented Euler Equation 
 
Pooled 
Tobit 
Random 
effects Tobit 
IV-Tobit 
Pooled 
Tobit 
Random 
effects Tobit 
IV-Tobit 
npat-1 2.604*** 2.163*** 2.583*** 2.599*** 2.513*** 2.569*** 
 (0.023) (0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.017) (0.017) 
npat-12 -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sa    0.023*** 0.031*** -0.217*** 
    (0.004) (0.003) (0.026) 
sat-1 -0.072*** -0.065*** -0.082*** -0.094*** -0.093*** 0.119*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.022) 
cfat    0.144*** 0.178*** 0.468** 
    (0.037) (0.036) (0.234) 
cfat-1 0.082** 0.146*** 0.232*** -0.013 0.043 -0.122 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.054) (0.039) (0.038) (0.155) 
 [0.017] [0.029] [0.051]    
 {1.411} {2.412} {4.071}    
dbtat    0.077 0.073* -0.161 
    (0.042) (0.041) (0.667) 
dbtat-1 -0.003 0.002 -0.089 0.007 0.014 -0.032 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.241) (0.039) (0.040) (0.117) 
∆chat    -0.033* -0.035** -0.150 
    (0.017) (0.017) (0.099) 
∆chat-1 -0.008 -0.014 -0.057 -0.022 -0.031* -0.034 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.050) (0.017) (0.017) (0.039) 
sum(cfa)    0.132*** 0.221*** 0.346*** 
    (0.035) (0.035) (0.089) 
    [0.028] [0.044] [0.058] 
    {2.256} {3.651} {4.735} 
sum(dbta)    0.084 0.087 -0.193 
    (0.063) (0.064) (0.776) 
sum(∆cha)    -0.056** -0.067** -0.184 
    (0.028) (0.028) (0.135) 
Pseudo R2 0.133   0.133   
Rho  0.384   0.387  
Wald test of 
exogeneity 
  76.33   95.45 
(p-value)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Observations       
   Left-censored 256,376 256,376 184,482 256,376 256,376 184,482 
   Uncensored 33,337 33,337 25,867 33,337 33,337 25,867 
Notes: The dependent variable npa (new products/total assets) is a censored variable which takes its real value if 
the firm has positive new products output (uncensored observations), and zero otherwise (left-censored 
observations). Outliers in all regression variables are trimmed at the 1% and 99% level. We estimate the baseline 
and augmented Euler equations using the pooled Tobit, random effects Tobit and IV Tobit estimators. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% level respectively. Time dummies, industry dummies and time-industry interaction terms are 
included in all specifications but not reported in this results table. Pseudo R2 is McFadden’s pseudo R-squared in 
pooled Tobit regression. Rho is the percent contribution to the total variance of the panel-level variance 
component in random effects Tobit regression. We instrument sales and all financing variables using their own 
values lagged twice (t-2) in the IV Tobit regression. P-values of the Wald test of exogeneity are shown in 
parentheses. The numbers in square brackets are marginal effects on the probability of being uncensored, and in 
curly brackets are marginal effects on uncensored observations. See Appendix for complete definitions of all 
variables. 
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Table 3.10: Robustness test based on the private firms’ sample: differentiating firms on the basis of size, region, political affiliation, 
percentage of state shares, and organization style 
 Size Region Political Affiliation State Shares Organization style 
 Small Medium Large East Central West No Medium High No Yes SP JV 
npat-1 3.503*** 2.720*** 1.719*** 2.517*** 2.272*** 2.629*** 2.688*** 2.358*** 1.665*** 2.641*** 1.849*** 2.567*** 2.205*** 
 (0.091) (0.034) (0.020) (0.025) (0.057) (0.068) (0.029) (0.037) (0.049) (0.024) (0.037) (0.024) (0.042) 
npat-12 -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.003*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sa -0.246** -0.088 0.027 -0.257*** -0.163** -0.025 -0.192*** -0.263*** -0.189 -0.201*** -0.348*** -0.225*** -0.164** 
 (0.110) (0.054) (0.048) (0.039) (0.071) (0.093) (0.041) (0.063) (0.136) (0.036) (0.075) (0.035) (0.084) 
sat-1 0.101 0.031 -0.034 0.105*** 0.092 0.010 0.073** 0.159*** 0.137 0.085*** 0.270*** 0.109*** 0.066 
 (0.089) (0.045) (0.042) (0.033) (0.061) (0.086) (0.035) (0.055) (0.122) (0.031) (0.068) (0.030) (0.075) 
sum(cfa) 2.222*** 0.433** -0.244 1.212*** 0.381* -0.529 1.204*** -0.028 -0.414 0.951*** -0.623*** 0.761*** 0.132 
 (0.376) (0.190) (0.152) (0.145) (0.208) (0.456) (0.153) (0.209) (0.410) (0.133) (0.227) (0.126) (0.300) 
 [0.058] [0.024] [0.012] [0.064] [0.027] [-0.007] [0.073] [0.057] [0.015] [0.072] [-0.022] [0.034] [0.022] 
 {11.682} {2.658} {0.604} {12.755} {2.995} {-0.340} {7.843} {4.606} {0.482} {6.764} {-0.979} {4.658} {0.979} 
sum(dbta) -3.530 1.635 0.487 -0.055 2.586* -1.317 -0.726 1.101 3.221 -0.228 0.964 0.288 3.180 
 (2.990) (1.307) (0.974) (1.101) (1.492) (1.954) (1.066) (1.546) (3.424) (0.987) (1.219) (0.892) (2.865) 
Wald test of exogeneity 14.90 8.43 3.08 68.24 12.07 10.15 40.03 27.64 4.19 45.87 37.20 54.35 8.92 
(p-value) (0.002) (0.038) (0.379) (0.000) (0.007) (0.017) (0.000) (0.000) (0.242) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.030) 
Observations              
   Left-censored 33,695 60,408 20,721 85,979 16,411 12,434 81,586 30,274 2,964 103,807 11,017 99,883 14,707 
   Uncensored 2,288 7,687 8,115 12,964 2,568 2,558 11,192 5,130 1,768 14,675 3,415 14,652 3,405 
 
Notes: The dependent variable npa (new products/total assets) is a censored variable which takes its real value if the firm has positive new products output (uncensored observations), and zero 
otherwise (left-censored observations). Outliers in all regression variables are trimmed at the 1% and 99% level. We estimate the augmented Euler equation using the IV Tobit estimators. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Time dummies, industry dummies and time-
industry interaction terms are included in all specifications but not reported in this results table. We instrument sales and all financing variables using their own values lagged twice (t-2) in the 
IV Tobit regression. P-values of the Wald test of exogeneity are shown in parentheses. The numbers in square brackets are marginal effects on the probability of being uncensored, and in curly 
brackets are marginal effects on uncensored observations. See Appendix for complete definitions of all variables and criteria of all classifications. 
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Appendix 
 
 
The National Medium- and Long-Term Program of Science and Technology 
Development (2006-2020)  
Table 3.A1 presents details of the main areas of responsibility and total number of 
supporting policies by department characterizing the plan. 
 
 
Definition of the variables used 
New products: new product sales. 
Sales: firms’ total sales (including domestic and overseas sales).  
Cash flow: net income plus depreciation. 
New long-term debt issue: difference between long-term debt in period t and t-1. 
∆Cash holdings: difference between cash & cash equivalents in period t and t-1, 
where cash & cash equivalents are proxied as the difference between current assets - 
stocks - accounts receivable.  
Total assets: sum of the firm’s fixed and current assets, where fixed assets include 
tangible fixed assets, intangible fixed assets, and other fixed assets; and current 
assets include inventories, accounts receivable, and other current assets. 
Total liabilities: sum of current liabilities and non-current liabilities, where current 
liabilities include bank loans, accounts payable, and other current liabilities; and 
non-current liabilities include long-term debt and other non-current liabilities. 
Age: firms’ age, from the year they established to the year t. 
Sales growth: log-difference between real sales in period t and t-1. 
Assets growth: log-difference between real total assets in period t and t-1. 
Employee growth: log-difference between number of employees in period t and t-1. 
Labor productivity: ratio of total real sales to number of employees. 
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Wage per employee: ratio of total real wage bill to number of employees. 
Leverage: ratio of total liabilities to total assets. 
Liquidity: difference of current assets and current liabilities to total assets ratio. 
Coverage: ratio of operating profits to interest payments. 
Deflators: all variables (except tangible fixed assets) are deflated using provincial 
ex-factory producer price indices taken from various issues of the China Statistical 
Yearbook. Tangible fixed assets are deflated using a deflator for fixed capital 
formation. 
Region: coastal=1; central=2; west=3. 
Political affiliation: Lishu=10, affiliated at central level; Lishu=20, affiliated at 
provincial level; Lishu=40: city or district level; Lishu=50, county level; Lishu=61, 
street level; Lishu=62, town level; Lishu=63, township level; Lishu=71, community 
level; Lishu=72, village level; Lishu=90, no political affiliation. 
 
 
Classification criteria: 
Ownership (based on 
the majority average 
ownership shares) 
SOEs At least 50% shares are state owned 
Foreign At least 50% shares are foreign owned 
Private At least 50% shares are privately owned 
Collective At least 50% shares are collectively owned 
Ownership (based on 
100% paid-in capital 
rule) 
SOEs 100% shares are state owned 
Foreign 100% shares are foreign owned 
Private 100% shares are privately owned 
Collective 100% shares are collectively owned 
Size 
Small 
If a firm’s total real assets are in the lowest 
quartile of the distribution of total real assets of 
all firms belonging to the same industry and 
same year 
Medium 
If a firm’s total real assets are in the second or 
third quartiles of the distribution of total real 
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assets of all firms belonging to the same 
industry and same year 
Large 
If a firm’s total real assets are in the highest 
quartile of the distribution of total real assets of 
all firms belonging to the same industry and 
same year 
Region 
East 
/Coastal 
If a firm is located in the coastal region, which  
includes the following provinces/autonomous 
regions/municipal cities: Beijing, Tianjin, 
Hebei, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, 
Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Hainan, 
Guangxi 
Central 
If a firm is located in the central region, which 
includes the following provinces/autonomous 
regions/municipal cities: Shanxi, Inner 
Mongolia, Anhui, Jiangxi, Heilongjiang, Jilin, 
Henan, Hubei, Hunan 
West 
If a firm is located in the western region, which 
includes the following provinces/autonomous 
regions/municipal cities: Qinghai, Sichuan, 
Gansu, Yunnan, Xinjiang, Shaanxi, Guizhou, 
Chongqing, Ningxia, Tibet 
Political Affiliation 
No If a firm has no political affiliation (Lishu=90) 
Medium 
If a firm is affiliated at city or district level, or 
county level, or street level, or town level, or 
township level, or community level, or village 
level (Lishu>20 & Lishu<90) 
High 
If a firm is affiliated at central level or 
provincial level (Lishu<=20) 
State Shares 
No If a firm does not have any state shares 
Yes If a firm has some state shares 
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Organization style 
SP 
Sole proprietorships (if there is only one 
owner) 
JV 
Joint-ventures (collaboration or association of 
any  two or more firms owned by different 
agents,  undertaken for mutual profit) 
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Table 3.A1: The National Medium- and Long-Term Program of Science and 
Technology Development (2006-2020): Areas of Responsibility and Total 
Number of Supporting Policies by Department 
 
Leading Department 
Total number of 
supporting policies 
Areas of responsibility 
National Development and 
Reform Commission 
29 
 Venture capital, corporate bonds, 
innovation funds 
 Strengthening indigenous innovation 
 Strengthening innovation in small and 
medium-sized enterprises 
 Encouraging credit guarantee 
institutions for small and medium-sized 
enterprises  
 Reducing tax exemption on foreign 
invested projects 
 Industrial technology policy 
 Strengthening public venture capital 
funds 
 Independent innovation capabilities 
Ministry of Finance 21 
 Financial policies to support or 
encourage innovation in enterprises 
 Public procurement 
 Providing ECI (export credit insurance) 
for high- tech export firms 
Ministry of Science and 
Technology 
17 
 Incubators and science parks 
 Measures for supporting research and 
application of significant technologies 
 Popularizing science 
Ministry of Education 9 
 Universities 
 Attracting overseas talent 
Ministry of Finance, State 
Administration of Taxation 
4 
 Tax incentives to encourage innovation 
in enterprises 
Ministry of Personnel 4 
 Increasing education of personnel in 
scientific fields 
 Encouraging the return of overseas 
Chinese 
Ministry of Commerce 2 
 Encouraging technology and innovation 
import 
China Banking Regulatory 
Commission 
2 
 Strengthening financial service for high 
tech firms 
China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission 
2 
 Regulations on investing insurance 
funds in venture capital enterprises 
State-owned Assets 
Supervision and 
Administration Commission 
2 
 Innovation and S&T management in 
state-owned enterprises 
Ministry of Information 
Industry 
1  
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China Development Bank 1 
 Soft loans to enterprises in national high 
tech- fields 
Export-Import Bank of China 1 
 Instruments (special accounts) for 
supporting the development of high-tech 
enterprises 
General Administration of 
Customs 
1  
Ministry of Central Military 
Equipment 
1  
 
Source: State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “Consolidated List of the Rules for Implementation of 
the Supporting Policies for the ‘The National Medium- and Long-Term Program of Science and Technology 
Development (2006-2020)’ Formulated by Relevant Department”, 2006  
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2006/content_310755.htm 
  
 
 
86 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
Herding Behavior in Innovation Activities: Evidence 
from China 
 
 
 
In this chapter, using data on 19,722 Chinese innovative firms over the period 
2000−2007, we first investigate the extent to which these firms display herding 
behavior in their innovation activities, and then assess the impact of this behavior on 
corporate productivity. Based on a variety of different specifications, we find strong 
evidence in favor of herding in Chinese firms’ innovation activities. In particular, 
private, small firms, with no political affiliation are more likely to herd. We also find 
that innovation herding has a negative effect on productivity.  
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4.1. Introduction 
There are innumerable social and economic situations in which our behavior is 
influenced by the decisions of others. The term herding is defined to include any 
behavioral pattern whose similarity with that of other individuals is attributable to 
interaction with these individuals (Hirshleifer and Hong Teoh, 2003). Herding 
originally refers to collective animal behavior, but has been extended in social 
psychology to describe how individuals in a group can act together without a 
planned direction. In the fields of Economics and Finance, existing research has 
analyzed herding behavior among investors (Bowe and Domuta, 2004; Tan et al. 
2008), mutual fund managers (Lakonishok et al., 1992; Wermers, 1999), and 
financial analysts (Trueman, 1994; Welch, 2000; Hong et al., 2000; Clement and Tse, 
2005).  
As the main participants in markets, firms are actively involved in several 
activities, and their behavior is certainly influenced by that of other firms. One of 
these activities is innovation. Although innovation naturally lends itself to herding, 
surprisingly, the literature on herding behavior has neglected this particular corporate 
activity. Our research fills this gap.  
In a perfect market, innovation should be a firm-level idiosyncratic activity. 
Firms should make innovation decisions individually by considering their financial 
capacity (e.g. the amount of free cash flow available to them), assessing their 
willingness to undertake risky activities, and taking into account the value of and 
social demand for new products. However, due to high adjustment costs and the high 
uncertainty of innovation activities (Hall, 1992; Hall and Lerner, 2010), innovative 
firms generally suffer more from asymmetric information than their counterparts 
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who do not engage in innovation activities. It is therefore often difficult for the 
managers of innovative firms to assess the value of potential new projects. In other 
words, private information on specific innovation projects is limited. Yet, it is 
reasonable to believe that managers are aware of the average innovation investment 
made by other firms in the same industry, which can be viewed as public information. 
Given that private information is limited, one strategy for managers is to mimic the 
behavior of their peers, based on public information. Lieberman and Asaba (2006) 
propose that imitation is a natural response to environmental uncertainty. Therefore, 
firms’ innovation activities tend to some degree to “move with the market” or 
“follow the general market trend”.  
As a central element in endogenous growth models, innovation has been 
widely considered as a key driver of economic growth (Romer, 1990; Aghion and 
Howitt, 1992) and productivity growth (see Griliches, 1998, for a survey). The 
effects of herding are more controversial. In the financial realm, it has been found 
that herding reduces price efficiency (Froot et al., 1992; Shiller, 2003), raises risk 
and instability (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007; Beck et al., 2013), and increases the 
danger of financial crisis contagion (Chari and Kehoe, 2004; Borensztein and Gelos, 
2003). Moreover, earlier research provides evidence that herding behavior generally 
hurts shareholders’ interests (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Zwiebel, 1995) and has a 
negative effect on firm performance and productivity growth (Knyazeva et al., 2008). 
By contrast, Bo et al. (2013) find that investment herding is positively related to the 
performance of Chinese firms. Similarly, Wagner (2008) argues that herding among 
banks is beneficial as it decrease optimal capital charges.  
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Due to the beneficial effects of innovation and the mixed effects of herding, 
our objective is to investigate the extent to which herding applies to the innovation 
activities of Chinese firms, and to assess its impact on corporate productivity.  
China is an ideal laboratory to study herding behavior in innovation activities. 
Chinese firms have in fact exhibited very high growth rates in the last three decades 
due to China’s successful economic transition (Allen at al., 2005; Guariglia et al., 
2011). Scholars attribute this phenomenal development to productivity growth, 
rather than capital or labor accumulation (Zheng et al., 2009; Brandt et al., 2012). 
Promotion of firm-level productivity may be exemplified through technological 
innovation. China has also become a major participant in the global markets. In this 
environment, China’s innovation system has undergone considerable changes, and 
its innovation performance has improved remarkably.19  However, Chinese firms’ 
innovation activities started late and still face considerable challenges. The most 
significant challenge is that most Chinese firms, especially privately-owned firms, 
lack indigenous and original innovation capability, so they often imitate or even 
copy their counterparts’ technology.20 Furthermore, the Chinese market is generally 
considered as a new market with a high degree of asymmetric information, due 
among other things to its unsound property rights protections and poorly regulated 
patent legal system, as well as its weak shareholders’ protection and weak corporate 
                                                          
19 According to the OECD (2010), gross expenditure on R&D in China increased consistently from 
0.73% of GDP in 1991 to 1.5% in 2008. This is even more impressive considering that China’s GDP 
has simultaneously grown on average by close to 9% per year. The business sector’s share of total 
R&D expenditure has also dramatically increased, from 30% in 1994 to 70% in 2008. Considering 
that since 2004, China is the second largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the world, 
it has become an attractive country for future R&D investment, and, in recent years, foreign 
companies have established hundreds of new R&D centers in the country. In 2006, China overtook 
the U.S. and the E.U. to become the largest exporter of high-tech products worldwide (World Bank, 
2008). Chinese government report also shows that high-tech products relative to the total volume of 
export have risen from 20.8% in 2002 to 28.9% in 2012 (Ministry of Commerce, 2012).  
20 Source: “Chinese private firms lack innovation spirit: report”, People’s Daily Online, website: 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90778/8067864.html. 
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governance system. Herding is therefore more likely to take place in such an 
uncertain environment. 
We contribute to the literature along the following three dimensions. First, 
existing work has mainly analyzed herding behavior in stock markets, but very few 
papers have empirically tested herding on corporate activities, especially in China. 
Building on the work  by  Knyazeva et al. (2008), and Bo et al. (2013) and Chen et al. 
(2013), who focus their analyses of herding on firms’ corporate investment 
respectively in the US and China, we investigate the extent to which herding affects 
innovation activities and analyze its impact on firm productivity in the Chinese 
context. Second, like Chen et al. (2013), we conduct our empirical analysis based on 
a very large database, compiled by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) 
over the period 2000−2007. Yet, unlike them, we only focus on innovative firms. 
Our database is made up of 19,722 mainly unlisted innovative firms operating in 31 
provinces or province-equivalent municipal cities. By contrast, Bo et al. (2013) 
analyze herding only based on Chinese listed firms (1,155 firms during 1999−2004). 
Yet, listed firms are very few in China, and are not representative of the whole 
Chinese market. Third, advancing previous literature, we take into account various 
aspects of firm heterogeneity in our analysis.  
Based on a variety of specifications, we find that herding affects Chinese firms’ 
innovation activities, and is more likely to prevail in private firms, small firms, and 
firms with no political affiliation. Furthermore, we find that innovation herding has a 
negative effect on firm productivity.  
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the 
literature on the causes of herding. Section 4.3 puts forward our hypotheses. Section 
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4.4 introduces our database. Section 4.5 illustrates our models and estimation 
methodology. Section 4.6 presents summary statistics. Section 4.7 describes our 
main empirical results, and robustness tests are presented in Section 4.8. Section 4.9 
sets forth our conclusions. 
 
4.2. Literature review  
Although herding in stock markets has received considerable attention in the US 
market (Lakonishok et al., 1992; Grinblatt et al., 1995; Wermers, 1999; Nofsinger 
and Sias, 1999) and in other countries (Wylie, 2005; Walter and Weber, 2006; 
Uchida and Nakagawa, 2007; Tan et al., 2008), little is known about herding 
behaviour in corporate activities. Some studies provide theoretical explanations why 
managers mimic the behavior of others due to payoff externalities, information 
externalities, and principal-agent concerns. The other branch of literature provides 
empirical findings.  
 
4.2.1. Theoretical reasons 
Payoff externalities involve convergence or divergence of behavior arising from the 
fact that the payoff to an individual’s action is affected by others who take the same 
action. Bulow et al. (1985) demonstrate that, if agents’ strategies are “strategic 
complements”, each agent’s incentive to act in a certain way increases as others 
agents act this way as well. In such a case, positive payoff externalities are generated 
and agents have an incentive to act alike. The most relevant example in the literature 
concerns herding behavior in IT adoption, which can be affected by network 
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externalities. Recent studies have indicated that many technology markets are subject 
to a positive network feedback, which makes the leading technology grow more 
dominant (Brynjolfsson and Kemerer, 1996; Gallaugher and Wang, 2002; Kauffman 
et al., 2000). Drehmann et al. (2007) explain that the more users adopt a given 
technology, the easier the interactions between them, and the lower the 
incompatibility cost. Kauffman and Li (2003) demonstrate that, in the presence of 
network externalities, herding increases the payoffs and decreases risk. Positive 
payoff externalities can therefore contribute to explain herding behavior in the 
market. 
Herding due to informational cascades occurs if an agent imitates previous 
agents’ decisions, to the point where they completely ignore their private information 
or do not give it appropriate weight (Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Welch, 1992). Since 
actions are more publicly visible than private information, a successor will try to 
infer his predecessors’ information from their actions. Kauffman and Li (2003) 
document that, due to information asymmetries and information incompleteness in 
the technology market, 21  decision-makers try to learn valuable information by 
observing others’ IT adoption actions. This is called observational learning. 
Informational cascades occur when sufficient observational learning has been 
accumulated to overwhelm a decision-maker’s imprecise private information. For 
example, a firm decision-maker with the most negative private information (e.g. no 
profit or even loss from investing in a particular innovation project) may be swayed 
to invest anyway if he/she observes that three peers in the same industry previously 
invested. In this case, the information coming from the actions undertaken by the 
                                                          
21 Information asymmetries refer to the situation in which some decision-makers access less relevant 
information than others. Information incompleteness refers to the situation in which some decision-
makers do not have complete information. 
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peers would outweigh the private negative information. Devenow and Welch (1996) 
illustrate a list of empirical phenomena, including the investment decision in R&D, 
which may be explained by information cascades.  
Recent developments in the principal-agent theory provide a new perspective 
on researching managerial incentives that could foster investment herding. 
Traditional capital budgeting theory suggests that, in order to maximize firms’ 
profits, managers should make investment decisions based on expected returns. 
However, when making decisions, managers may have incentives to deviate from the 
profit-maximizing goals in order to pursue their own interests, i.e. enhance their 
reputation in the labour market. In The General Theory, Keynes (1936) suggests that 
“it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally”. 
This statement motivates Scharfstein and Stein (1990) who document that smart 
managers receive signals with high precision, therefore their informative (true) 
private information is correlated with that of other smart managers, and hence they 
will tend to make similar investment decisions. However, dumb managers tend to 
receive uninformative signals (noise), as consequences, they will mimic smart 
managers’ behavior, in order to conceal the poor quality of these signals and 
maintain their reputation, even at the time when smart managers make wrong 
decisions. In addition, Scharfstein and Stein (1990) discuss the potential application 
of herding behavior to the adoption of new technologies. They found reputational 
externality is created when a leading firm in the industry adopts new technology. For 
the reputational concern, other managers in the same industry will tend to be biased 
toward the new technology in order to keep up competition. 22  Zwiebel (1995) 
                                                          
22 Graham (1999) tests theoretical herding model developed by Scharfstein and Stein (1990). Using 
U.S sample of investment newsletter asset allocation recommendations, and identifies the attributes of 
newsletters that herd on the advice of “market leader”.  
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models corporate conservatism in which reputational concerns may lead managers to 
refrain from deviating from the herd. If enough managers have adopted a certain 
technology, subsequent managers prefer to adopt this technology instead of a 
possibly superior but proprietary technology. This is because, an ex-post bad 
outcome under an ex-ante new action could be attributed to bad governance and 
result in a consequent loss of power, whereas an ex-post bad outcome under the ex-
ante old action may be rationalized as “beyond government control”, as evidenced 
by similar bad outcomes in peers. Given the high uncertainty characterizing 
innovation activities, managers would rather herd than take risks.  
In addition, relative performance evaluation (Palomino, 2005; Albuquerque; 
2009; Albuquerque et al., 2013; Gong et al., 2011) also contributes to explain 
herding behavior in corporate investment. It is argued that managers’ performance is 
evaluated not individually but relative to their peer groups. In this case, managers 
may mimic the actions of other managers, completely ignoring private informative, 
to maintain their reputation and avoid being considered as low-ability managers.  
 
4.2.2. Empirical findings 
Only a few papers empirically test herding in corporate investment. Based on a panel 
of UK public non-financial firms over the period 1994−2003, Bo (2006) finds a 
negative relationship between managers’ reputation and investment deviation. They 
argue that those managers who are particularly concerned with reputation are more 
likely to herd when making investment decisions. The author measures the 
manager’s reputation by the pay received in the managerial labor market. Further 
findings show that large public firms are more closely monitored by the public, are 
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experiencing more reputational concerns, and therefore their managers have stronger 
incentives to follow the herd than small firms. 
Using both US and non-US data, Knyazeva et al. (2008) find that investment is 
more likely to comove when firms rely on public information rather than on firm-
specific private information about investment opportunities. Moreover, weakly 
governed managers generally comove more in their investment decisions, as they 
tend to shirk in the process of acquiring information. This effect is found to be 
stronger for firms with a high share of specialized assets and in high information 
intensive industries (such as, for example, IT-intensive industries). The authors also 
find that investment comovement is decreasing in property rights and shareholder 
rights protection, and increasing in the degree of information asymmetry. This can be 
explained considering that weak property rights erode the expected return on firm 
value creation and thus reduce private information acquisition, and hence increase 
investment comovement. Shareholder rights protection increases ex ante and ex post 
of outside shareholders to limit insiders’ self-dealing transactions. Similarly, firms 
faced with high information asymmetries may opt for investment based on verifiable 
public information, which would result in an increase in investment comovement. 
Finally, Knyazeva et al. (2008) show that investment comovement negatively affects 
profitability at the firm and industry level, as well as productivity growth at the 
country level. 
Based on 1,155 Chinese listed non-financial firms over the period 1999−2004, 
Bo et al. (2013) examine whether board attributes can help to explain investment 
herding. Specifically, corporate boards are more like to herd in their investment 
decisions if they are relatively large and have more young/female/independent 
directors, and if their CEO is not the chairman of the board. Surprisingly, the results 
 
 
96 
 
show a positive relationship between investment herding and firm performance. The 
authors explain this considering that when firms operate in an environment with high 
uncertainty or high asymmetric information such as the Chinese environment, 
private information may contains large amount of noise, which cannot ensure 
managers achieving positive investment outcomes. Under such circumstances, it is 
safer for managers to herd in the crowd.  
Chen et al. (2013) use a large Chinese sample and find a significantly positive 
relationship between government intervention and investment comovement. This 
impact is higher and more significant for state-owned firms than foreign and private 
firms. This happens because the Chinese government has a greater influence on 
state-owned firm, and their corporate investment decisions. Further, the authors 
show that investment comovement has a negative impact on corporate performance.  
 
4.3. Hypotheses 
4.3.1. General hypothesis on herding in the Chinese context 
The Chinese market is a newly established market. It is therefore characterized by a 
high degree of information asymmetry. In addition, given high adjustment costs and 
uncertainty characterizing them, innovative activities are believed to suffer more 
from asymmetric information than other corporate activities. As many Chinese firms 
cannot access private information, they have to make their investment decisions, and 
especially innovation decisions, based on observable public information or simply 
imitate the actions of other firms. Moreover, compared with other countries, China’s 
property rights protections started late (in 1979), and their patent legal system is 
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unsound, with relatively poor regulation. 23  Therefore, some firms exploit legal 
loopholes to imitate and even copy other firms’ innovation projects. Additionally, 
shareholders’ protection and corporate governance are still weak in China, which 
aggravates the conflict of interest between principal and agent.  
Furthermore, because many Chinese firms lack indigenous and original 
innovation capabilities, they tend to often imitate or even copy their counterparts’ 
technology. Maskin et al. (2000) demonstrate that a relative performance evaluation 
system is widely used in China. Under this system, managers’ performance not only 
depends on their own ability, but is also evaluated relative to the performance of 
their peers. Specifically, a manager’s performance is assessed as good, as long as the 
manager performs no worse than the industry average. This relative performance 
evaluation provides managers with a strong motivation to follow their peers. In the 
light of these considerations, we hypothesize that: 
H1: Herding behavior exists in Chinese firms’ innovation activities. 
 
4.3.2. Firm heterogeneity and herding 
4.3.2.1. Ownership 
The Chinese corporate world consists of state-owned, foreign, private, and collective 
enterprises. Because of their strong ties with the central government, SOEs (state-
owned enterprises) typically have the advantage of knowing the latest innovation 
policies. Compared to other firms, they therefore suffer less from asymmetric 
                                                          
23 Patent protection in modern mainland China began with the promulgation of the Patent Law of the 
People's Republic of China in 1984, which aims to encourage invention creation and to promote the 
development of science and technology. To comply with its international obligations, as well as to 
facilitate its development into an innovative country, China has since amended its Patent Law three 
times: first in 1992, then again in 2000, and most recently in 2009. 
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information and are able to search for good innovative projects based on their private 
information. In addition, high-tech SOEs generally do not hesitate to spend heavily 
on hiring highly skilled managers, who may help make the right decisions with 
regard to innovation activities. Furthermore, SOEs are not subject to financing 
constraints (Guariglia et al., 2011), which enables them to carry on large, costly, but 
potentially profitable innovation projects. Moreover, because SOEs’ innovation 
activities are directly related to China’s social progress and future development, they 
are generally conducted not just by SOEs but more likely to be operated under the 
government guidance, which makes their innovation investment more efficient. It is 
different with corporate investment in Chen et al. (2013) that the decisions are 
generally made by SOEs’ managers who may herd due to the consideration of their 
reputation in the market. Therefore, compared to other firms, Chinese SOEs are less 
likely to herd when making innovation decisions. The same is likely to apply to 
collective firms, given their strong links with local governments.  
Coming to foreign firms, we expect them to display a lower innovation herding 
behavior, first, due to their strong shareholder rights and property rights protection; 
and second, because of their advanced technology and rich experience in carrying 
out innovation investment. In addition, they have access to more capital and 
international product markets, as well as better channels through which to diversify 
economic risks and balance their financial performance on a global scale (Desai et al., 
2004).  
Private firms, on the other hand, are typically characterized by a higher degree 
of informational asymmetries and severe principal-agent conflicts. They can only 
access limited private information and therefore have a strong incentive to make 
innovation decisions in the crowd. They also suffer from serious problems in terms 
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of corporate governance, property rights protections, patent legal system, and 
shareholders’ protection (Allen et al., 2005; Lin et al., 2010), which makes them 
more likely to herd when undertaking innovation activities. We therefore 
hypothesize that: 
H2a: Firms owned by private agents are more likely to herd in innovation activities, 
compared to firms owned by other agents. 
 
4.3.2.2. Size 
In stock markets, Wermers (1999) posits that informational cascades are more likely 
in small-capitalization securities because institutional investors would put a 
relatively smaller weight on their own private information but more on what the herd 
is doing. Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) find that small banks have stronger 
incentives to herd because of the “too-many-to-fail” problem.24  
Focusing on corporate investment, Knyazeva et al. (2008) find that small firms 
exhibit a higher degree of investment comovement, because they are likely to face 
more severe information asymmetries. Using Chinese data, Sami et al. (2014) find 
that small firms tend to rely more on the publicly available information such as peer 
group information to negotiate audit fees, but large firm prefer to make decision rely 
on their private information. Moreover, Ho et al. (2006) point out that large firms are 
generally more informative and they will make more effort to search for potential 
R&D project with high growth opportunities, and they can exploit the results of 
                                                          
24 In their paper, according to the “too-many-to-fail” argument, it is ex-post optimal for the regulator 
to bail out some or all failed banks when the number of bank failures is large, whereas when the 
number of bank failures is small, failed banks can be acquired by the surviving banks. This gives 
banks, and especially small banks, an incentive to herd.  
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innovation better than small firms. Due to the above concerns, small firms may 
mimic large firms’ behavior in order to reap high growth from innovation investment. 
Based on the arguments above, we hypothesize that: 
H2b: Small firms are more likely to herd in innovation activities than their larger 
counterparts. 
 
4.3.2.3. Political connections 
Li et al. (2008) show that political connections (guanxi) give Chinese firms certain 
advantages, including “better access to key resources that are controlled by the Party 
and the government, such as business operation licenses, bank loans, land, and 
eligibility for favorable but discretionary government policies such as tax benefits 
and the waiver of ‘extralegal’ fees” (p. 288). Xu et al. (2013) demonstrate that, in a 
relationship-based economy such as China, building connections with the 
government or even engaging in politics can facilitate firms’ private communication 
with the state, and hence mitigate information asymmetries, as well as social 
discrimination. As they are more likely to suffer from information asymmetries, 
politically unaffiliated firms are more likely to herd in innovation activities. Based 
on the arguments above, we set forth the following hypothesis: 
H2c: Firms with no political affiliation are more likely to herd in innovation 
activities, than their politically affiliated counterparts. 
 
4.3.3. Herding and corporate productivity 
 
 
101 
 
The impact of herding has been largely examined in the stock market that it 
generally destabilizes stock price, increases the volatility on stock return, and even 
cause temporary price bubbles (Shiller et al., 1984; Barber et al., 2009; Venezia et al., 
2011). Au and Kauffman (2003) point out that, once a technology is adopted and its 
true value is revealed, this technology is proven to be more favorable than other 
technologies whose value may be uncertain. People are therefore likely to select the 
“proven” technology, even if the “unproven” one has a much higher expected value. 
This often generates inefficiencies in the economy. According to Bikhchandani et al. 
(1998), the information cascades theory implies pervasive but fragile herding 
behavior, because cascades are triggered by a small amount of individuals containing 
limited information. In addition, private information may allow firms to explore 
specific projects that cannot be identified via public information alone. Private 
information also provides a more accurate assessment of firms’ investment 
opportunities, thus increasing the likelihood of making correct decisions. However, 
in an information cascade, a firm following the crowd may completely ignore private 
information or not give it the appropriate weight. In addition, valuable information 
about new technologies is often lost when a firm blindly follows others’ decisions, 
which negatively affects corporate productivity. Finally, focusing on principal-agent 
concerns, the managers herd because they pursue their own interest instead of 
maximizing corporate profits, which once again damage productivity. Based on the 
arguments above, we hypothesize that:  
H3: Innovation herding has a negative effect on corporate productivity. 
 
4.4. Data and summary statistics 
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4.4.1. Sample construction 
The data we used in this chapter is similar as we used in Chapter 3. But, to analyze 
firms’ innovation herding behavior, we only focus on firms involved in innovation 
activities, that is, those firms that display positive new product sales.25  We also 
follow the similar process and criteria to clean the data as in Chapter 3. For example, 
we drop observations that make little sense, such as those with a negative value of 
sales and negative new product sales. Observations with negative values of total 
assets minus total fixed assets, negative values of total assets minus liquid assets, and 
negative values of accumulated depreciation minus current depreciation, are also 
removed from our sample. We also exclude firms with incomplete records on our 
main regression variables. Finally, in order to control for extreme values, we drop 
outliers, defined as the 1% and 99% tails of the distribution of our main regression 
variables. After the above adjustments, our final panel data set includes 45,319 
observations, covering 19,722 mainly unlisted firms over the period 2000−2007.26 
 
4.4.2. Innovation herding measures 
In constructing our proxy for innovation herding, we follow the method used in Bo 
(2006) and Bo et al. (2013). These authors point out that it is reasonable to assume 
that firm i takes the innovation decisions of its peers as reference point. By “peers” 
we mean other firms operating in the same industry as firm i. However, in practice, it 
is not easy for managers to obtain their peers’ private information on investment in 
                                                          
25 Firms who do not sell new products may choose to do so through herding behavior. Yet, their 
choice could also be caused by other factors such as the lack of funds, the lack of skilled workers (e.g. 
scientists, engineers or other specialists); or the lack of technology. As we do not have information on 
these motivations in our data, we only focus on firms with positive sales of new products. Hereafter, 
we refer to these firms as innovative firms. 
26 Details about the structure of our panel are provided in Table 4.A1 in the Appendix. 
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innovation activities. Managers will therefore need to make a forecast based on 
available public information, which we assume to be given by the average 
innovation investment of other firms in the same industry in a given year.27 Our 
proxy for innovation herding in this research is therefore given by: |(
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
−
(
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
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̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
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|, which is the absolute value of the difference between the new product 
sales to total assets ratio of firm i in year t, (
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𝑖,𝑡
; and the average corresponding 
ratio of other firms operating in the same industry, excluding firm i, in that same 
year, (
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𝐾
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̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
−𝑖,𝑡
. A smaller deviation suggests that firm i’s innovation decisions are 
very similar to those of other firms in the same industry in the same year, which 
means more herding. Herding proxies of this type were originally developed in the 
literature on herding among financial analysts (Lamont, 2002; Graham, 1999; Ashiya 
and Doi, 2001). 
 
4.4.3. Summary statistics 
Table 4.1 presents the distribution of the values of innovation herding, measured as 
|(
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𝑖,𝑡
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𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
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|, by year and industry. We observe that in the full sample, the 
average value of herding is 37.51. If we look specifically by year, we find that this 
value is relatively smaller in the first four years of our sample (i.e. 2000−2003) 
compared to later years (2005−2007), which means that more herding took place in 
                                                          
27 Bo et al. (2013) use the previous year’s industry average as a reference for fixed investment 
decisions. Yet, because we consider innovation decisions, and because to keep up with the market in a 
highly competitive environment, firms need to upgrade fast, we include the contemporaneous industry 
average in our regressions. The results were robust to using the lagged industry average. These results 
are available on request. 
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the early part of our sample. This trend is probably due to China’s unsound property 
rights protections and poorly regulated patent legal system in the early years. 
Chinese firms’ weak shareholders’ protection and weak corporate governance may 
also have played a role. With the “National Medium- and Long-Term Program of 
Science and Technology Development (2006−2020)” published in 2006, China 
committed to strengthening indigenous innovation and independent innovation 
capacity. Moreover, the Company Law revised in 2005, provides a new foundation 
for drawing up a corporate governance framework in China and improved companies’ 
governance structure by protecting lawful shareholders’ rights and public interests. 
These developments can explain why the average values of |(
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
− (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
−𝑖,𝑡
| rose 
in the 2005−2007 period, which means less evidence of herding.  
[Insert Table 4.1 here] 
Looking at the distribution across industries, we observe that the high-tech 
industries (e.g. chemicals & plastic, machinery & equipment, electrical equipment) 
contain more innovative firms (19.88%, 19.04%, and 21.26% of the whole sample, 
respectively), and are more likely to herd, as witnessed by smaller average values of 
|(
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
− (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
−𝑖,𝑡
|. This can be explained by the high uncertainty and high levels of 
asymmetric information characterizing high-tech industries.  
Table 4.2 presents descriptive statistics for several key variables used in our 
empirical analysis. As discussed in Table 4.1, the average herding value is 37.51 
(median 32.97). The average TFP value is 6.07 (median 4.36). Compared with Ding 
et al. (2012), who use the same data but calculate TFP based on the whole 
(innovative and non-innovative) sample of firms, our results suggest that TFP in 
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innovative firms is relatively larger (the average TFP value is 3.34 in their paper). 
Focusing on the other two productivity measures, the mean of PROD is 2.77 (median 
1.92), and the mean of VAPW is 0.42 (median 0.30). 28  Coming to the control 
variables, we observe that innovative firms are relatively larger (average size, 
described by the logarithm of total real assets, is 6.38) than average (Ding et al., 
2012, report an average size of 5.48). This finding can be explained considering that 
only large firms with more assets can afford the high adjustment costs associated 
with innovation activities. Another explanation is that large firms are likely to be 
more financially healthy, which means they have sufficient financial resources to 
undertake innovative activities. The average cash flow to assets ratio is 7.71 (median 
5.70). In addition, compared to the average firms examined in Ding et al. (2012), 
innovative firms have more leverage (58.22 compared to 57.81) as they need more 
financial resources. They also have less collateral (31.26 compared to 34.12, due to 
their higher intangible assets), a higher sales growth (14.14 compared to 11.61, 
because of their higher investment opportunities), and are more likely to export (the 
export dummy takes the average value of 0.56 for innovative firms, compared to 
0.34 for the full sample). 
[Insert Table 4.2 here] 
 
4.5. Model and methodology  
4.5.1. Baseline models: testing the presence of herding 
To test the extent to which Chinese firms exhibit herding when undertaking 
                                                          
28 TFP is the abbreviation of total factor productivity; VAPW is the abbreviation of value add per 
worker; PROD is the abbreviation of productivity. See their calculations in Appendix. 
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innovation activities, we begin by estimating the following two equations: 
∆ (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆ (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
−𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   (4.1) 
(
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
−𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡   (4.2) 
where i indexes firms, and t, time. Equation (4.1) is based on the equation used by 
Knyazeva et al. (2008) and Chen et al. (2013). It estimates the propensity to herd as 
the sensitivity of firm-level innovation changes to industry-level changes in 
innovation. Specifically, if the coefficient β1 is positive and significant, this means 
that firm-level change in new products follow industry-level change in new products. 
This would suggest that herding behavior may exist, which would prove our 
Hypothesis 1. 
We also estimate Equations (4.2) as a robustness test, with the aim of 
examining whether firm innovation level is close to the industry average level. 
Specifically, if the coefficient β1 is positive and significant, this means that firms’ 
new products to sales ratios are close to the industry average ratio, which would, 
once again, indicate the existence of innovation herding and support our first 
hypothesis. 
In order to test Hypothesis 2a, 2b, and 2c, we then differentiate firms based 
on ownership (state-owned, foreign, and private), political affiliation (high, medium, 
and low), and size (large, medium, and small), and interact ∆ (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
 or (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
 with 
ownership, size, and political affiliation dummies in Equation (4.1) and (4.2) to test 
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the extent to which the sensitivities differ in each category. 
Both our equations also include a range of control variables, which are 
similar to those used in the literature on herding. In particular, Sizei,t is the natural 
logarithm of the firm’s total assets. Knyazeva et al. (2008) find that firm size 
negatively affects the change of investment, because larger firms generally have 
more financing capacity and invest more consistently, exhibiting therefore less 
change in their investment. For the similar reason, we expect to observe a negative 
coefficient on Size in Equation (4.1). Yet the predicted sign for Size in Equation (4.2) 
is not clear. On the one hand, small firms are more likely to be innovative since they 
have a more responsive climate for making quicker decisions to go ahead with new 
and ambitious projects, a less bureaucratic inertia and more flexible structure, a 
higher ability to adapt and improve, and fewer difficulties in accepting and 
implementing change (Chandy and Tellis, 2000). On the other hand, large firms are 
more likely to be innovative because they have more financial and technical 
capabilities, the economies of scope to spread the risk of failure and absorb the costs 
of innovation, the ability to establish and maintain scientific facilities, the resources 
to hire professional and skilled workers, and the ability to raise capital and market 
the innovation (Damanpour, 2010). 
Salesgrowthi,t is the log-difference between real sales in periods t and t-1. This 
is used to represent firms’ investment opportunities. Higher investment opportunities 
indicate high expected investment on innovation. We therefore expect a positive 
coefficient on Salesgrowth in both Equations (4.1) and (4.2). 
Cashflowi,t is the ratio of cash flow (net income plus depreciation) to total assets. 
Its coefficient is expected to be negative in Equation (4.1). This can be explained 
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considering that because innovation has high adjustment costs and is financed with 
volatile sources, internal cash flow is the cheapest way for firms to adjust the flow of 
innovation in response to transitory shocks. Therefore, the higher the cash flow of a 
firm, the stronger the effect on smoothing its innovation expenditures, and the 
smaller the change in the firm’s innovation activities. However, the coefficient of 
Cashflow is expected to be positive in Equation (4.2) since firms’ innovation 
activities are constrained by the availability of internal finance (Guariglia and Liu, 
2014). 
Leveragei,t is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Previous studies have 
found mixed results on the effect of leverage on R&D investment (Szewczyk et al. 
1996; Zantout, 1997; Vincente-Lorente, 2001; O’Brien, 2003). This is not surprising 
since leverage influences managers’ investment behavior in two contrasting manners: 
positively, through playing a disciplinary role, and negatively, through the presence 
of agency cost and information asymmetry problems (Ho et al., 2006). Specifically, 
on the one hand, the disciplinary role of debt has a positive influence on managerial 
behaviour, driving managers to invest in projects with positive net present value 
(NPV) such as R&D projects. On the other hand, agency cost problems arise when 
the principal (debt holders) and the agent (managers) cannot reach a consensus in an 
R&D investment decisions. Managers sometimes withhold information on 
innovation to maintain confidentiality for competitive reasons. The less-informative 
debt holders would therefore ask for a premium when they realize the possible high 
risks in R&D projects, which raise the cost of the capital, and reduce the attraction of 
innovation activities. Chen et al. (2013) find insignificant effect on leverage. We 
therefore keep an open mind about the sign of the coefficient associate with 
Leverage. 
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Collaterali,t is the ratio of tangible to total assets. On the one hand, it can be 
used as a proxy for firms’ borrowing capacity, which is important in raising funds in 
credit markets with imperfect information (Wette, 1983; Bester, 1987; Guariglia and 
Mateut, 2014). Therefore, firms with a higher tangibility of assets are likely to find it 
easier to borrow external funds. This is especially important for Chinese firms as 
their innovation activities are generally constrained by the availability of internal 
finance (Guariglia and Liu, 2014). From this point of view, collateral should have a 
positive effect on innovation activities. However, Hovakimian (2009) argues that 
firms with high tangibility are more likely to operate in industries with low growth, 
and could therefore display lower investment, especially lower investment in risky 
innovation projects. Additionally, a firm with higher collateral value indicates less 
intangible assets, such as, patents, copyrights, technology, and therefore, less 
innovation activities. Based on the argument above, we will keep an open mind 
about the sign of the coefficient associate with Collateral. 
Expdumi,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm reports a positive value of 
overseas sales, and 0 otherwise. Exporting firms are more likely to connect with 
foreign firms to incorporate better production techniques or upgrade product quality 
(Aw et al., 2008), which results in more innovation. Therefore, we expect a positive 
coefficient on Expdum in both Equations (4.1) and (4.2). 
Lastly, our Equation includes vi  to indicate the firm-specific component of the 
error term, which is dealt with by estimating the equation in first-differences. dt is 
included to indicate a time-specific component, which controls for macroeconomic 
fluctuations or business cycle effects and which we take into account by including 
time dummies in all our specifications. Finally, εi,t is an idiosyncratic component. 
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4.5.2. Baseline models: testing the effect of herding on productivity 
To test the effects of innovation herding on firm productivity, we then estimate the 
following equation, which follows  Knyazeva et al. (2008), Bo et al. (2013), and 
Chen et al. (2013)’s approach: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐻𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡  
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡      (4.3) 
where Herdingi,t=|(
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
− (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
−𝑖,𝑡
|. We proxy Productivityi,t using three different 
measures. First, we construct firm-level total factor productivity, TFP, using the 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method.29 This method has been widely used in recent 
research (Greenaway et al., 2014; Ding et al., 2012; Chen and Guariglia, 2013). 
Second, following McGuckin and Nguyen (1995) and Maksimovic and Phillips 
(2001), we calculate value added per worker, VAPW, which is defined as the value 
of total real sales net of  materials cost of goods sold, divided by the number of 
workers. Third, we compute average labor productivity, PROD, on total real sales 
divided by the number of employees (Greenaway et al., 2007; Ding et al., 2012). A 
positive and significant β1 coefficient would suggest that a smaller product 
innovation deviation (i.e. more product innovation herding) is associated with lower 
firm productivity, providing support for our Hypothesis 3. 
All other independent variables are the same as those included in Equation (4.1) 
and (2). We expect Size to affect productivity positively, as larger firms may benefit 
                                                          
29 TFP estimates based on the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method can be obtained in STATA by 
using the levpet command. 
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from economies of scale and have better access to external finance (Chhibber and 
Majumdar, 1999), which might enhance their productivity. Evidence of this can be 
found in both the theoretical (Melitz, 2003) and the empirical literature (Bernard and 
Jensen, 1999; Chen and Guariglia, 2013).  
As for sales growth, Knyazeva et al. (2008) find that it is positively related 
with firms’ performance but not consistently significant. Bo et al. (2013) find that 
sales growth is negatively associated with Tobin’s Q, but positively linked with 
ROA. Therefore, the predicted sign for Salesgrowth in Equation (4.3) is not clear.  
We expect Cashflow to have a significantly positive impact on productivity. 
Because Chinese firms, and especially innovative firms, are generally financially 
constrained (Guariglia and Liu, 2014), their ability to undertake innovative projects 
depends on the availability of internal cash flow.  
We also expect to observe a positive and significant coefficient on Leverage, 
as a higher debt to assets ratio means the firm has more resources at hand to 
undertake productivity-enhancing projects. Additionally, lenders are likely to 
consider firms who obtained more debt in the past as credit worthy and will therefore 
lend more to them, which once again, will enable the firm to invest more in 
productivity-enhancing projects.  
The predicted sign for Collateral is not clear. Using Chinese firm-level data, 
Chen et al. (2013) find that the effect of tangibility on corporate performance 
(measured by operating income divided by total assets) is negative and significant 
for their full sample, state-owned firms, and foreign firms, but is positive and 
significant for private firms. Similarly, based on US data, Knyazeva et al. (2008) find 
that tangibility is positively associated with industry average profit, but negatively 
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linked with firms’ profitability.  
We expect Expdum to have a positive effect on productivity. Aw et al. (2008) 
explain that exporting provides a channel for knowledge acquisition by firms, which 
allows them to incorporate better production techniques or upgrade product quality.  
As in Equations (4.1) and (4.2), we include vi to indicate the firm-specific 
component of the error term; dt, to indicate a time-specific component; and εi,t, an 
idiosyncratic component. 
 
4.5.3. Estimation methodology 
We estimate all equations using the first-difference Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991).30 This methodology has 
been widely used in recent research (Guariglia et al., 2011; Greenaway et al., 2014; 
Guariglia and Mateut, 2014). On the one hand, it controls for the unobserved firm-
specific heterogeneity by estimating the equations in first differences. On the other 
hand, it takes potential endogeneity into consideration by using two or more lags of 
the endogenous regressors as instruments. Time dummies and industry dummies are 
also included in the instrument matrix. 
To evaluate the legitimacy of our instruments and assess whether our model is 
correctly specified, we use the test for second-order serial correlation of the residuals 
in the differenced equation (m2), and the Hansen/Sargan statistics (or J statistics) for 
overidentifying restrictions.  
If the relevant equation is correctly specified, the variables in the instrument 
                                                          
30 All our regressions are performed in STATA using the command xtabond2 developed by Roodman 
(2009). 
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set should be uncorrelated with the error term. m2 tests the null of no second-order 
serial correlation of the differenced residuals. If it is rejected, we set the instruments 
to lag 3 and deeper. Specifically, the m(n) test follows an asymptotically standard 
normal distribution under the null of no nth-order serial correlation of the differenced 
residuals (Brown and Petersen, 2009; Roodman, 2009).31 As for the Hansen/Sargan 
test, Blundell and Bond (1998) and Benito (2005) show that, when samples with a 
very large cross-sectional dimension are used in estimation, it tends to over-reject the 
null hypothesis of instrument validity.32 Given the size of our panel, we are therefore 
inclined to pay little attention to the J test.  
 
4.6. Results and discussion 
4.6.1. Herding behavior in Chinese firms’ innovation activities 
We first test our Hypothesis 1, i.e. whether herding behavior exists among Chinese 
firms’ innovation activities. Column 1 in Table 4.3 reports our regression results for 
Equation (4.1). The coefficient on  ∆ (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
 is 0.992, and significant at the 1% level. 
This means that the changes in firms’ innovation output are positively and 
significantly related to the changes in the industry average, which can be seen as 
evidence for herding behavior, and provides support for our Hypothesis 1. Knyazeva 
et al. (2008) and Chen et al. (2013) also find this positive coefficient in their research. 
[Insert Table 4.3 here] 
Focusing on the control variables, the cash flow term displays a highly 
                                                          
31 Deeper lags of the instruments were only included if they improved the specification tests. 
32 Significant Sargan test statistics can be found in estimation results in Nickell and Nicolitas (1999), 
Benito (2005), Benito and Hernando (2007), Greenaway et al. (2014), and Chen and Guariglia (2013). 
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significant and negative relationship with the changes in the new products ratio (the 
cash flow coefficient is -2.539). This is because internal cash flow is the cheapest 
way for firms to adjust the flow of innovation in response to transitory shocks. 
Therefore, the higher the cash flow of a firm, the stronger the effect on smoothing its 
innovation expenditures, and the smaller the change in the firm’s innovation 
activities. The coefficient on size (-19.518) is negative and significant at 10% level, 
which is consistent with the finding in Knyazeva et al. (2008), suggesting that larger 
firms exhibit smaller changes in the innovation activities, probably due to their long-
time consistent investment. In addition, high sales growth firms and exporting firms 
exhibit more change in new products, with significant coefficients of 0.211 and 
25.879, respectively. Finally, the coefficients on leverage and collateral are not 
significant.  
Column 2 presents the results obtained from the estimation of Equation (4.2). 
We can see that the coefficient on firm innovation output (0.453) is positive and 
highly sensitive to the industry average, which, once again, can be seen as evidence 
for herding, and provides further evidence in support of our Hypothesis 1.  
As regard to other variables, the significantly positive coefficient of cash flow 
(1.215) suggests that internal finance is an important channel to support firms’ 
innovation activities. This finding is consistent with Guariglia and Liu (2014). The 
coefficient associated with the export dummy (21.837) is positive and significant, 
which indicates that exporting can enhance Chinese firms’ innovation activities. 
Girma et al. (2008) explain that exporters generally have more opportunities to learn 
advanced technologies and attract FDI from aboard. The coefficients associated with 
size, sales growth, leverage, and collateral are not significant. 
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The J and m2-tests do not indicate any problems with the specification of the 
models and the choice of instruments.33 In summary, the result reported in columns 1 
and 2 of Table 4.3 suggest that the firms’ product innovation activities in China are 
close to the industry average, and can be seen as evidence in favor of the presence of 
herding behavior. This provides support for our Hypothesis 1. 
 
4.6.2. Herding behavior and firm heterogeneity 
We next explore the extent to which innovation herding varies across firms 
characterized by different ownership, size, and different degrees of political 
affiliation. To this end, we interact the (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
−𝑖,𝑡
and ∆ (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
−𝑖,𝑡
 variable in all our 
specifications with dummy variables for State/Foreign/Private firms, 
Small/Medium/Large firms,34 and firms with No/Medium/High political affiliation,35 
which are labelled as CATEGORY1, CATEGORY2, and CATEGORY3 in Tables 4.4a 
and Table 4.4b, respectively. Estimating our equations with interactions rather than 
separate regressions for each group allows us to avoid problems of endogenous 
sample selection, to gain degrees of freedom, and to take into consideration the fact 
that firms can transit between groups. It also enables us to test whether the 
                                                          
33 The m2 statistic is missing in the equations that use ∆ (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
 as the dependent variable because of 
an insufficient number of time-series observations.  
34 As discussed in the Appendix, small/medium/large dummies take the value of 1 in a given year if a 
firm’s total real assets are respectively in the lowest/second-and-third/highest quartile of the 
distribution of the total real assets of all firms belonging to the same industry of that firm in that year, 
and 0 otherwise.  
35As discussed in the Appendix, political affiliation (which is called Lishu in our dataset) is a 
categorical variable, which takes the following values: Lishu=10, affiliated at central level; Lishu=20, 
affiliated at provincial level; Lishu=40, affiliated at the city or district level; Lishu=50, affiliated at the 
county level; Lishu=61, affiliated at the street level; Lishu=62, affiliated at the town level; Lishu=63, 
affiliated at the township level; Lishu=71, affiliated at the community level; Lishu=72, affiliated at the 
village level; Lishu=90, no political affiliation. We label firms with Lishu<=20 as high political 
affiliation firms; firms with Lishu>20 and Lishu<90 as firms with medium political affiliation; and 
firms with Lishu=90 as firms with no political affiliation. 
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differences in relevant coefficients across different types of firms are statistically 
significant.  
[Insert Table 4.4a here] 
[Insert Table 4.4b here] 
Table 4.4a shows the estimates of Equation (4.1) augmented with the 
interaction terms. As in Table 4.4a, the coefficients associated with ∆ (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
−𝑖,𝑡
are all 
positive and highly significant (at the 1% level) for privately-owned firms (column 
1), small firms (column 2), and firms with no political affiliation (column 3), but 
insignificant for other groups. These findings provide support for our Hypotheses 2a, 
2b, and 2c. In addition, the finding on small firm is consistent with Knyazeva et al. 
(2008), who find that corporate investments of smaller US firms tends to exhibit a 
higher degree of  comovement than that of their larger counterparts. We also report 
p-values associated with F-tests aimed as assessing whether the impact of 
∆ (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
−𝑖,𝑡
on ∆ (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
is equal across various groups of firms-years. The results 
suggest that the hypothesis is rejected when comparing firms with no political 
affiliation to firms with high affiliation, and when comparing small and large firms.36 
In addition, the J and m2-tests do not indicate any problems with the specification of 
the model and the choice of instruments.37 
                                                          
36  Although the difference in magnitude between the coefficients associated with ∆ (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
−𝑖,𝑡
at 
privately-owned and state-owned firm-years is not statistically significant, the latter coefficient is not 
precisely determined. Similarly, although the difference in the coefficients associated with ∆ (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
−𝑖,𝑡
 
at privately-owned and foreign-owned enterprises is not statistically significant, the latter coefficient 
is not significant. 
37 Once again, the m2 statistic is missing in the equations that use ∆ (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
 as the dependent variable 
because of an insufficient number of time-series observations. The results were robust to estimating 
 
 
117 
 
The regression results of Equation (4.2) augmented with the interaction terms 
are reported in Table 4.4b. Focusing on column 1, which divides firms according to 
ownership, we observe that, in line with our Hypothesis 2a, the coefficient on 
(
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
−𝑖,𝑡
 is positive and significant for privately firms, but insignificant for SOEs and 
foreign firms. We also report p-values associated with F-tests aimed as assessing 
whether the impact of (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
−𝑖,𝑡
on (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
is equal across various groups of firms-
years. The results suggest that the hypothesis is rejected when we compare private 
firms and state-owned firms, but cannot be rejected when we compare foreign and 
private firms on the one hand, and state-owned and foreign firms on the other.38 
These findings provide further support for our Hypotheses 2a. 
Column 2 differentiates firms according to size (based on total assets). In line 
with Hypothesis 2b, the coefficient on (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
−𝑖,𝑡
 is positive and highly significant (at 
the 1% level) for small firms, less significant (at the 5% level) and smaller (0.362 
compared to 0.959) for medium-sized firms, and insignificant in for large firms. The 
differences in the coefficient associated with (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
−𝑖,𝑡
across small, medium, and 
large firms are all statistically significant.  
Column 3 differentiates firms on the basis of political affiliation. We observe 
that the coefficient associated with (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
−𝑖,𝑡
 is positive and highly significant (at the 
1% level) for firms with no political affiliation, less significant (at the 5% level) and 
smaller (0.496 compared to 0.574) for firms with medium political affiliation, and 
                                                                                                                                                                    
separate regressions for firms belonging to the different groups analyzed. These results are not 
reported for brevity, but available upon request. 
38 Once again, however, the coefficients for private and foreign firms are not statistically significant. 
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insignificant for firms with high political affiliation. 39  These findings provide 
support for our Hypothesis 2c. 
The coefficients on other control variables are consistent with our prediction.  
Moreover, the J and m2-tests do not indicate any problems with the specification of 
the model and the choice of instruments.40 
In summary, the coefficients on ∆ (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
−𝑖,𝑡
and (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
−𝑖,𝑡
are consistently positive 
and significant for private firms, firms with no political affiliation firms, and small 
firms, which indicate these firms’ innovation activities tend to “move with the 
market”, or “follow the general market trend”. Although the coefficients for firms 
with medium political affiliation and medium-sized firms are significant in Table 
4.4a, they are no longer significant in Table 4.4b. Finally, the coefficients for firms 
with high political affiliation and large firms are insignificant in all specification, 
suggesting that these firms do not exhibit herding in their innovation activities.  
 
4.6.3. Impact of innovation herding on firms’ productivity 
Table 4.5 presents estimation results for Equation (4.3), which tests the relationship 
between innovation herding and firm productivity. In column 1, productivity is 
measured using TFP. We observe that the coefficient on the product innovation 
herding proxy |(
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
− (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
−𝑖,𝑡
|  is highly significant (at the 1% level) with a 
                                                          
39 Although, according to our F-test, the differences in magnitude between the coefficients associated 
with (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
−𝑖,𝑡
for firm-years with no political affiliation on the one hand, and firms with medium/high 
political affiliation, on the other, are not statistically significant, the coefficients for the high 
affiliation group are not significant. 
40 Similar results, not reported for brevity, but available from the authors upon request, were obtained 
if separate regressions were estimated for firms belonging to the different categories analyzed.  
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positive sign. This suggests that a smaller product innovation deviation (i.e. more 
product innovation herding) is associated with lower firm productivity. The elasticity 
of |(
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
− (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
−𝑖,𝑡
| evaluated at sample means is 0.21, suggesting that a 10% 
decrease in |(
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
− (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
−𝑖,𝑡
| leads to 2.1% decrease in TFP. Therefore, if firms 
are more likely to herd their product innovation towards their industry average level, 
they are more likely to have lower TFP. Similar results are found when we use 
PROD (column 2) and VAPW (column 3) as alternative measures of productivity. 
The elasticity of |(
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
− (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
−𝑖,𝑡
| evaluated at sample means are 0.12 and 0.18 
respectively for PROD and VAPW, suggesting that that a 10% decrease in |(
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
−
(
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
−𝑖,𝑡
| leads to 1.2% and 1.8% decrease in PROD and VAPW, respectively. These 
results indicate that a smaller product innovation deviation (i.e. more product 
innovation herding) is associated with lower firms’ productivity, providing support 
for our Hypothesis 3. 
[Insert Table 4.5 here] 
Our findings are consistent with the results in Knyazeva et al. (2008) and Chen 
et al. (2013), who find that corporate investment comovement hinders firm 
performance and productivity growth in the US and China, respectively. Yet, Bo et 
al. (2013) provide evidence that corporate investment herding is positively related to 
firm performance in Chinese listed firms, suggesting that corporate investment 
herding does not necessarily hurt shareholders in the Chinese context. They explain 
that the theoretical prediction of negative herding effects is based on the assumption 
that the information obtained by the decision-makers is perfect and truly informative. 
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However, in the case of China, which is characterized by an underdeveloped stock 
market and high uncertainty, this information contains significant noise. Hence, 
decision-makers do not necessarily generate positive outcomes based on their private 
information. Additionally, with no well-established monitoring mechanisms, being 
in the crowd may provide ordinary shareholders with a sense of security concerning 
the outcomes of corporate decisions. Our results differ from Bo et al.’s (2013) for 
two main reasons. First, contrary to us, these authors analyze herding only based on 
Chinese listed firms (1,155 firms in the period of 1999−2004). As listed firms only 
make a very small proportion of the population of Chinese firms,41 their sample is 
not representative of the whole Chinese market. Furthermore, innovation is by nature 
a more noisy and uncertain phenomenon than corporate investment. In the case of 
innovation, it may therefore not be a good strategy to just move with the market or 
follow the leaders, because even the market and the leader firms may not know 
where to go next or which innovation project will be successful in the future. Private 
information is therefore precious for firms and helps them make appropriate 
decisions. If the decision-makers ignore their private information by following the 
herd, this may result in distortions. This can explain why in the Chinese context, 
innovation herding may have a negative effect on firms’ productivity, even though 
corporate investment herding has a positive effect. 
Focusing on the control variables, we observe that the coefficients on size are 
all positive and significant. This is reasonable as larger firms have been often found 
to have higher productivity in both the theoretical (Melitz, 2003) and the empirical 
literature (Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Chen and Guariglia, 2013). In addition, cash 
flow is positively and significantly associated with firms’ productivity. Because 
                                                          
41 For example, in 2007, there were only 1,550 listed firms in China. Yet, our database contains 
93,552 firms in that year. 
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Chinese firms, and especially innovative firms, are generally financially constrained 
(Guariglia and Liu, 2014), they generally finance their innovation projects with 
internal cash flow. The positive and significant coefficient on leverage can be 
explained considering that, when internal cash flow is exhausted, firms have to 
borrow external funds to support their innovation activities. Therefore, both internal 
cash flow and external borrowing are important for firms to sustain their innovation 
projects, and achieve higher productivity. The coefficients on other variables are not 
significant.  
Having found that private firms, small firm, and firms with no political 
affiliation are more likely to herd in innovation activities, we next investigate the 
extent to which innovation herding hurts the performance of those three categories of 
firms. The results are presented in Table 4.6. We observe that the coefficients 
associated with our herding proxy |(
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
− (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
−𝑖,𝑡
| are significant and positively 
signed in all specifications. This suggests that a smaller product innovation deviation 
(i.e. more product innovation herding) is associated with lower firm productivity for 
the three categories of firms, and provides further support for our Hypothesis 3. 
[Insert Table 4.6 here] 
 
4.7. Robustness tests 
4.7.1. Replacing average (
𝑵𝑷
𝑲
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝒊,𝒕
with median(
𝑵𝑷
𝑲
)
̿̿ ̿̿ ̿̿
𝒊,𝒕
 
Instead of using mean values of investment to total assets ratio, Knyazeva et al. 
(2008) and Chen et al. (2013) use medians of investment to total assets ratio to 
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measure average industry-level investment. When a distribution is skewed, the 
median can in fact be seen as a better measure of the mid-point. In Table 4.7, we 
verify whether our results are robust to using median instead of mean industry-level 
innovation values in new products to total assets ratio. In column 1, we observe that 
the product innovation change is still significantly and positively related to the 
median product innovation, ∆ (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̿̿ ̿̿ ̿̿
−𝑖,𝑡
. Similarly, the results in column 2 show that 
firm product innovation ratio are also highly sensitive to the industry median level, 
(
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̿̿ ̿̿ ̿̿
−𝑖,𝑡
. These results confirm that herding behavior exists in Chinese firms’ 
innovation activities, providing further support for our Hypothesis 1. 
[Insert Table 4.7 here] 
The results in column 3 to 5 represent the impact of innovation herding on 
firms’ productivity, whereby the new herding variable is calculated as |(
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
−
(
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̿̿ ̿̿ ̿̿
−𝑖,𝑡
|, where (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̿̿ ̿̿ ̿̿
−𝑖,𝑡
is the median value of new product ratio in this industry 
excluding firm i in year t. We observe that the coefficient on this new herding 
variable is still positive and significant, which confirms that innovation herding has a 
negative impact on firms’ productivity, and once again, provides support for our 
Hypothesis 3.42 
 
4.7.2. Testing the impact of innovation herding at industry-level 
Chen et al. (2013), Kynazeva et al. (2008), and Morck et al. (2000) use the industry-
                                                          
42 All the results are robust in private firms, small firms, and firms with no political affiliation when 
we take into account the median industry-level innovation values in new products to total assets ratio. 
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level comovement index to capture herding in investment, which is calculated as:  
Comove(I) = Max(NI_incr, NI_decr)/N 
where I is the corporate investment ratio calculated as the sum of property, plant and 
equipment and depreciation, deflated by the firm’s total assets. They define the index 
as the ratio of the highest between the number of firms which increase their 
investment (NI_incr) and the number of firms which decrease their investment (NI_decr) 
to the total number of firms (N), in a specific industry and a given year.43 In a similar 
vein, we can calculate an innovation comovement index as following:  
Comove(NP) = Max(NNP_incr, NNP_decr)/N 
where NP is the new product sales deflated by the firm’s total assets. Comove(NP) 
measures the proportion of firms that increase (or decrease) new products in a 
specific industry and year. A higher Comove(NP) value implies that companies tend 
to comove more in their new products within a given industry and year, which means 
more innovation herding.  
We next assess how Comove(NP) affects corporate productivity. We expect the 
effect to be negative. The regression results are presented in Table 4.8. Based on 
GMM estimates, we observe that Comove(NP) has a negative and significant effect 
on productivity. The Comove(NP) elasticity evaluated at sample means are -0.65, -
                                                          
43 Chen et al. (2013) use province or province-equivalent municipal cities-level data to construct a 
regional-industry-time ratio to measure investment comovement. We do not take the regional effect 
into our consideration for two reasons. First, as we only include innovative firms, our observations 
(45,319 in total) are less than Chen et al. (2013)’s, who analyze herding in corporate investment using 
556,221 observations. If we follow Chen et al. (2013)’s method and divide our sample into different 
regions and different industries, our observations will decrease significantly in each regional-industry 
group. Second, we believe that firm managers would consider their peers’ innovation actions in the 
whole market, and not just within a specific province. Therefore, we do not consider the regional 
effect at the province or province-equivalent municipal cities level. However, we add robustness tests 
by calculating the regional-industry-time new product comovement, based on a larger region 
classification (East, Central, and West). Our main findings still hold (see columns 4, 5, and 6 in Table 
4.8). See the Appendix for a list of the provinces comprising the Eastern, Central, and Western 
regions.  
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1.04, and -1.38 respectively for TFP, PROD, and VAPW, suggesting that a 10% 
increase in Comove(NP) leads to a 6.5%, 10.4%, and 13.8% decrease in TFP, PROD, 
and VAPW, in column 1, 2, and 3, respectively. This provides further support for our 
Hypothesis 3. Based on regional-industry-time constructing Comove(NP),44 we find 
the results still hold for PROD (in column 5) and VAPW (in column 6). Although 
the coefficient is not statistically significant for TFP in column 4, it still displays a 
negative effect. Kynazeva et al. (2008) also use this herding measure to test its 
relationship with the US firms’ operating performance and find a negative 
relationship, which is consistent with our findings.  
[Insert Table 4.8 here] 
Focusing on the control variables, Size and Cash flow are consistently 
significant in all equations and have a positive effect on productivity. This indicates 
that large firms and firms with more internal financing are more likely to display 
higher productivity. These findings are consistent with empirical findings in 
literature and with our results in Table 4.5. The Sargan tests for instrument validity 
do not give cause of concern, but the m2 statistic is missing because of an 
insufficient number of time-series observations.45 
 
4.8. Conclusion 
Making use of a panel of 19,722 Chinese innovative firms over the period 
2000−2007, we explore the extent to which herding affects corporate innovation 
activities and investigate the impact of herding on firms’ productivity. We find 
                                                          
44 See the calculation in footnote 28. 
45 The first time-series observation for each firm is lost as our herding measures based on the increase 
(or decrease) in new products for each firm.  
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strong evidence in favor of herding, which is more likely to affect private, small 
firms, with no political affiliation. We also find a negative impact of innovation 
herding on firm productivity. 
Our findings suggest that relevant policies should be established to reduce 
herding behavior in Chinese firms’ innovation activities, especially for private, small 
firms, with no political affiliation. To this end, the Chinese government should 
endeavour to establish a sound protection of property rights, and a strong regulated 
patent legal system. At the same time, information disclosure and information 
exchange should be encouraged to reduce asymmetric information. Finally, Chinese 
firms should enhance shareholders’ protection and further improve corporate 
governance to reduce principal-agent problems.  
Further research needs to be undertaken in the following directions. First, as 
our regressions are only based on production innovation, it would be interesting to 
test whether they are robust to using other innovation measures, such as R&D 
investment. Second, one could test whether our results also hold for listed firms. 
Third, it would be interesting to test the extent to which Chinese firms herd 
following industry leaders instead of herding following the industry average. Finally, 
one could investigate whether similar results apply to other developing countries.  
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Table 4.1: Distribution of the number of observations by year and industry  
 
 Mean Observations Frequency  
Year    
2000 30.01 2,929 6.46 
2001 32.29 4,327 9.55 
2002 34.71 5,300 11.69 
2003 35.13 5,902 13.02 
2005 40.86 9,012 19.89 
2006 39.86 9,591 21.16 
2007 40.03 8,258 18.22 
    
Industry    
Metal & Metal products 47.00 2,834 6.25 
Nonmetal products & Petroleum 
processing 
40.68 2,442 
5.39 
Chemicals & Plastic 38.04 9,011 19.88 
Machinery & Equipment 30.42 8,629 19.04 
Electrical equipment 37.24 9,633 21.26 
Transport equipment 31.15 3,708 8.18 
Food & Tobacco 30.82 1,512 3.34 
Textile 48.06 4,387 9.68 
Leather & Timber & Furniture 40.35 2,215 4.89 
Mining & Logging 43.56 948 2.09 
    
Total 37.51 45,319 100.00 
Notes: Innovation herding is calculated as |(
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
− (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
−𝑖,𝑡
|, where i indexes firms and t, time. NP indicates the 
sale of new products, and K, total assets. The year 2004 is missing because the variable Newproducts is not 
available in that year. 
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Mean Median S.D. Min Max Observations 
Innovation variable:       
New products/Total assets 42.12 24.60 48.12 0.12 291.28 45,319 
       
Innovation Herding variable:       
|(
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
− (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
−𝑖,𝑡
| 
37.51 32.97 30.22 0.85 214.03 45,319 
       
Productivity variables:       
TFP 6.07 4.36 5.30 0.34 34.77 45,319 
PROD 2.77 1.92 2.68 0.19 20.34 45,319 
VAPW 0.42 0.30 0.36 0.04 2.33 45,319 
 
      
Control variables:       
Size 6.38 6.36 1.30 3.51 9.25 45,319 
Sales growth 14.14 12.84 30.15 -84.36 133.38 45,319 
Cash flow 7.71 5.70 7.56 -3.88 57.81 45,319 
Leverage 58.22 59.42 21.16 5.92 115.07 45,319 
Collateral 31.26 29.46 15.43 4.15 76.67 45,319 
Expdum 0.56 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 45,319 
Notes: NP indicates the sale of new products, and K, total assets. i indexes firms and t, time. See the Appendix 
for complete definitions of all variables. 
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Table 4.3: Testing for the presence of herding in Chinese firms’ innovation 
activities 
 
Dependent variable: ∆ (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
 (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
 
 (1) (2) 
∆ (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
−𝑖,𝑡
 
0.992***  
(0.313)  
(
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
−𝑖,𝑡
 
 0.453*** 
 (0.175) 
Size -19.518* -7.906 
 (10.010) (6.210) 
Sales growth 0.211* 0.038 
 (0.116) (0.076) 
Cash flow -2.539*** 1.215* 
 (0.954) (0.654) 
Leverage -0.043 0.260 
 (0.282) (0.189) 
Collateral 0.016 0.032 
 (0.302) (0.206) 
Expdum 25.879* 21.837** 
 (14.402) (9.628) 
J(p-value) 0.195 0.195 
m1 -7.16 -7.16 
m2 . -0.89 
Observations 7,367 19,706 
Notes: NP indicates the sale of new products, and K, total assets. i indexes firms and t, time. We estimate all 
specifications using the first-difference GMM estimator. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. Time dummies and industry dummies are included in all specifications. Instruments in all 
columns include two and deeper lags of all right hand side variables, time dummies, and industry dummies. The J 
statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. 
m1/m2 are tests for first-order/second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically 
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The m2 statistic is missing in the equation with 
∆ (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
as dependent variable because of an insufficient number of time-series observations. See the Appendix for 
complete definitions of all variables. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4.4a: Testing for the presence of herding in Chinese firms’ innovation 
activities differentiating firms on the basis of ownership, political affiliation, 
and size 
Dependent variable: ∆ (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
 
 
Ownership-
interactions 
Size-  
interactions 
Political 
affiliation-
interactions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆ (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
−𝑖,𝑡
∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐺𝑂𝑅𝑌1 
0.489 0.186 -0.208 
(0.464) (0.359) (0.599) 
∆ (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
−𝑖,𝑡
∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐺𝑂𝑅𝑌2 
0.634 0.685 0.429 
(0.600) (0.429) (0.359) 
∆ (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
−𝑖,𝑡
∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐺𝑂𝑅𝑌3 
1.216*** 2.407*** 1.625*** 
(0.424) (0.769) (0.618) 
Size -20.858* -8.653 -14.336 
 (10.893) (10.733) (11.061) 
Sales growth 0.199 0.220* 0.292** 
 (0.127) (0.119) (0.129) 
Cash flow -2.798*** -1.288 -1.780* 
 (1.040) (1.053) (1.036) 
Leverage -0.016 0.169 -0.037 
 (0.289) (0.281) (0.283) 
Collateral 0.001 0.283 -0.005 
 (0.311) (0.308) (0.298) 
Expdum 32.556** 31.447** 29.789** 
 (15.141) (14.204) (14.175) 
H0: Impact of ∆ (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
−𝑖,𝑡
on ∆ (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
same 
across CATEGORY1 and CATEGORY3 
firm-years (p-value) 
0.163 0.005*** 0.047** 
H0: Impact of ∆ (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
−𝑖,𝑡
on ∆ (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
same 
across CATEGORY2 and CATEGORY3 
firm-years (p-value) 
0.443 0.070* 0.109 
H0: Impact of ∆ (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
−𝑖,𝑡
on ∆ (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
same 
across CATEGORY1 and CATEGORY2 
firm-years (p-value) 
0.847 0.330 0.274 
J(p-value) 0.134 0.295 0.141 
m1 -5.20 -5.21 -5.34 
m2 . . . 
Observations 7,367 7,367 7,367 
Notes: NP indicates the sale of new products, and K, total assets. i indexes firms and t, time. We estimate all specifications using the 
first-difference GMM estimator. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. Time dummies and 
industry dummies are included in all specifications. Instruments in all columns include two and deeper lags of all right hand side 
variables, time dummies, and industry dummies. The J statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square 
under the null of instrument validity. m1/m2 are tests for first-order/second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, 
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The m2 statistics are missing in the equations using 
∆ (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
as dependent variable because of an insufficient number of time-series observations. CATEGORY1/ 
CATEGORY2/CATEGORY3 indicate state-owned/foreign/private firms in column 1; high/medium/no political affiliation firms in 
column 2; and large/medium/small sized firms in column 3, respectively. See the Appendix for complete definitions of all variables. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4.4b: Testing for the presence of herding in Chinese firms’ innovation 
activities differentiating firms on the basis of ownership, political affiliation, 
and size 
 
Dependent variable: (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
 
 
Ownership-
interactions 
Size-  
interactions 
Political 
affiliation-
interactions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
(
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
−𝑖,𝑡
∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐺𝑂𝑅𝑌1 
-0.057 0.014 0.057 
(0.226) (0.160) (0.406) 
(
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
−𝑖,𝑡
∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐺𝑂𝑅𝑌2 
0.637 0.362** 0.496** 
(0.417) (0.170) (0.243) 
(
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
−𝑖,𝑡
∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐺𝑂𝑅𝑌3 
0.342* 0.959*** 0.574*** 
(0.199) (0.314) (0.215) 
Size -10.536** -9.134 -7.323 
 (4.711) (5.599) (5.693) 
Sales growth -0.005 0.034 0.051 
 (0.056) (0.078) (0.069) 
Cash flow 0.804* 0.205 1.515*** 
 (0.433) (0.506) (0.561) 
Leverage 0.227 0.242 0.278 
 (0.158) (0.166) (0.178) 
Collateral -0.073 0.039 0.093 
 (0.175) (0.194) (0.202) 
Expdum 10.926 16.546* 19.874** 
 (7.022) (8.718) (9.375) 
H0: Impact of (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
−𝑖,𝑡
on (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
same 
across CATEGORY1 and CATEGORY3 
firm-years (p-value) 
0.079* 0.012** 0.245 
H0: Impact of (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
−𝑖,𝑡
on (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
same 
across CATEGORY2 and CATEGORY3 
firm-years (p-value) 
0.518 0.017** 0.772 
H0: Impact of (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
−𝑖,𝑡
on (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
same 
across CATEGORY1 and CATEGORY2 
firm-years (p-value) 
0.116 0.083* 0.337 
J(p-value) 0.630 0.625 0.192 
m1 -6.58 -6.52 -7.33 
m2 -0.63 -0.82 -0.76 
Observations 19,706 19,706 19,706 
Notes: NP indicates the sale of new products, and K, total assets. i indexes firms and t, time. We estimate all 
specifications using the first-difference GMM estimator. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. Time dummies and industry dummies are included in all specifications. Instruments in all 
columns include two and deeper lags of all right hand side variables, time dummies, and industry dummies. The J 
statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. 
m1/m2 are tests for first-order/second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically 
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. CATEGORY1/CATEGORY2/ CATEGORY3 indicate 
state-owned/foreign/private firms in column 1; high/medium/no political affiliation firms in column 2; and 
large/medium/small sized firms in column 3, respectively. See the Appendix for complete definitions of all 
variables. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4.5: Impact of innovation herding behavior on firm productivity 
 
Dependent variables: TFP PROD VAPW 
 (1) (2) (3) 
|(
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
− (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
−𝑖,𝑡
| 
0.034*** 0.009*** 0.002*** 
(0.010) (0.003) (0.001) 
Size 7.579*** 1.921*** 0.491*** 
 (0.730) (0.200) (0.049) 
Sales growth -0.019* 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.010) (0.002) (0.001) 
Cash flow 0.572*** 0.080*** 0.033*** 
 (0.085) (0.020) (0.005) 
Leverage 0.162*** 0.023*** 0.008*** 
 (0.026) (0.007) (0.002)  
Collateral 0.027 0.005 0.003* 
 (0.025) (0.008) (0.002) 
Expdum 1.000 0.266 -0.031 
 (1.204) (0.375) (0.077) 
J(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
m1 -8.64 -5.00 -8.25 
m2 -1.69 -0.27 0.57 
Observations 19,706 19,706 19,706 
Notes: Innovation herding is calculated as |(
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
− (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
−𝑖,𝑡
| , where i indexes firms and t, time. NP 
indicates the sale of new products, and K, total assets. We estimate all specifications using the first-
difference GMM estimator. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. Time 
dummies and industry dummies are included in all specifications. Instruments in all columns include two 
and deeper lags of all right hand side variables, time dummies, and industry dummies. The J statistic is a 
test of the over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. 
m1/m2 are tests for first-order/second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, 
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. See the Appendix for complete 
definitions of all variables. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4.6: Impact of innovation herding behavior on corporate productivity: 
focusing on private firms, small firms, and firms with no political affiliation 
 
Dependent variables: TFP PROD VAPW 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: Private firms    
|(
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
− (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
−𝑖,𝑡
| 
0.032*** 0.011*** 0.001** 
(0.009) (0.004) (0.001) 
J(p-value) 0.000 0.031 0.000 
m1 -8.09 -4.27 -7.22 
m2 -0.60 1.12 1.31 
Observations 13,459 13,459 13,459 
    
Panel B: Firms with no political 
affiliation 
  
 
|(
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
− (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
−𝑖,𝑡
| 
0.041*** 0.020*** 0.003*** 
(0.013) (0.006) (0.001) 
J(p-value) 0.000 0.176 0.103 
m1 -4.95 -4.17 -5.59 
m2 0.57 -0.58 1.54 
Observations 8,604 8,604 8,604 
    
Panel C: Small firms    
|(
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
− (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
−𝑖,𝑡
| 
0.013** 0.015** 0.002** 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.001) 
J(p-value) 0.273 0.784 0.430 
m1 -3.11 -2.07 -2.60 
m2 -0.08 0.52 1.19 
Observations 3,832 3,832 3,832 
Notes: Innovation herding is calculated as |(
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
− (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
−𝑖,𝑡
| , where i indexes firms and t, time. NP 
indicates the sale of new products, and K, total assets. We estimate all specifications using the first-
difference GMM estimator. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. Time 
dummies and industry dummiesare included in all specifications. Instruments in all columns are two and 
deeper lags of all right hand side variables, time dummies, and industry dummies. The J statistic is a test of 
the over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. m1/m2 are 
tests for first-order/second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically 
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. See the Appendix for complete definitions of all 
variables. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4.7: Robustness test: replacing average(
𝑵𝑷
𝑲
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝒊,𝒕
with median(
𝑵𝑷
𝑲
)
̿̿ ̿̿ ̿̿
𝒊,𝒕
 
 
Dependent variables:  ∆ (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
 (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
 TFP PROD VAPW 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
∆ (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̿̿ ̿̿ ̿̿ ̿
−𝑖,𝑡
 
2.534*     
(1.539)     
(
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̿̿ ̿̿ ̿̿ ̿
−𝑖,𝑡
 
 1.164***    
 (0.346)    
|(
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
− (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
̿̿ ̿̿ ̿̿ ̿
−𝑖,𝑡
| 
  0.036*** 0.015*** 0.002*** 
  0.009 0.004 0.001 
Size -7.147 -16.162** 7.878*** 2.281*** 0.512*** 
 (9.974) (7.144) 0.733 0.293 0.050 
Sales growth 0.070 0.106 -0.017* 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.136) (0.077) 0.010 0.004 0.001 
Cash flow -1.559 0.958 0.577*** 0.090*** 0.033*** 
 (0.975) (0.682) 0.082 0.029 0.005 
Leverage 0.072 0.038 0.158*** 0.028*** 0.008*** 
 (0.299) (0.187) 0.025 0.009 0.002 
Collateral -0.244 -0.114 0.021 0.011 0.002 
 (0.321) (0.200) 0.025 0.009 0.002 
Expdum 41.173*** 26.839*** 0.889 0.367 -0.042 
 (16.714) (9.644) 1.164 0.440 0.076 
J(p-value) 0.440 0.132 0.000 0.010 0.001 
m1 -5.36 -7.27 -8.38 -5.41 -8.22 
m2 . -0.66 -1.19 0.05 0.78 
Observations 7,367 19,706 19,706 19,706 19,706 
Notes: NP indicates the sale of new products, and K, total assets. i indexes firms and t, time. We estimate all 
specifications using the first-difference GMM estimator. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Time dummies and industry dummies are included in all specifications. Instruments in all columns are 
two and deeper lags of all right hand side variables, time dummies, and industry dummies. The J statistic is a test of 
the over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. m1/m2 are tests for 
first-order/second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under 
the null of no serial correlation. The m2 statistic is missing in the equations using ∆ (
𝑁𝑃
𝐾
)
𝑖,𝑡
as dependent variable 
because of an insufficient number of time-series data. See the Appendix for complete definitions of all variables. ***, 
** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4.8: Robustness test: the impact of innovation herding at industry-level 
 
 Industry-time level Regional-industry-time level 
Dep. variables:  TFP PROD VAPW TFP PROD VAPW 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (0036) 
Comove(NP) 
-7.327** -5.367*** -1.077*** -4.165 -3.055** -0.649*** 
(3.709) (1.255) (0.220) (3.880) (1.373) (0.224) 
Size 6.104*** 1.759*** 0.384*** 6.355*** 1.964*** 0.422*** 
 (0.541) (0.239) (0.039) (0.560) (0.238) (0.039) 
Sales growth -0.026*** 0.004 -0.001 -0.033*** 0.002 -0.001** 
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.001) (0.009) (0.003) (0.001) 
Cash flow 0.447*** 0.070*** 0.026*** 0.456*** 0.082*** 0.029*** 
 (0.058) (0.022) (0.004) (0.063) (0.022) (0.004) 
Leverage 0.088*** 0.012 0.004*** 0.098*** 0.013 0.005*** 
 (0.018) (0.007) (0.001) (0.020) (0.008) (0.001) 
Collateral -0.027 -0.001 0.001 -0.021 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.019) (0.008) (0.001) (0.021) (0.008) (0.001) 
Expdum 1.677* 0.479*** -0.013 2.087** 0.714* 0.027 
 (0.960) (0.396) (0.065) (1.046) (0.415) (0.066) 
J(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
m1 -3.55 -4.49 -4.20 -3.64 -3.58 -3.64 
m2 . . . . . . 
Observations 7,367 7,367 7,367 7,367 7,367 7,367 
Notes: NP indicates the sale of new products. We estimate all specifications using the first-difference GMM estimator. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. Time dummies and industry dummies are 
included in all specifications. Instruments in all columns are two and deeper lags of all right hand side variables, time 
dummies, and industry dummies. The J statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square 
under the null of instrument validity. m1/m2 are tests for first-order/second-order serial correlation in the first-
differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The m2 statistics are 
missing because of an insufficient number of time-series data. See the Appendix for complete definitions of all 
variables. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 4.A1: Structure of unbalanced panel 
 
Panel I. 
Year 
Number of 
observations 
Percent Cumulative 
2000 2,929 6.46 6.46 
2001 4,327 9.55 16.01 
2002 5,300 11.69 27.71 
2003 5,902 13.02 40.73 
2005 9,012 19.89 60.61 
2006 9,591 21.16 81.78 
2007 8,258 18.22 100.00 
Total 45,319 100.00  
 
Panel II. 
Number of obs. per 
firm 
Number of 
observations 
Percent Cumulative 
1 8,430 18.60 18.60 
2 9,282 20.48 39.08 
3 8,676 19.14 58.23 
4 6,076 13.41 71.63 
5 5,185 11.44 83.08 
6 4,506 9.94 93.02 
7 3,164 6.98 100.00 
Total 45,319 100.00  
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Table 4.A2: Descriptive statistics on sub-groups 
 Ownership Size Political Affiliation 
 
CATE
GOR
Y1 
CATE
GOR
Y2 
CATE
GOR
Y3 
CATE
GOR
Y1 
CATE
GOR
Y2 
CATE
GOR
Y3 
CATE
GOR
Y1 
CATE
GOR
Y2 
CATE
GOR
Y3 
Innovation variable:          
New products/Total assets 20.84 49.21 45.02 32.00 40.06 56.03 27.45 36.81 50.95 
          
Productivity variables:          
TFP 6.20 7.55 5.89 10.49 5.43 2.94 7.89 5.78 5.79 
PROD 1.67 3.74 2.82 3.61 2.69 2.13 2.42 2.42 3.19 
VAPW 0.29 0.61 0.61 0.57 0.41 0.29 0.44 0.37 0.46 
 
         
Control variables:          
Size 7.16 6.58 6.24 8.03 6.36 4.74 7.22 6.47 6.05 
Sales growth 10.29 13.34 15.25 13.52 14.61 13.84 10.92 13.17 15.92 
Cash flow 4.09 9.66 7.95 6.53 7.49 9.32 5.36 6.99 9.01 
Leverage 65.24 47.87 58.81 58.92 58.45 57.05 59.01 60.16 56.34 
Collateral 35.26 30.83 30.68 31.63 31.41 30.57 31.99 32.28 30.17 
Expdum 0.49 0.80 0.54 0.69 0.54 0.47 0.54 0.53 0.60 
Notes: NP indicates the sale of new products, and K, total assets. i indexes firms and t, time. See the Appendix 
for complete definitions of all variables. CATEGORY1/CATEGORY2/ CATEGORY3 indicate state-
owned/foreign/private firms in the column of Ownership; large/medium/small sized firms in the column of Size; 
and high/medium/no political affiliation firms in the column of Political Affiliation. 
 
 
 
Definitions of the variables used 
TFP: total factor productivity calculated using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
method, applied separately to different industrial groups. 
VAPW: ratio of value added (net income + income tax + wages + depreciation + 
interest payments) to total number of employees. 
PROD: ratio of total real sales to total number of employees. 
Total assets: sum of the firm’s fixed and current assets, where fixed assets include 
tangible fixed assets, intangible fixed assets, and other fixed assets; and current 
assets include inventories, accounts receivable, and other current assets. 
New products (npa): ratio of new product sales to total assets. 
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Size: natural logarithm of totalreal assets. 
Cash flow: ratio ofcash flow (net income plus depreciation) to total assets. 
Leverage: ratio of total liabilities to total assets. 
Collateral: ratio of tangible fixed assets to total assets. 
Expdum: dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm reports a positive value of overseas 
sales, and 0 otherwise. 
Sales growth: log-difference between total real sales in periods t and t-1. 
Assets growth: log-difference between total real assets in periods t and t-1. 
Deflators: all variables (except tangible fixed assets) are deflated using provincial 
ex-factory producer price indices taken from various issues of the China Statistical 
Yearbook. Tangible fixed assets are deflated using a deflator for fixed capital 
formation. 
Political affiliation (Lishu): Lishu=10, affiliated at central level; Lishu=20, affiliated 
at provincial level; Lishu=40: city or district level; Lishu=50, county level; Lishu=61, 
street level; Lishu=62, town level; Lishu=63, township level; Lishu=71, community 
level; Lishu=72, village level; Lishu=90, no political affiliation. 
 
 
Classification criteria: 
Ownership 
(based on the 
majority 
average 
ownership 
shares) 
SOEs At least 50% of all shares are state owned 
Foreign At least 50% of all shares are foreign owned 
Private At least 50% of all shares are privately owned 
Collective 
At least 50% of all shares are collectively owned 
Size 
Small 
If a firm’s total real assets are in the lowest quartile of 
the distribution of total real assets of all firms belonging 
to the same industry in a given year 
Medium 
If a firm’s total real assets are in the second or third 
quartiles of the distribution of total real assets of all 
firms belonging to the same industry in a s given year 
Large 
If a firm’s total real assets are in the highest quartile of 
the distribution of total real assets of all firms belonging 
to the same industry in a given year 
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Political 
Affiliation 
No If a firm has no political affiliation (Lishu=90) 
Medium 
If a firm is affiliated at city or district level, or county 
level, or street level, or town level, or township level, or 
community level, or village level (Lishu>20 & 
Lishu<90) 
High 
If a firm is affiliated at central or provincial level 
(Lishu<=20) 
Region 
East 
If a firm is located in the coastal region, which  includes 
the following provinces/autonomous regions/municipal 
cities: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Jiangsu, 
Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, 
Hainan, Guangxi 
Central 
If a firm is located in the central region, which includes 
the following provinces/autonomous regions/municipal 
cities: Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Anhui, Jiangxi, 
Heilongjiang, Jilin, Henan, Hubei, Hunan 
West 
If a firm is located in the western region, which includes 
the following provinces/autonomous regions/municipal 
cities: Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu, Yunnan, Xinjiang, 
Shaanxi, Guizhou, Chongqing, Ningxia, Tibet 
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Chapter 5 
To what extent do state and foreign ownership affect 
firms’ innovation activities? Microeconometric 
evidence from China 
 
 
Using data from 114,881 mainly unlisted Chinese firms over the period 2000−2007, 
we find a significant positive effect of joint ventures on innovation activity. 
Moreover, our results display an inverse U-shaped relationship between state 
ownership and product innovation. Foreign-affiliated firms, especially foreign-
affiliated joint-venture firms, are more likely to innovate than domestic firms, but 
their innovation propensity and intensity both diminish as foreign ownership 
increases. We also report strong evidence that, conditional on absorptive capacity, 
the relationship between foreign ownership and product innovation becomes positive 
for foreign-affiliated joint-venture firms. 
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5.1. Introduction  
China’s economy has undergone dramatic changes in the last 30 years. On the one 
hand, technological upgrades and global competition have emphasized the 
importance of innovation, and Chinese governments have made great progress 
towards building a favourable environment to facilitate innovation, through policy 
incentives, tax reductions, and other financial support. Still, innovation remains a 
key management challenge for Chinese governments, as well as for Chinese 
enterprises, since the latter have now become major participants in innovation 
activities.  
On the other hand, China’s economic reforms have led to significant changes 
in firms’ ownership structure. This can be seen from the proliferation of increasingly 
diversified ownership forms, and by the fall in state ownership and the rise in foreign 
ownership (Jefferson and Singh, 1998). These changes may affect firms’ innovation 
activities through issues of corporate governance, managerial discretion, resource 
allocation, risk distribution, and international cooperation (Li et al., 2008; Dong and 
Gou, 2010).  
As China embarks upon its Eleventh Five-year Guidelines, State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) are being called on to take the lead in increasing China’s 
capacity to innovate.46 China's large and medium-sized SOEs have made significant 
gains in economic strength over the past 30 years, and have been a major driving 
force of the country's economic growth. Since China introduced reforms and open-
door policies, independent innovation, encouraged by the Central Government, has 
played an increasingly important role in the transformation and development of 
                                                          
46 Source: “The 11th Five-Year Plan”, website: http://english.gov.cn/special/115y_index.htm 
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China's SOEs. State investors are therefore encouraged to take more responsibility in 
accelerating the development of new technologies, renovating traditional industries, 
and making new breakthroughs in key technologies. They are also incentivized to 
pay more attention to intellectual property rights and implement an intellectual 
property rights strategy that promotes sound interaction between technical 
innovation and intellectual property, encouraging some independently-developed 
core technologies, and play a leading role in industrial upgrades and structural 
optimization (Sheng and Zhao, 2012). However, China's SOEs has long been 
criticized as its inefficiencies, unfair competition, public displays of waste, in 
addition with corruption and bureaucratic problem (Lin et al., 2001). Recent news 
reported a number of issues from the results of a National Audit Office audit of ten 
SOEs, including inaccurate accounting, incomplete financial statements, illegal 
practices, which would result in poor management of investment decisions.47 And 
these problems are more serious in purely SOEs, which attract deeply attention for 
Chinese government.  
Although there has been some research on the relationship between foreign 
ownership and corporate performance (Greenaway et al., 2014), and some studies of 
the effect of FDI on innovation activities (Girma et al., 2008; Girma et al., 2009), 
empirical studies of the role of foreign ownership on evolving innovation activities at 
the firm-level are rare. As recently reported in The Economist,48 China is gradually 
losing its appeal for foreign companies. Because of flagging growth and rising costs, 
in addition to increasing competition from domestic enterprises, foreign firms’ 
                                                          
47 Source: “China unveils audit results for state-owned enterprises”, website: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/ china/2013-05/10/c_132373725.htm 
48 Source: “China loses its allure”, The Economist, website: 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21595001-life-getting-tougher-foreign-companies-those-
want-stay-will-have-adjust-china 
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business is getting tougher in China, and firms will have to adjust their investment 
strategies if they want to stay. Some foreign firms (for example: Best Buy, an 
American electronics retailer; Media Market, a German rival; and Yahoo!, an 
internet giant) have already left China. Some have given up trying to get it alone, and 
entered into joint ventures with domestic firms (see, for example, Tesco, a British 
food retailer). A very recent news released in Reuters reports that the Chinese state 
would no longer allow German car parts suppliers to operate their Chinese 
subsidiaries on their own, and instead only as part of joint ventures.49 This action is 
believed to represent an attempt to strengthen cooperation in terms of know-how and 
innovation through political way. 
In this chapter, we aim to investigate the relationship between firms’ 
ownership and their innovation activities. China provides an ideal laboratory setting 
to study this issue. This is because China’s innovation system has undergone 
considerable change in the past 30 years, and its innovation performance has 
improved remarkably. Furthermore, China’s economic reforms have led to 
significant changes in ownership structure, which enables us to investigate firms’ 
innovation activities across different ownership types and for different ownership 
levels.  
Making use a panel of 114,881 mainly unlisted Chinese firms over the period 
2000−2007, we investigate how joint ventures and state/foreign ownership affect 
corporate innovation activities. Based on a variety of specifications and a range of 
estimation methods, we find a significant positive effect of joint venture on 
innovation activity. Moreover, our results display an inverse U-shaped relationship 
                                                          
49 Source: “German car parts suppliers asked to form JVs in China: Stuttgarter”, Reuters, website: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/25/us-autos-china-partnership-idUSKBN0GP0LV20140825 
 
 
143 
 
between state ownership and product innovation. For foreign-affiliated firms, 
especially for foreign-affiliated joint-venture firms, they are more likely to innovate 
than domestic firms, but their innovation propensity and intensity both diminish as 
foreign ownership increases. We also report strong evidence that, conditional on 
absorptive capacity, the relationship between foreign ownership and product 
innovation becomes positive for foreign-affiliated joint-venture firms. 
We contribute to existing literature in three ways. Primarily, for the first time 
in a Chinese context, we test the relationship between ownership and innovation at 
firm level, and we take into account the non-linear effect of ownership on innovation. 
Most of the studies examine the spillovers of FDI at industry level (Girma et al., 
2008; Girma et al., 2009). Only a few papers in the literature have tested the state or 
foreign ownership on innovation on firm level (see for instance Choi et al., 2012; and 
Chen et al., 2014), but they only consider the linear effect. Second, we make use of a 
very large database, compiled by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) 
over the period 2000−2007. This database is made up of 114,881 mainly unlisted 
firms from 31 provinces or province-equivalent municipal cities, which make up to 
563,386 firm-level observations. Unlike the study only focusing on the large and 
healthy listed firms with very strict regulations (for example, foreign firms still 
cannot directly list in China’s stock market), our database includes a large proportion 
of small and young firms, and allow entry of new firms, and exit of exiting firms, 
also take the change of ownership into consideration.  
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows: Section 5.2 reviews the 
literature on ownership and innovation. Section 5.3 puts forward our hypotheses. 
Section 5.4 introduces our database and presents summary statistics. Section 5.5 
illustrates our models and estimation methodology. Section 5.6 describes our main 
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empirical results. Section 5.7 presents robustness tests. Section 5.8 puts forward our 
conclusions. 
 
5.2. Literature review 
5.2.1. Joint ventures and firm innovation 
Joint ventures (JVs) have become important in international business, especially in 
terms of innovation activities. 50  The nature of collaboration has shifted from 
peripheral interests to core functions of corporations, such as the generation, 
exchange, and/or adoption of new technologies (Caloghirou et al., 2003). Hladik 
(1994) and Tidd et al. (2001) summarize the potential benefits of JVs on firms’ 
innovation activities. First, collaborative R&D agreements can spread the costs and 
risks of R&D between joint venture partners. Firms generally face financing 
constraints when they participate in innovation activities (Hall and Lerner, 2010; 
Brown et al., 2012). By sharing R&D expenses, JVs provide firms with financial 
resources and help them stay at the forefront of technology. Even if a firm is able to 
raise enough financing by itself, it still faces several risks, including the uncertainty 
of any expected R&D breakthrough, future consumer demands for a product, and the 
actions of competitors. With enough support, JVs allow firms to diversify their 
investment over several innovation projects and reduce these risks. Second, JVs have 
more ready access to technology and technical know-how. Each partner has a 
comparative advantage, and when the comparative advantages of the partners are 
                                                          
50 According to  OECD (1986), innovation is an important component of all the activities carried out 
by JVs. JVs are defined as activities “...in which the operations of two or more firms are partially, but 
not totally, functionally integrated in order to carry out activities in one or more of the following areas: 
(i) buying or selling operations; (ii) natural resource exploration, development and/or production 
operations; (iii) research and development operations; and, (iv) engineering and construction 
operations.” 
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combined together, the technical capabilities of every single partner are exceeded. 
Third, JVs can provide access to domestic and international markets. Given the fixed 
costs of innovation, the larger the market, the higher the joint ventures’ expected rate 
of return from R&D activities. Lastly, through innovative collaboration with 
potential competitors, JVs can not only reduce the number of competitors splitting 
the market, but also have the opportunity to develop common technical standards 
which form the basis for subsequent product design and development. This can 
ensure the JV firm keeps a favorable position relative to competition.  
In an early empirical work, Link and Bauer (1989) find a positive relationship 
between cooperative R&D and firms’ productivity in the US. Along the same line, 
Scott (1996) shows that cooperation appears to foster new research and expand the 
scope of the US firms’ R&D horizon. Caloghirouet al. (2000) demonstrate that 
Europe has embarked on Framework Programmes for Research and Technological 
Development (FWP) since 1984, aimed at forcing European organizations to work 
together in cross-border partnership and created a sense of European “togetherness” 
in science and technology (S&T). In a broad survey of European companies, it is 
reported that JVs are beneficial for the development of new products and the 
improvement of technological and organizational capabilities. Adams and Marcu 
(2004) suggest that innovation is the primary motivation for research joint ventures. 
Instead of directly testing the effect of JVs on innovation, some empirical research 
has found a positive relationship between JVs and firms’ performance (Benfratello 
and Sembenelli, 2002; Greenaway et al., 2014). Logically, better performing firms 
have more resources and higher capabilities to participate in innovation activities. 
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5.2.2. State ownership and firm innovation 
Previous studies have obtained mixed results on the effect of state ownership on 
firms’ innovation activities (Choi et al., 2011; Choi et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2003; 
Shleifer, 1998). This is not surprising since state ownership influences innovation 
activities in two contrasting ways: positively, by playing a resource-rich role 
(accessing more resource with the support of the government) and representing an 
advantage in terms of political connections, but also negatively, in terms of agency 
costs and corruption problems. 
Specifically, Choi et al. (2012) explain the positive effect of state ownership on 
innovation through resource dependence theory. This theory shows how 
organizations try to gain control over scarce resource. It was originally articulated by 
Pfeffer (1972), who propose that the resources which one organization needs for 
innovation are often in the hands of other organizations. From this perspective, the 
state can help controlled firms to access scarce technological resources, since they 
are generally resource-rich outsiders who possess specific properties, and can 
transcend many boundaries, bringing in the necessary resources for technological 
innovation. State-owned enterprises also benefit from financial resources and suffer 
little or not at all from financing constraints (Guariglia and Liu, 2014), which 
reduces firms’ external dependencies and uncertainties in respect of resources, and 
therefore, promotes their innovation activities. Empirically, Chang et al. (2006) and 
Xu and Wang (1999) provide evidence that, in China, a high portion of state 
ownership is likely to positively impact technological innovation and R&D 
investment. In addition, Choi et al. (2011) demonstrate that governments stimulate 
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firms’ learning and innovation activities through an array of policy instruments.51 
Successful economies, such as South Korea and Taiwan, provide good examples of 
the state-led industrialization model, as well as government-driven technological 
development strategies (Amsden, 1992; Koo, 1987; Wade, 1990; Kim, 1997). State-
owned enterprises or state investors can therefore benefit from these policy 
instruments due to their close relationship with the government.  
However, some research has emphasized the negative aspects of state 
ownership on firm performance (Boardman and Vining, 1989; Vickers and Yarrow, 
1991; Boycko et al., 1996; Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001). These authors argue that 
problems arise from a government’s choices with regard to social and political policy 
objectives that go beyond profit maximization. Su et al. (2008) explain specifically 
that, in China, when the state is in a control position, it can appoint directors and 
managers who are sympathetic to the government’s political objectives, such as 
preserving social stability or solving employment issues. Hart et al. (1997) and 
Shleifer (1998) argue that government agents have poor incentives to reduce costs or 
improve quality. Child (1994) and Child and Lu (1996) explain that the negative 
impact of government ownership on firm performance is caused by inefficient 
structures and a lack of managerial knowledge. Lin et al. (1998) demonstrate that the 
root of the SOE problem is the separation of ownership and control: the state cannot 
operate firms by itself and needs to delegate their control to the enterprises’ 
managers. This separation may raise issues of incentive incompatibility and 
information asymmetry between managers and owners. In addition, corruption and 
                                                          
51  Policy instruments include “the facilitation of R&D investments in strategic industries, the 
management of government-funded research institutes, the establishment of patent regulations and 
law, the import of advanced technology from foreign countries, and the launch of national strategic 
projects” (Choi et al., 2011, pp. 442). In 2006, the Chinese government put forward a policy called 
“The National Medium- and Long-Term Program of Science and Technology Development (2006-
2020)”, which aimed to strengthen China’s scientific and technological (S&T) progress, and bring 
about an innovation-oriented society by 2020. 
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crony capitalism can develop through ‘unhealthy’ ties between government and 
businesses, and may play as a ‘grabber’ by demanding informal payments from firms, 
for example, bribery through issuing a license or circumventing laws and regulations, 
which limits firms’ incentive to innovate and lowers the returns of R&D (Lin et al., 
2010). 
 
5.2.3. Foreign ownership and firm innovation 
Foreign investors (i.e. multinational corporations (MNCs) and financial institutions) 
join with domestic firms not merely through equity participation, but through a range 
of business and other activities, such as R&D (Douma et al., 2006). Cheung and Lin 
(2004) summarize several important channels through which domestic investors can 
benefit from the innovation activities of foreign firms in their host country. First, 
foreign partners provide domestic firms with advanced technologies, financial 
support, and managerial knowledge and resources (Srholec, 2009; Dachs and 
Ebersberger, 2009). Second, spillovers can take place through labor mobility 
whereby domestic firms “steal” skilled workers from foreign firms to obtain 
technological know-how (Fosfuri et al., 2011). Third, foreign technologies have a 
‘demonstration effect’ which can inspire and stimulate domestic firms to participate 
in innovation. Moreover, since the products and technologies that foreign partners 
bring in have already been tested in foreign markets, the perceived risk of innovating 
along similar trajectories is relatively low for domestic firms. Finally, spillovers may 
take place vertically through supplier-customer relationships by means of 
technological know-how transfer, staff training, and so on, and enhance the 
innovation capability of local suppliers or customers.  
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A recent empirical study conducted by Guadalupe et al. (2012) uses Spanish 
firm-level data and find that foreign-acquired firms prompt a greater adoption of 
innovation activity. By investigating Japanese listed manufacturing firms, David et 
al. (2006) suggest that foreign ownership leads firms to engage in a more optimal 
level of R&D. Other empirical evidence reports that foreign-investment-related firms 
are more likely to introduce innovation than domestic firms in the US (Dunning and 
Narula, 1995), the UK (Frenz and Ietto-Gillies, 2007), Italy (Balcet and Evangelista, 
2005), the Netherlands (Sadowski and Sadowski-Rasters, 2006), and other European 
countries (Falk, 2008; Srholec, 2009). 
However, several studies have failed to find a significant positive effect or 
even observe the negative spillovers from foreign investment (Kinoshita, 2001; 
Knell and Srholec, 2005; Zhang and Rogers, 2009). Kokko (1994) explains that 
these findings, which contradict with respect to the positive effect of foreign 
investors, are generally caused by host country characteristics, for example, the 
educational level of the local labor force, local competition, and the requirements on 
the affiliates’ operations. The support of local markets and access to local science 
and technology also determines the dispersion of R&D (Von Zedtwitz and 
Gassmann, 2002). Kuemmerle (1999) points out that the relative market size and 
relative strength of a country’s science base determine the types of FDI, whether it is 
“Home-base-exploiting” or “Home-base-augmenting”. 52  Beyond country 
characteristics, Cantwell and Mudambi (2005) find that the level of subsidiary R&D 
                                                          
52 “Home-base-exploiting” describes a type of FDI in R&D where foreign investors exploit existing 
firm-specific advantages by establishing manufacturing facilities abroad to adapt existing products to 
local needs. “Home-base-augmenting” shows another type of FDI in R&D: that foreign firms 
augment knowledge by building up new knowledge production sites abroad and capturing 
externalities locally. “Home-base-exploiting” is preferred if a host country offers important market 
opportunities that a foreign firm seeks to convert into profit, while “Home-base-augmenting” is more 
probable if the size of a host country’s knowledge base is large and the quality of this knowledge base 
is high (Kuemmerle, 1999).  
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also depends on multination enterprises’ (MNEs) group-level and subsidiary-level 
factors.  
In addition, Gertler et al. (2000) and Narula (2003) suggest that foreign-owned 
firms are likely to concentrate innovation activities in their home countries, while 
maintaining limited R&D and cooperation links to their host economy. According to 
OECD (1998), firms in developed countries spend less than 12 percent of total R&D 
expenditure outside their home sites. Lall (1992) argues that foreign firms are likely 
to transfer existing technologies to other countries, rather than develop new 
technologies abroad. Kuemmerle (1999) emphasizes that, whatever the type of FDI 
in R&D (either “Home-base-exploiting” or “Home-base-augmenting”, as above) is 
undertaken, foreign firms’ core technologies are generally located in firms’ domestic 
headquarters or divisional headquarters.  
Moreover, monopoly power is generally viewed as the main engine of 
technological progress, for reasons relating to the optimal scale for R&D and 
innovation, appropriability conditions, and the presence of financial constraints 
(Cohen and Levin, 1989; Symeonidis, 2001). However, foreign investment increases 
competition by raising the level of concentration in the host-country market (Aitken 
and Harrison, 1999), and thus trims down monopoly rents, therefore decreasing the 
incentive to innovate. 
 
5.2.4. Absorptive capacity and firm innovation 
Economic theory suggests that domestic firms need a certain level of technological 
capacity before they can benefit from foreign firms’ stock of knowledge (Lapan and 
Bardhan, 1973).   Cohen and Levinthal (1989) observe that domestic firms’ own 
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R&D activities can boost firms’ efficiency in an indirect way, by accelerating the 
assimilation of technologies generated in other countries. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) 
put forward the notion of absorptive capacity as “the ability of a firm to recognize 
the value of new, external information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial 
ends”. They emphasize that the ability of a firm to exploit external knowledge is a 
critical component of its innovative capabilities. Girma (2005) argues that absorptive 
capacity may result in different impact of FDI on productivity spillovers, which 
could either be negative, positive, or neutral. Initially, firms’ productivity gains 
increase at an increasing rate of FDI with moderate absorptive capacity, but the 
magnitudes of FDI on productivity become less important or even negative if firms’ 
technological capacity is too high or too low. Kostopoulos et al. (2011) offer 
evidence that absorptive capacity allows firms to identify more external knowledge 
inflows and add more positive value to innovation performance. Except for the 
positive impact on innovation, absorptive capacity also helps to reduce entry barriers 
into export markets, thus further boosting export performance (Harris and Li, 2009).  
Existing literature has considered a multitude of activities to measure firms’ or 
countries’ absorptive capacity, including R&D expenditures and R&D intensity 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Tsai, 2001; Griffith et al., 
2000); employee skills, educated workers, technical personnel, or external scientists 
(Lund Vinding, 2006; Grimpe and Sofka, 2009; Cockburn and Henderson, 1998); 
investment in scientific and technical training (Mowery and Oxley, 1995); the firm's 
basic research activities (Rosenberg, 1990; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Dyer and 
Singh, 1998); inter-organizational trust and cultural compatibility between domestic 
and foreign parents (Lane et al., 2001); the economic policies that enforce 
competition among domestic firms (Mowery and Oxley, 1995); and the efficiency of 
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the financial sector in host countries (Alfaro et al., 2004).  
 
5.3. Hypotheses 
5.3.1. Joint ventures and firms’ innovation activities 
In China, different investors generally have different advantages. Specifically, state 
investors and collective investors are likely to have a widespread knowledge of the 
Chinese markets and legal environment (Greenaway et al., 2014). They also have 
strong political connections (Guanxi) with central or local governments, which is 
often considered a key factor in determining firms’ performance in China (Hsieh and 
Klenow, 2007). From the perspective of foreign investors, they bring in capital, 
modern technologies, and better corporate governance (through monitoring and 
market discipline, as well as managerial and international networking skills). Private 
or family investors are generally more creative, and have a higher degree of 
marketization, better incentive mechanisms, and fewer restrictions (Li et al., 2004).53 
Therefore, joint ventures (JVs) between two or more of these ownership groups can 
boost corporate innovation activities as each partner brings its comparative 
advantages to the firm. Based on the arguments above, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1: Joint ventures are more likely to undertake innovation activities 
relative to sole proprietorships. 
 
5.3.2. State ownership and firms’ innovation activities 
                                                          
53 See the explanations in footnote 15. 
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In transition economies such as China, the government still plays a key role in the 
process of innovation. With an increase of state ownership, firms can benefit more 
from political affiliation with the government. These benefits include access to 
technology, financial resources, highly skilled technicians, and regulatory and legal 
support. Moreover, at moderate levels of state ownership, no single shareholder 
group has complete influence, and the state owner is therefore forced to collaborate 
with other shareholder groups to negotiate their common interests instead of making 
arbitrary decisions (Su et al., 2008). Such mutual monitoring helps decrease the 
negative effects of government control on performance, such negative effects 
including low-level productive efficiency, non-maximization profit consideration, 
corruption and bureaucratic problem. As state ownership increases further, 
government control rises. Therefore, state owners no longer need to consult with 
other shareholder groups, and can appoint directors and managers sympathetic to the 
government’s social and political goals. Under these circumstances, they may ignore 
projects with high profit or growth potential, such as innovation activities. In 
addition, corruption and crony capitalism problems are more significant when state 
ownership is high. Based on the arguments above, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 2: There will be an inverse U-shaped relationship between state 
ownership and firms’ innovation activities. 
 
5.3.3. Foreign ownership and firms’ innovation activities 
In China, foreign-affiliated firms still have comparative innovation advantages 
relative to domestic firms due to their advanced technologies, financial capacity, and 
managerial knowledge and resources. We therefore expect that foreign-affiliated 
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firms are more innovative than purely domestic firms. However, we expect that this 
effect is particularly reflected in joint-venture. Guadalupe et al. (2012) point out that 
the fundamental objective for foreign firms is to increase firm productivity, no 
matter what activities they undertake internationally, including foreign innovation. 
Their aim is to get maximum profit with lowest risk and minimum cost. As proposed 
by Richards and Yang (2007), the level of environmental uncertainty in a host 
country has a negative impact on the share of foreign ownership in its international 
R&D. Although China has made great progress in reducing political, economic, and 
social uncertainty and FDI indeed has increased total fixed asset investment in the 
country (Chen et al., 1995), the Chinese market still faces a high degree of 
asymmetric information when developing innovation activities, because of its 
unsound property rights protections and poorly regulated patent legal system, as well 
as its weak shareholder protection and weak corporate governance systems. This puts 
foreign firms in an uncertain environment. Under these circumstances, foreign 
investors can collaborate with domestic firms and only invest a small amount of 
shares in joint ventures, especially when dealing with innovation projects with high 
risks and large costs.54 Once the project succeeds, they will draw enormous profits, 
with only a minimal loss if the projects fail. With so little to lose and so much to gain, 
it is not surprising that firms with lower foreign ownership participation are more 
likely to undertake innovative activities.   
As foreign shares increase, foreign investors have to commit more capital and 
therefore take relatively greater risks, increasing their uncertainty and decreasing 
their incentive to undertake innovation activities. When foreign ownership rises 
further to represent the majority of shareholders, foreign investors may enjoy fewer 
                                                          
54 In some joint-venture firms, foreign investors may get some shares by only providing relevant 
technologies or patents but may have no capital investment.  
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advantages from domestic investors, including their widespread knowledge of the 
Chinese markets, and the legal, regulatory, and bureaucratic environments, as well as 
Guanxi 55  (Greenaway et al., 2014). All this may decrease their incentives to 
undertake innovative activities. In addition, foreign firms’ innovation activities have 
been found constrained by their internal finance, which may restrict their investment 
in innovation (Guariglia and Liu, 2014). They may also face an increasing level of 
competition when the number of foreign investors in the market increases, which 
might hinder laggard firms to catch and will, in turn, tend to decrease their incentive 
to innovate. Moreover, Burkart et al. (1997) demonstrate a trade-off between 
monitoring and managerial initiative. With the rise of foreign ownership, foreign 
investors will increase their levels of monitoring and control power as it delegates a 
certain degree of control to management, but reduce their managerial initiative 
within a firm. From this perspective, firms with higher foreign ownership may have 
less initiative to innovate. In addition, firms that are fully (or almost fully) owned by 
foreign investors may locate their innovation activities mostly in their firms’ 
headquarters. Their main tasks abroad are to redesign, customize, and adjust 
products, but not to undertake radical innovation. Based on this point, we expect less 
innovation activities in firms with a higher degree of foreign ownership.  
Furthermore, in China, foreign firms include a large number of investors from 
Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan (HMT). Greenaway et al. (2014) argue that investors 
from HMT are likely to be fundamentally different from investors from other parts of 
the world. On the one hand, HMT firms have a more limited ability to transfer 
technology to the domestic market (Huang, 2004; Buckley et al., 2007). On the other 
                                                          
55 Guanxi can be portrayed as “the existence and development of interpersonal relationship in order to 
seek some specific privileges beyond usual norms, rules, and laws” (Wei and Youmin, 2001, pp. 295). 
In our research, we emphasize Guanxi on political connection with the government.  
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hand, “round-tripping” refers to the fact that some domestic firms go abroad and 
later re-invest back, registering as HMT firms to take advantage of favorable tax and 
regulatory treatment received by foreign investors (Huang, 2003; Xiao, 2004). In 
such cases, one would not necessarily expect firms with increasing HMT shares 
(viewed as foreign ownership) to undertake more innovation activities. 
Due to the above, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 3: Foreign-affiliated firms, especially foreign-affiliated joint-
venture firms, are more likely to innovate than domestic firms, but their innovation 
propensity and intensity both diminish as foreign ownership increases. 
 
5.3.4. The role of absorptive capacity  
Based on a panel data set from China, Fu (2008) finds that the availability of 
absorptive capacity plays an important role on the relationship between FDI intensity 
and innovation efficiency. Specifically, the enhancement of local absorptive capacity 
can help to create effective assimilation of knowledge and technology spillovers 
from FDI. Similarly, Girma et al. (2009) find that FDI has a significant positive 
effect on SOEs’ innovation activities only when absorptive capacity is taken into 
account. They explain that SOEs with a greater absorptive capacity may be less 
likely to be “laggards” and may actually be able to increase their innovation activity 
in the presence of increasing competition from FDI. Liu and Buck (2007) 
incorporate absorptive capacity of local firms in Chinese high-tech industries into 
their analyses, and find that firms are likely to take advantage of external technology 
spillovers pending a certain level of absorptive capacity. These three studies focus on 
the effects of absorptive capacity at the industry or sector level, but, to the best of our 
 
 
157 
 
knowledge, whether and how absorptive capacity works on the technology transfer 
from foreign investors to individual firms has not been studied. Dyer and Singh 
(1998) propose the concept of partner-specific absorptive capacity according to 
which “a firm has developed the ability to recognize and assimilate valuable 
knowledge from a particular alliance partner”. This capacity allows collaborating 
firms to systematically identify and translate external knowledge inflow across 
organizational boundaries, and achieve superior innovation. More specifically, with 
absorptive capacity, domestic investors can recognize the value of new, external 
information or technology, learn and assimilate it from their foreign partners, and 
finally create their own innovation and apply it to commercial ends. Therefore, we 
believe that, with foreign shares increasing in a collaborating firm, domestic 
investors with a certain level of absorptive capacity will recognize and assimilate 
more valuable know-how and technology from foreign investors, and eventually 
promote innovation activities. Based on the above reasons, we therefore hypothesize 
that: 
Hypothesis 4: Conditional on absorptive capacity, the relationship between 
foreign ownership and firms’ innovative activities will turn from negative to positive.  
 
5.4. Data and summary statistics 
5.4.1. Data 
The data we used in this chapter is similar as we used in Chapter 3. We also follow 
the similar process and criteria to clean the data. After the above adjustments, our 
final panel data set includes 563,368 firm-level observations, covering 114,881 
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mainly unlisted firms over the period 2000−2007. 56 The sample is unbalanced: the 
structure of the panel is shown in Table 5.A1 in Appendix. The number of 
observations ranges from a minimum of 49,222 in 2000 to a maximum of 98,468 in 
2003. Similar as in Chapter 3, we define innovation activities as the ratio of a firm’s 
sales of new products to total sales.57  
The NBS dataset contains a continuous measure of ownership, based on the 
fraction of paid-in-capital contributed by six types of investor: the state; foreign 
investors (excluding those from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan); investors from 
Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan; legal entities; individuals; and collective 
investors.58 Our state ownership variable is taken as the share of a firm’s capital paid 
in by all state investors, while the foreign ownership variable is calculated by the 
share of the firm’s capital paid in by all foreign investors, including those from Hong 
Kong, Macao and Taiwan.  
 
5.4.2. Summary statistics 
In Table 5.1, we divide our observations into four categories on the basis of the share 
of capital paid in by state investors (Panel A). Our first category in Panel A contains 
those firm-years with no state participation, which make up 90.39% of our sample. 
Our second category in Panel A encompassed those observations with a share of 
                                                          
56 It should be noted that listed firms are included in our dataset. However, they represent only a very 
small proportion of our sample: in 2007, for example, there were only 1,550 listed firms out a total of 
93,552 firms. In addition, it is difficult to track these firms as their legal identification numbers are 
changed when they go public. 
57 All our results were robust to focusing on the ratio of sales of new products to total assets (see 
Table 5.1). 
58 We classify ownership based on the fraction of capital paid in by various agents in every year, 
rather than by registration codes. One reason for this choice is that there are often substantial delays in 
updating firms’ registration codes, which make them unreliable. Another reason is that firms might 
have an incentive to falsely register as foreign firms, in order to take advantage of the benefits granted 
to these firms. 
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state capital which is positive but lower than 50% (2.50% of our sample). Our third 
category in Panel A includes observations with a state share equal to or higher than 
50% but lower than 100% (2.13% of our sample). Our final category displays firms 
than are 100% state owned, which make up 4.99% of our sample. Similarly, we 
divide our observations into four categories on the basis of the share of capital paid 
in by foreign investors using the same thresholds:  0%, 0%−50%, 50%−100%, 100% 
(Panel B). Each category makes up 74.27%, 7.26%, 4.97%, and 13.51% of our 
sample, respectively. We also make finer classifications based on every 25% of the 
share of capital paid in by state investors (Panel C) and foreign investors (Panel D).  
[Insert Table 5.1 here] 
Our analysis focuses on the following measures of innovation activity: dnp (a 
dummy variable, which equals to 1 if a firm has new product sales, and 0 otherwise); 
nps (the new product sales to total sales ratio). We also provide an alternative 
measure of innovation, npa (the new product sales to total assets) for robustness. 
This variable was used in Guariglia and Liu (2014). 
Table 5.1 presents summary statistics about the behavior of our innovation 
variables for different categories of ownership. In Panel A, we observe that dnp, nps, 
and npa all increase with the degree of state ownership, but decline for those 
observations that are 100% state owned. This suggests that firms with state capital 
are more likely to innovate and invest more in innovation activities than firms 
without any state capital. This may reflect the fact that state investors bring in 
attributes essential to innovation activities. Specifically, state investors take 
advantage of superior financing accessibility, thereby suffering less or not at all from 
financial constraints (Guariglia and Liu, 2014). However, product innovation in 
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purely state owned firms (column 4) is relatively smaller than in state joint-venture 
firms (columns 2 and 3). This indicates that, firms’ product innovation firstly 
increase with the rise of state ownership, but then decrease after state ownership 
going up still further, which presents an inverse U-shaped relationship between state 
ownership and firms’ innovation activities. This result is in line with our Hypothesis 
2. Meanwhile, it also indicates that join venture firms are more likely to undertake 
innovation activities, which provide evidence for our Hypothesis 1. 
In Panel B, we can observe that dnp, nps, and npa all decrease with the degree 
of foreign ownership, but their average values in foreign affiliated joint-ventures 
(columns 2 and 3) are larger than in purely domestic firms (column 1), and also 
larger than purely foreign firms (column 4). This trend indicates that product 
innovation will decrease with an increase of foreign ownership, but that product 
innovation in foreign-affiliated firms, at least in foreign-affiliated joint-venture firms 
is, on average, greater than in purely domestic firms. This provides evidence for our 
Hypothesis 2. 
 
5.5. Model and methodology 
5.5.1. Baseline models 
In order to test our hypotheses, we initially estimate the following regression: 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐽𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑒
2
𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽9𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ_𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑑𝑡 +  ε𝑖,𝑡                                                                 (5.1) 
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where the subscript i indicates firms, and t, time. The dependent variable 
Innovationi,t represents innovation activities. When examining the probability of 
Innovationi,t, the dependent variable is a binary variable taking a value of one if the 
firm has positive new product sales, and zero otherwise. When focusing on the 
determinants of the amount of Innovationi,t, the dependent variable is a censored 
variable which is equal to zero if the firm does not have new product sales, and takes 
the value of the actual new product sales to total sales ratio, otherwise.  
The independent variables in Equation (5.1) include proxies aimed at testing 
the effect of joint-ventures on innovation, as well as some control variables. 
Specifically, JVi,t is equal to 1 if a firm owned by two or more agents, and 0 
otherwise. If joint-ventures enhance firms’ innovation activities, we expect that β2>0. 
The other regressors in Equation (5.1) are informed by the finance literature (e.g. 
Choi et al., 2011). Sizei,t-1 is defined as the lagged value of the natural logarithm of 
real total sales.59 Large firms are more likely to be innovative because they have 
more financial and technical capabilities, economies of scope so as to spread the risk 
of failure and absorb the costs of innovation, the ability to establish and maintain 
scientific facilities, the resources to hire professional and skilled workers, and the 
ability to raise capital and market an innovation (Damanpour, 2010). Guariglia and 
Liu (2014) find that large firms are less likely to be subject to financial constraints, 
which should facilitate their tendency to innovate. We therefore expect a positive 
coefficient on firm size. Leveragei,t-1 is the lagged value of the ratio of total liabilities 
to total assets. On the one hand, firms with a high debt ratio might decrease their 
innovation activities due to concerns over bankruptcy risk. On the other hand, 
although debt finance is not a favorite source of financing for innovation-intensive 
                                                          
59 All our results are robust to using the natural logarithm of real total assets to measure firm size. 
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firms in the U.S. (Brown et al. 2009, Brown et al. 2012), it plays an important role 
for Chinese firms, especially for state-owned firms who can easily access loans from 
banks.60 We therefore remain agnostic about the sign of the coefficient associate with 
the leverage ratio. Collaterali,t-1 is the lagged value of the ratio of tangible to total 
assets, which is expected to negatively affect innovation. Hovakimian (2009) argues 
in fact that firms with high tangibility are more likely to operate in industries with 
low growth potential, and could therefore display lower R&D investment and less 
new product output. Expdumi,t-1 is an export dummy, which is equal to 1 if a firm 
exports, and 0 otherwise. Consistent with widespread evidence that innovation and 
exports are positively correlated (Girma et al., 2009; Pla-Barber & Alegre, 2007), we 
would expect a positive sign on Expdumi,t-1. 
We also take the influence of competition into consideration. Aghion et al. 
(2002) find an inverted U-shaped relationship between product market competition 
(measured by the price cost margin) and innovation. They explain that the positive 
“escape competition effect” dominates when the competition level is low, whereas 
the negative “Schumpeterian effect” dominates when competition level is high.61 We 
therefore expect similar results in our estimations. Tingvall and Poldahl (2006) show 
that this inverted U-shaped relation is only supported by the Herfindahl index, but 
not by the price cost margin. They also point out the Herfindahl index is more 
appropriate when an economy is large (i.e. when the domestic market is the main 
market). Considering their results and the characteristics of the Chinese market, we 
calculate the Herfindahl index (HI) at the 2-digit industry level, as follows: 
                                                          
60 Unlike the U.S., most Chinese firms generally do not issue equity. In addition, more than 95% of 
the firms covered in our dataset are unlisted. 
61 The “escape competition effect” means that more competition induces neck-and-neck firms to 
innovate in order to escape competition. The “Schumpeterian effect” indicates that more competition 
may reduce innovation as the laggard’s reward to catching up with the technological leader may fall, 
which is more typical in less neck-and-neck, or more “unleveled” industries (Aghion et al., 2002). 
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where the subscript i indicates firms, and t, time. HI measures firm size in relation to 
the industry and thereby indicates the amount of competition. Its value ranges from 0 
(many competitors and/or many equally distributed market shares) to 1 (a single 
monopolistic producer with no competitors). In order to understand the relationship 
between competition and innovation more directly, we use the reverse Herfindahl 
concentration index (one minus the Herfindahl index) to measure industry 
competitive intensity, i.e. we define the following variable: 1Compete HI  , as in 
Ju and Zhao (2009). The higher the value of Compete, the more competitive the 
industry. We also include its squared term, Compete2, to capture the non-linearity, as 
suggested by Aghion et al. (2002). 
Furthermore, we consider the effect of technology gap on innovation. As 
originally proposed by Findlay (1978) and confirmed by several other works, 
including Wang and Blomström (1992), Sjöholm (1999), and more recently, Jabbour 
and Mucchielli (2007) and Imbriani et al. (2014), the technology gap has a positive 
impact on the spillovers between domestic firms and multinational enterprises. They 
explain that a firm distant from the technology frontier has a larger backlog of 
established knowledge to absorb than a leading-edge firm. According to the 
definition in Tingvall and Poldahl (2006), we calculate the technology gap 
(Tech_gap) as follows: 
, , ,
,
,
_ ,  where  
max
j m t i t
i t
i t
TFP TFP
Tech gap j leading firm
TFP

   
The subscript i indicates firms; and t, time. TFPi,t represents total factor productivity 
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for the ith firms in year t.62 TFP
max 
j,m,t denotes the maximum TFP for the leading firm j 
in the mth industry in year t. (TFP
max 
j,m,t − TFPi,t) therefore indicates the distance to the 
technology frontier for the ith firms in year t. We expect a positive coefficient of 
Tech_gap on innovation. 
To better understand the nature of the relationship between state/foreign 
ownership and firm innovation activities, we then estimate the following variant of 
Equation (5.2), which replaces the JV dummy with the actual percentage of the 
firm’s capital paid in by state/foreign investors, Statecap/Foreigncap, respectively: 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1
2
+ 𝛽3𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽8𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑒
2
𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ_𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑣𝑗 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡        (5.2) 
where the subscript i indicates firms; and t, time. Considering the large literature on 
the effects of privatization on corporate performance, which further affects 
innovation, we also include Privatecap (the percentage of the firm’s total capital 
paid by the private investors) and its squared term Privatecap2 in all specifications. 
Other control variables are the same as defined in Equation (5.1). 
In order to test whether the impact of foreign ownership on innovation is 
different depending on absorptive capacity, we then estimate Equation (5.3), which 
interacts Foreigncap with an absorptive capacity dummy, as follows: 
                                                          
62 TFP estimates based on the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method can be obtained in STATA by 
using the levpet command. 
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𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝐴𝐶 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑤_𝐴𝐶 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽9𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑒
2
𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ_𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                         (5.3) 
where the subscript i indicates firms; and t, time. High_AC (Low_AC) are dummy 
variables equals to 1 if a firm has a high (low) level of absorptive capacity, and 0 
otherwise. Specifically, we follow the definition in Girma et al. (2009),63  which 
High_AC (Low_AC) equals to 1 if a firm has R&D investment (or not) or has past 
experience in product innovation (or not); and 0 otherwise. 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) argue that firms conducting their own R&D are 
better able to use externally available information,64 which implies that absorptive 
capacity may be created as a byproduct of a firm’s R&D investment. They also 
suggest that prior related knowledge is important for firms to assimilate and use new 
knowledge. Research on memory development suggests that accumulated prior 
knowledge increases both the ability to put new knowledge into memory, and the 
ability to recall and use it. Lane et al. (2001) also point out that managerial, 
marketing, and manufacturing knowledge and skills are all developed through past 
experience, which have a positive impact on learning from foreign parents. Fu (2008) 
highlights that it is necessary for a firm to have a certain level of R&D intensity 
before it can benefit from FDI-generated externalities. According to the literature 
discussed above and considering the information available from our data, we 
                                                          
63  In their paper, they consider absorptive capacity by using the following four indicators: past 
experience in product innovation, R&D activity, labor training, and exporting. For labor training 
measure, we do not have this data so we cannot test for it. For exporting measure, more than 80% 
foreign firms in our sample are exporting, which has very limit impact when differentiating them 
separately. Therefore, we use the first two indicators (past experience in product innovation, and 
R&D activity) to measure firms’ absorptive capacity. 
64 Also see Tilton (1971), Allen (1977), and Cohen and Levinthal (1989). 
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therefore take R&D activity and past experience in product innovation as indicators 
of absorptive capacity.65 Other control variables are the same as defined in Equation 
(5.1) and Equation (5.2). 
The error term in Equation (5.1), (5.2), and (5.3) is made up of four 
components. vi denotes a firm-specific effect; dt represents time-specific effect, 
which we take into account by including time dummies in our regressions capturing 
business cycle effects; vj is an industry-specific effect, which we control for by 
including industry dummies. Finally, εi,t is an idiosyncratic error term.66 
 
5.5.2. Estimation methodology 
We first estimate a pooled probit model to examine the impact of JVs or state/foreign 
ownership on the probability of the firm to undertake innovation activities. We then 
use a pooled tobit model to test the effect of these variables on the amount of 
innovation activities. 67 To control for the potential endogeneity of our regressors, all 
variables except Compete, Compete2, and Tech_gap, are lagged once in our 
regression, with the aim to alleviate simultaneity bias.68 As a robustness test, we also 
estimate our equations using Instrumental Variable (IV) Probit and Tobit models.69 
 
                                                          
65 These two indicators are also used in Girma et al. (2009). 
66 All our results were robust to including regional dummies, as well as to including industry and 
time-industry interactions. 
67 Our results are robust to using random-effects probit and tobit estimators. We prefer the pooled 
probit and tobit models with cluster-robust standard errors to the random-effects estimators owing to 
their computational advantages: for large samples, computational time is in fact an issue for random-
effects probit and tobit models, because they use full ‘random effects’ with a high number of 
covariates (Wooldridge, 2008). 
68 We do not lag Compete, Compete2, and Tech_gap as they are calculated at industry level, and less 
likely to affect firms’ activities. However, the results were still robust when we lag them once.  
69 See Table 5.6. 
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5.6. Results and discussion 
Table 5.2 shows the estimates of Equation (5.1). Specifically, the results in column 1 
are predicated on our baseline static model without including the lagged dependent 
variable and without considering the effects of competition and technology gap. The 
marginal effects indicate that increasing the probability of the firm being a joint 
ventures by 0.1, or 10 percentage points, would increase the probability of selling 
new products by 0.0018, or about 0.18 percentage points. The estimation in column 
2 improves our baseline model by adding the lagged dependent variable into 
consideration, calling as dynamic model. We observe that the coefficient on JV is 
also positive and significant, but the marginal effect is smaller (a 10-percentage point 
rise in the probability of being a joint venture increases the probability of innovation 
by 0.05 percentage points). The positive effect of joint ventures is also present in 
column 3, when we consider the competition and technology gap effects. This 
evidence supports our first hypothesis. 
[Insert Table 5.2 here] 
Focusing on the control variables, the size term displays a significantly 
positive relationship with innovation activity. This is in line with the findings of 
Choi et al. (2012). In the presence of a 10-percentage point rise in size, the 
probability of innovation increases by 0.13 percentage points. This is because large 
firms generally have several advantages, such as more financial resources, more 
technical capabilities, and a greater ability to spread the risk of failure, compared 
with small firms when participating in innovation (Damanpour, 2010). The 
coefficient on leverage is significant and positive, due to the important role of 
external finance on innovation. Specifically, a 10-percentage point raises in leverage 
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increases the probability of innovation by 0.07 percentage points. In line with our 
expectations, exports have a positive effect on innovation. With a 10-percentage 
point increase in exports, the probability of innovation rises by 0.1 percentage points. 
Cheung (2010) explains that exports provide a channel to attract FDI and strength 
spillover effects on innovation performance. We also find an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between competition and innovation (with a positive coefficient on 
Compete, and a negative coefficient on Compete2, both of which are significant), 
which is in line with the findings in Aghion et al. (2002) and Tingvall and Poldahl 
(2006). This indicates that, in the case of low competition, the leading firms are in a 
monopolistic position and therefore have a lower incentive to innovate. Followers 
have therefore an opportunity to catch up and will increase their innovation. 
However, when market competition is high, leading firms will invest relatively more 
in innovation to retain their strong positions, which makes it difficult for lagging 
firms to catch up and will, in turn, decrease their incentive to innovate. The 
coefficient on the technology gap is consistent with our prediction, as it is positive 
and significant. This indicates that a firm that is distant from the technology frontier 
has a higher incentive to innovate. 
We then estimate Equation (5.1) using a pooled tobit mode to explore the 
effect of joint ventures on the actual new product sales to total sales ratio. The results 
are shown in columns 4−6 in Table 5.2. In line with the findings of the probit model, 
a higher probability of being a joint ventures is associated with a higher level of 
product innovation. The marginal effects suggest that a 10-percentage point rise in 
the probability of being a joint ventures increases the new products sales to total 
sales ratio by 0.26 percentage points in the static model (column 4), and by and 0.13 
points in the dynamic models (column 5 and 6). This once again provides evidence 
 
 
169 
 
in support of our Hypothesis 1. The results for the other control variables are 
consistent with the results in the probit model.  
Table 5.3a reports regression results for Equation (5.2), which tests the 
relationship between state/foreign ownership and firm innovation activities based on 
the pooled probit model. All specifications are estimated as dynamic models and 
include market competition and technology gap. Focusing on column 1, we observe 
that the coefficient on Statecap is positive and significant, while that on Foreigncap 
is negative and significant. In order to test the non-linear effect of state/foreign 
ownership on innovation, we include the squared term Statecap2 and Foreigncap2. 
We find that Statecap2 is negatively associated with product innovation, whilst the 
coefficient on Statecap is still positive and significant (see column 2). This provides 
evidence that there is an inverse U-shaped relationship between state ownership and 
product innovation, and is consistent with our Hypothesis 2. The average turn point 
is around 70%.70  Specifically, when state ownership rises to a relatively low or 
moderate level (lower than 70%), firms increasingly build up their political 
affiliation with the government and therefore enjoy several benefits, such as access 
to scarce technological resources, financial resources, highly skilled technicians, 
regulation advantages and legal support Yet, if state ownership increases beyond a 
certain threshold (more than 70%), the power of state control rises over a firm’s 
board. In this case, state investors can appoint directors and managers who are 
sympathetic to the government’s social and political goals. These individuals may 
ignore projects with high profit potential, such as innovation activities. In addition, 
firms with high levels of state ownership generally experience several other 
problems, such as corruption and crony capitalism, which may further affect firms’ 
                                                          
70 This turning point is calculated as - (0.798/(2*(-0.566))). 
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investment decisions.  
[Insert Table 5.3a here] 
We also add the squared term Foreigncap2 to our Equation (5.2) to consider 
the non-linear effect of foreign ownership. The results are also shown in column 2 in 
Table 5.3a. Although the coefficient for Foreigncap2 is negative and significant, 
Foreigncap does not have a precisely determined coefficient. However, as there is a 
positive sign on Foreigncap, we believe product innovation will increase as the 
rising of foreign ownership, but this trend is not significant. Then we test whether 
there is a break for different level of foreign ownership. Following this idea, we add 
DF (a dummy variable, which equals to 1 if a firm has foreign ownership, and 0 
otherwise) into Equation (5.2) to test whether there is significant difference between 
foreign-affiliated firms and purely domestic firms, and re-examine the impact of 
foreign ownership on product innovation in foreign-affiliated firms. The results 
based on the pooled probit regression are present in column 3 in Table 5.3a. We 
observe that the coefficient on DF is positive and significant, which indicate that 
foreign-affiliated firms are more likely to innovation than purely domestic firms. 
Meanwhile, the coefficient on Foreigncap is negative and significant, which means 
foreign ownership has a negative impact on product innovation in foreign-affiliated 
firms. This is consistent with the argument of Liu and Buck (2007), who observe that 
inward FDI may negatively affect the innovation activities or productivity of local 
firms by monopolising markets, drawing demand from local firms and substituting 
local suppliers with foreign ones. We then add the squared term Foreigncap2 for 
consideration, and its coefficient is not significant (see column 4). Moreover, taking 
into account the difference between joint-venture firms and fully owned firms, we 
divide DF into two parts: DF0100 (a dummy variable, which equals to 1 if a firm has 
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positive foreign ownership but less than 100%, and 0 otherwise), and DF100 (a 
dummy variable, which equals to 1 if a firm 100% owned by foreign ownership, and 
0 otherwise). The results are present in column 5 in Table 5.3a. We observe that the 
coefficient for DF0100 is positive and significant, but insignificant for DF100. This 
indicates that foreign-affiliated joint venture firms are more likely to undertake 
innovation activities, but not for fully foreign owned firms, which provide further 
evidence for our Hypothesis 1. The coefficient for Foreigncap2 is still insignificant 
in column 6. These results are in line with our third hypothesis that foreign-affiliated 
firms, especially foreign-affiliated joint-venture firms, are more likely to innovate 
than domestic firms, but their innovation propensity and intensity both diminish as 
foreign ownership increases.71  
Similar results are obtained in Table 5.3b, which reports Tobit estimates for the 
ratio of new product sales to total sales. All the results for other control variables are 
consistent with the findings presented in Table 5.2. In addition, we note that 
Privatecap have a significantly positive impact on innovation, which is in line with 
the findings of Ayyagari et al. (2012), who report that ownership by families and 
individuals is associated with higher firm innovation. Guariglia and Liu (2014) also 
show evidence of a higher new products sales to total sales ratio for private firms in 
their summary statistics, indicating that private firms have a strong enthusiasm to 
participate in innovation activities. Similarly, we consider the non-linear effect of 
private ownership, and find the coefficient on Privatecap2 to be negative and 
significant, which indicates that private ownership also has a negative impact on 
product innovation if it increases beyond a certain threshold.  
                                                          
71 There are not serious correlations among independent variables through Pairwise Correlation tests. 
Results are available from the author upon request. 
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[Insert Table 5.3b here] 
In order to capture the effects of absorptive capacity on the relationship 
between foreign ownership and innovation, we expend the model by including the 
interaction terms of foreign ownership and absorptive capacity. The regression 
results are shown in Table 5.4.72 We find that state ownership still has an inverse U-
shaped relationship with product innovation, but that the coefficient for foreign 
ownership become positive when it is interacted with High_AC, yet remained 
negative when it is interacted with Low_AC.73 We also report p-values associated 
with F-tests aimed at assessing whether the impact of Foreigncap on dnp/npa is 
equal across various groups of firms-years. The results reject the hypothesis that 
there is no difference between firms with high absorptive capacity and those with 
low absorptive capacity. This evidence provides strong support for the proposition of 
the important role of absorptive capacity in the assimilation of technology spillover 
from foreign investors. The coefficients associated with other control variables are 
similar to those reported in previous specifications. 
[Insert Table 5.4 here] 
 
5.7. Robustness tests 
5.7.1. Replacing JV with a measure of ownership diversity 
                                                          
72 The observations in Table 5.4 are smaller than in previous tables, because we examine the effect of 
absorptive capacity only in foreign-affiliated joint-venture firms. Absorptive capacity works in fact 
within a firm through reorganization and assimilation of valuable knowledge from foreign partners 
and transfer technology or know-how to domestic partners. It is therefore less like to happen in purely 
domestic firms or fully foreign-owned firms. And we only perform the results based on tobit model. 
As discussed in Ai and Norton (2003), the estimation on interaction term in probit models may cause 
biased.  
73 The results are robust if we add the squared of foreign ownership (Foreigncap2), and the coefficient 
on Foreigncap2 is not significant.  
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We use ownership type diversity as an alternative measure of joint venture. This 
measure is widely used (e.g. Chen et al. 2014; Zhou and Li, 2008) to calculate 
ownership diversification based on a Herfindahl index. Specifically, we define the 
following variable: 
2
     
  1/
    i
Cummulative ownership of type i investor
Ownership type diversity
Total ownership by all investor
  
   
   
  
Note that a higher value of this measure corresponds to a more diversified 
ownership structure within a firm. The regression results are present in Table 5.5. 
Focusing on the new variable Diversity in column 1, we find that it has a positive 
and significant coefficient. This indicates that firms with a more diversified 
ownership structure are more likely participate in innovation activities. A similar 
result is obtained when we estimate a dynamic model (column 2). When we change 
the dependent variable from dnp to nps and use a pooled tobit estimator, we observe 
that the coefficient on Diversity is still significant and positive in columns 3 and 4. 
This indicates that firms with more diversified ownership structure are associated 
with a higher new product sales to total sales ratio.  The coefficients of other 
variables are consistent with our earlier findings as presented in Table 5.2.  
[Insert Table 5.5 here] 
 
5.7.2. Instrumental variable methods 
Our method of lagging the independent variables might not be sufficient to alleviate 
potential endogeneity. We therefore apply the instrumental variable (IV-probit and 
IV-tobit) method as a robustness test to examine our baseline model specification. 
We instrument all right-hand-side variables using their own values lagged twice. The 
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new regression results are present in Table 5.6. 74 We observe a positive coefficient 
for Statecap, a negative coefficient for Statecap2, but insignificant coefficient for 
Foreigncap and Foreigncap2. We next test the impact of foreign ownership on 
product innovation in different specifications, the coefficients for foreign ownership 
are all consistent with the findings in in Table 5.3a and 5.3b, as well as the results for 
other control variables. In brief, the instrumental variable results provide evidence 
that our baseline model findings are robust to controlling for the possible 
endogeneity of the regressors.  
[Insert Table 5.6 here] 
 
5.7.3. Using an alternative measure of innovation activity 
In our further robustness test, we use R&D expenditure as an alternative measure of 
innovation activity. Table 5.7a presents summary statistics for drd, rds, and rda. 
Specifically, drd is a binary variable which takes a value of one if a firm has positive 
R&D expenditure, and zero otherwise. rds/rda is a censored variable which is equal 
to zero if a firm does not innovate, and takes the value of the actual ratio of R&D 
expenditure to total sales/assets otherwise. As shown in Panel A, with the rise of 
state ownership, all three measures first increase and then decrease, showing an 
inverted U-shaped trend. Focusing on the statistics in Panel B, the values of these 
three measures decline as foreign ownership increases.  
[Insert Table 5.7a here] 
Regression results are presented in Table 5.7b, based on the pooled probit and 
                                                          
74 We do not report marginal effect in this table because marginal effects are not available after IV-
probit/IV-tobit two step estimators.  
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tobit methods. We observe a positive coefficient for Statecap, and a negative 
coefficient for Statecap2, indicating once again an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between state ownership and product innovation. We also observed a positive 
coefficient for DF and DF0100, and a negative coefficient for Foreigncap, 
indicating that foreign-affiliated firms, especially foreign-affiliated joint-venture 
firms, are more likely to innovate than domestic firms, but their innovation 
propensity and intensity both diminish as foreign ownership increases. This, once 
again, provides support for our Hypotheses 2 and 3.  
[Insert Table 5.7b here] 
 
5.8. Conclusion 
Using data from 114,881 mainly unlisted Chinese firms over the period 2000−2007, 
we find a significant positive effect of joint ventures on innovation activity. 
Moreover, our results indicate an inverse U-shaped relationship between state 
ownership and product innovation. For foreign-affiliated firms, especially for 
foreign-affiliated joint-venture firms, they are more likely to innovate than domestic 
firms, but their innovation propensity and intensity both diminish as foreign 
ownership increases. We also report strong evidence that, conditional on absorptive 
capacity, the relationship between foreign ownership and product innovation 
becomes positive for foreign-affiliated joint-venture firms. These results are 
consistent with a variety of theories and are robust to a range of estimation methods. 
Our findings suggest that relevant policies should be established to promote 
Chinese firms’ innovation activities. Specifically, joint ventures should be 
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encouraged in order to promote innovation activities. State ownership should also be 
recommended but should not go beyond a certain threshold (around 70%). Chinese 
enterprises, on the one hand, should continue introduce foreign investors as they are 
generally more likely to innovate than domestic investors. On the other hand, 
government should encourage the form of joint venture cooperation instead of fully 
foreign invested pattern. The negative impact of foreign ownership on innovation 
may also due to uncertain innovation projects, undeveloped stock market, unhealthy 
financial system, unsound intellectual property rights and shareholder rights 
protection, and unregulated patent legal system. Therefore, external incentives 
should be strengthened to change these situations, and to make foreign investors 
more confidence when participate in innovation activities in China. At last, Chinese 
firms themselves should strengthen their absorptive capacity to recognize the value 
of new, external information or technology, learn and assimilate it from their foreign 
partners, then internalize and exploit it, and finally create their own innovation and 
apply it to commercial ends. 
Further research should be undertaken in the following directions: First, as our 
regressions are only based on the probit/tobit model, it would be prudent to examine 
whether these results are robust to using other methods, such as the propensity score 
matching method (Girma et al., 2012). Second, future work could test whether our 
results also hold for listed firms. Third, one could investigate whether similar results 
are observed in other developing countries. 
  
 
 
177 
 
Table 5.1: Summary statistics 
Panel A: 
 
S = 0% 0% <S< 50% 50% ≤ S< 100% S = 100% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
dnp 0.087 0.183 0.206 0.146 
nps 0.033 0.067 0.068 0.044 
npa 0.047 0.058 0.050 0.031 
     
Observations 509,232 14,057 11,992 28,105 
 
 
Panel B: 
 
F = 0% 0% <F< 50% 50% ≤ F< 100% F = 100% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
dnp 0.100 0.127 0.101 0.050 
nps 0.037 0.051 0.043 0.020 
npa 0.048 0.060 0.051 0.027 
     
Observations 418,415 40,878 27,993 76,100 
 
Notes: S represents the fraction of the firm’s capital paid in by the state. F represents the fraction of the firm’s 
capital paid in by foreign investors. See the Appendix for complete definitions of all variables. 
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Table 5.2: Are joint-ventures more likely to innovate? 
 dnp dnp dnp nps nps nps 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged dep. Variable  2.305*** 2.300***  1.557*** 1.552*** 
  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.007) (0.007) 
  [0.221] [0.220]  [0.257] [0.256] 
JVi,t-1 0.114*** 0.053*** 0.051*** 0.080*** 0.031*** 0.029*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
 [0.018] [0.005] [0.005] [0.013] [0.005] [0.005] 
Sizei,t-1 0.230*** 0.139*** 0.140*** 0.157*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 [0.037] [0.013] [0.013] [0.026] [0.013] [0.013] 
Leveragei,t-1 0.133*** 0.074*** 0.071*** 0.065*** 0.056*** 0.053*** 
 (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) 
 [0.021] [0.007] [0.007] [0.011] [0.009] [0.009] 
Collaterali,t-1 -0.024 -0.058** -0.070*** -0.045*** 0.010 -0.001 
 (0.019) (0.023) (0.023) (0.013) (0.002) (0.009) 
  [-0.006] [-0.007] [-0.007]   
Expdumi,t 0.321*** 0.103*** 0.113*** 0.210*** 0.110*** 0.118*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
 [0.051] [0.010] [0.011] [0.034] [0.018] [0.019] 
Competei,t   1.374***   1.316*** 
   (0.344)   (0.149) 
   [0.132]   [0.217] 
Compete2i,t   -1.207***   -1.110*** 
   (0.224)   (0.095) 
   [-0.115]   [-0.183] 
Tech_gapi,t   0.677***   0.433*** 
   (0.173)   (0.068) 
   [0.065]   [0.071] 
       
Pseudo R2 0.091 0.442 0.443 0.085 0.342 0.344 
Observations 340,384 340,384 340,384 340,384 340,384 340,384 
Note: The dependent variable dnp is a binary variable which takes value of one if the firm has new products, and 
zero otherwise. The dependent variable nps is a censored variable which is equal to zero if the firm does not 
innovate, and takes the value of the actual ratio of new products to total sales otherwise. Heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent 
level respectively. Marginal effects are in square brackets for those variables that are statistically significant. 
Time dummies and industry dummies are included in estimation. See the Appendix for complete definitions of 
all variables. The results in column 1 to 3 are estimated by using the pooled probit estimator, and the results in 
column 4 to 5 are regressed based on the pooled tobit estimator.  
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Table 5.3a: Relationship between state/foreign ownership and firms’ innovation 
activity (the pooled probit model) 
 dnp dnp dnp dnp dnp dnp 
 (1) (3) (2) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged dep. variable 2.258*** 2.255*** 2.255*** 2.255*** 2.255*** 2.255*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
 [0.206] [0.214] [0.214] [0.214] [0.214] [0.214] 
Main variables:       
Statecapi,t-1 0.266*** 0.798*** 0.813*** 0.805*** 0.799*** 0.801*** 
 (0.020) (0.088) (0.087) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) 
 [0.015] [0.076] [0.077] [0.076] [0.076] [0.076] 
Statecap2i,t-1  -0.566*** -0.582*** -0.574*** -0.567*** -0.569*** 
  (0.091) (0.091) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) 
  [-0.054] [-0.055] [-0.054] [-0.054] [-0.054] 
Foreigncapi,t-1 -0.223*** 0.102 -0.351*** -0.163 -0.267*** -0.375** 
 (0.018) (0.070) (0.030) (0.152) (0.048) (0.186) 
 [-0.021]  [-0.033]  [-0.025] [-0.035] 
Foreigncap2i,t-1  -0.350***  -0.154  0.109 
  (0.071)  (0.122)  (0.182) 
  [-0.033]     
DFi,t-1   0.113*** 0.075**   
   (0.022) (0.038)   
   [0.011] [0.007]   
DF0100i,t-1     0.088*** 0.108*** 
     (0.025) (0.041) 
     [0.008] [0.010] 
DF100i,t-1     0.018 0.017 
     (0.048) (0.048) 
       
Control variables:       
Sizei,t-1 0.154*** 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.150*** 0.150*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
 [0.015] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] 
Leveragei,t-1 -0.047*** -0.039** -0.040** -0.039** -0.038** -0.039** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
 [-0.004] [-0.004] [-0.004] [-0.004] [-0.004] [-0.004] 
Collaterali,t-1 -0.126*** -0.109*** -0.109*** -0.109*** -0.109*** -0.109*** 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
 [-0.012] [-0.010] [-0.010] [-0.010] [-0.010] [-0.010] 
Expdumi,t 0.196*** 0.191*** 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.191*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
 [0.019] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] 
Competei,t 1.160*** 1.110*** 1.111*** 1.111*** 1.109*** 1.109*** 
 (0.341) (0.340) (0.340) (0.340) (0.340) (0.340) 
 [0.110] [0.105] [0.105] [0.105] [0.105] [0.105] 
Compete2i,t -0.973*** -0.933*** -0.934*** -0.934*** -0.933*** -0.933*** 
 (0.223) (0.222) (0.222) (0.222) (0.222) (0.222) 
 [-0.092] [-0.088] [-0.088] [-0.088] [-0.088] [-0.088] 
Tech_gapi,t 0.485*** 0.469*** 0.473*** 0.472*** 0.470*** 0.470*** 
 (0.173) (0.173) (0.173) (0.173) (0.173) (0.173) 
 [0.046] [0.044] [0.045] [0.045] [0.045] [0.045] 
Privatecapi,t-1 0.181*** 0.364*** 0.378*** 0.356*** 0.352*** 0.360*** 
 (0.015) (0.066) (0.064) (0.066) (0.065) (0.066) 
 [0.017] [0.035] [0.036] [0.034] [0.033] [0.034] 
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Privatecap2i,t-1  -1.180*** -1.192*** -1.171*** -1.167*** -1.175*** 
  (0.063) (0.061) (0.063) (0.062) (0.063) 
  [-0.017] [-0.018] [-0.016] [-0.016] [-0.017] 
       
Pseudo R2 0.448 0.448 0.448 0.448 0.448 0.448 
Observations 340,384 340,384 340,384 340,384 340,384 340,384 
Note: The dependent variable dnp is a binary variable which takes value of one if the firm has new products, and 
zero otherwise. The dependent variable nps is a censored variable which is equal to zero if the firm does not 
innovate, and takes the value of the actual ratio of new products to total sales otherwise. Heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent 
level respectively. Marginal effects are in square brackets for those variables that are statistically significant. 
Time dummies and industry dummies are included in estimation. See the Appendix for complete definitions of 
all variables. All results are estimated by using the pooled probit estimator. 
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Table 5.3b: Relationship between state/foreign ownership and firms’ innovation 
activity (the pooled tobit model) 
 nps nps nps nps nps nps 
 (1) (3) (2) (4) (5) (5) 
Lagged dep. variable 1.519*** 1.514*** 1.514*** 1.514*** 1.514*** 1.514*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
 [0.249] [0.248] [0.248] [0.248] [0.248] [0.248] 
Main variables:       
Statecapi,t-1 0.153*** 0.453*** 0.442*** 0.421*** 0.417*** 0.417*** 
 (0.008) (0.046) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
 [0.025] [0.074] [0.069] [0.069] [0.068] [0.068] 
Statecap2i,t-1  -0.282*** -0.285*** -0.284*** -0.279*** -0.279*** 
  (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
  [-0.046] [-0.047] [-0.047] [-0.046] [-0.046] 
Foreigncapi,t-1 -0.176*** -0.060 -0.214*** -0.188*** -0.176*** -0.449*** 
 (0.007) (0.039) (0.012) (0.058) (0.019) (0.170) 
 [-0.029]  [-0.035] [-0.031] [-0.029] [-0.073] 
Foreigncap2i,t-1  -0.091***  -0.022  0.446 
  (0.028)  (0.047)  (0.384) 
  [-0.015]     
DFi,t-1   0.033*** 0.027*   
   (0.009) (0.015)   
   [0.005] [0.004]   
DF0100i,t-1     0.021** 0.062*** 
     (0.010) (0.023) 
     [0.003] [0.010] 
DF100i,t-1     -0.012 0.011 
     (0.019) (0.002) 
       
Control variables:       
Sizei,t-1 0.083*** 0.081*** 0.080*** 0.080*** 0.080*** 0.080*** 
 (0.014) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 [0.015] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] 
Leveragei,t-1 -0.026*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.022*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
 [-0.004] [-0.004] [-0.004] [-0.004] [-0.004] [-0.004] 
Collaterali,t-1 -0.036*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.029*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
 [-0.006] [-0.005] [-0.005] [-0.005] [-0.005] [-0.005] 
Expdumi,t 0.167*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
 [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] 
Competei,t 1.042*** 1.005*** 1.007*** 1.007*** 1.006*** 1.005*** 
 (0.145) (0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.144) 
 [0.171] [0.165] [0.165] [0.165] [0.165] [0.165] 
Compete2i,t -0.847*** -0.819*** -0.821*** -0.821*** -0.821*** -0.820*** 
 (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) 
 [-0.139] [-0.134] [-0.134] [-0.134] [-0.134] [-0.134] 
Tech_gapi,t 0.298*** 0.290*** 0.291*** 0.291*** 0.289*** 0.290*** 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) 
 [0.049] [0.047] [0.048] [0.048] [0.047] [0.047] 
Privatecapi,t-1 0.071*** 0.261*** 0.217*** 0.214*** 0.205*** 0.218*** 
 (0.006) (0.048) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) 
 [0.012] [0.043] [0.036] [0.035] [0.034] [0.036] 
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Privatecap2i,t-1  -1.154*** -0.144*** -0.140*** -1.132*** -0.145*** 
  (0.026) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) 
  [-0.025] [-0.024] [-0.023] [-0.022] [-0.024] 
       
Pseudo R2 0.356 0.357 0.357 0.357 0.357 0.357 
Observations 340,384 340,384 340,384 340,384 340,384 340,384 
Note: The dependent variable dnp is a binary variable which takes value of one if the firm has new products, and 
zero otherwise. The dependent variable nps is a censored variable which is equal to zero if the firm does not 
innovate, and takes the value of the actual ratio of new products to total sales otherwise. Heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent 
level respectively. Marginal effects are in square brackets for those variables that are statistically significant. 
Time dummies and industry dummies are included in estimation. See the Appendix for complete definitions of 
all variables. All results are estimated by using the pooled tobit estimator. 
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Table 5.4: Relationship between foreign ownership and firms’ innovation 
activity: the role of absorptive capacity  
 
R&D 
Past experience in 
innovation 
 nps nps 
 (2) (4) 
Lagged dep. variable 1.369*** 1.230*** 
 (0.023) (0.021) 
 [0.269] [0.216] 
Main variables:   
Statecapi,t-1 0.368*** 0.228** 
 (0.136) (0.098) 
 [0.072] [0.040] 
Statecap2i,t-1 -0.427** -0.230* 
 (0.200) (0.137) 
 [-0.084] [-0.040] 
Foreigncapi,t-1× High_AC 0.213*** 0.319*** 
 (0.042) (0.038) 
 [0.042] [0.056] 
Foreigncapi,t-1× Low_AC -0.185*** -0.409*** 
 (0.045) (0.036) 
 [-0.036] [-0.072] 
Control variables:   
Sizei,t-1 0.047*** 0.067*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
 [0.009] [0.012] 
Leveragei,t-1 0.007 0.029 
 (0.025) (0.005) 
   
Collaterali,t-1 0.034 -0.016 
 (0.036) (0.034) 
   
Expdumi,t 0.156*** 0.118*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) 
 [0.031] [0.021] 
Competei,t 0.860 1.937* 
 (0.716) (1.221) 
  [0.340] 
Compete2i,t -0.620 -1.193* 
 (0.441) (0.718) 
  [-0.210] 
Tech_gapi,t 0.263 0.632*** 
 (0.240) (0.236) 
  [0.111] 
Privatecapi,t-1 0.131** 0.141** 
 (0.063) (0.056) 
 [0.026] [0.025] 
Privatecap2i,t-1 -0.051 -0.116* 
 (0.068) (0.066) 
  [-0.020] 
H0: Impact of Foreigncapi,t-1 on dnp/nps same across 
High_AC and Low_AC firm-years (p-value) 
0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.401 0.481 
Observations 16,757 22,145 
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Note: The dependent variable dnp is a binary variable which takes value of one if the firm has new products, and 
zero otherwise. The dependent variable nps is a censored variable which is equal to zero if the firm does not 
innovate, and takes the value of the actual ratio of new products to total sales otherwise. Heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent 
level respectively. Marginal effects are in square brackets for those variables that are statistically significant. 
Time dummies and industry dummies are included in estimation. See the Appendix for complete definitions of 
all variables. The results in column 1 and 3 are estimated by using the pooled probit estimator, and the results in 
column 2 and 4 are regressed based on the pooled tobit estimator. 
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Table 5.5: Robustness test: Are firms with a more diversified ownership 
structure more likely to innovate? 
 dnp dnp nps nps 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged dep. variable  2.300***  1.552*** 
  (0.009)  (0.007) 
  [0.220]  [0.256] 
Diversityi,t-1 0.119*** 0.062*** 0.085*** 0.031*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.007) (0.005) 
 [0.019] [0.006] [0.014] [0.005] 
Sizei,t-1 0.233*** 0.140*** 0.158*** 0.077*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
 [0.037] [0.013] [0.026] [0.013] 
Leveragei,t-1 0.125*** 0.071*** 0.059*** 0.053*** 
 (0.013) (0.017) (0.010) (0.007) 
 [0.020] [0.007] [0.010] [0.009] 
Collaterali,t-1 -0.062*** -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.002 
 (0.019) (0.023) (0.013) (0.009) 
 [-0.010] [-0.007] [-0.012]  
Expdumi,t 0.350*** 0.113*** 0.228*** 0.119*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.003) 
 [0.056] [0.011] [0.037] [0.020] 
Competei,t 4.557*** 1.380*** 3.123*** 1.322*** 
 (0.331) (0.344) (0.235) (0.149) 
 [0.728] [0.132] [0.512] [0.218] 
Compete2i,t -3.809*** -1.212*** -2.585*** -1.115*** 
 (0.209) (0.224) (0.148) (0.095) 
 [-0.608] [-0.116] [-0.424] [-0.184] 
Tech_gapi,t 1.079*** 0.680*** 0.615*** 0.435*** 
 (0.138) (0.173) (0.099) (0.068) 
 [0.172] [0.065] [0.101] [0.072] 
     
Pseudo R2 0.095 0.443 0.088 0.344 
Observations 340,384 340,384 340,384 340,384 
Note: The dependent variable dnp is a binary variable which takes value of one if the firm has new products, and 
zero otherwise. The dependent variable nps is a censored variable which is equal to zero if the firm does not 
innovate, and takes the value of the actual ratio of new products to total sales otherwise. Heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent 
level respectively. Marginal effects are in square brackets for those variables that are statistically significant. 
Time dummies and industry dummies are included in estimation. See the Appendix for complete definitions of 
all variables. The results in column 1 and 2 are estimated by using the pooled probit estimator, and the results in 
column 3 and 4 are regressed based on the pooled tobit estimator. 
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Table 5.6: Robustness test: Relationship between state/foreign ownership and 
firms’ innovation activity controlling for potential endogeneity 
 dnp dnp dnp nps nps nps 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged dep. Variable 2.334*** 2.334*** 2.334*** 1.517*** 1.517*** 1.517*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Main variables:       
Statecapi,t-1 1.012*** 1.018*** 1.033*** 0.592*** 0.592*** 0.594*** 
 (0.220) (0.220) (0.221) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) 
Statecap2i,t-1 -0.570** -0.577** -0.592*** -0.373*** -0.372*** -0.375*** 
 (0.229) (0.228) (0.230) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) 
Foreigncapi,t-1 0.123 -0.211*** -0.264*** -0.076 -0.176*** -0.183*** 
 (0.150) (0.066) (0.102) (0.052) (0.023) (0.036) 
Foreigncap2i,t-1 -0.231   -0.064   
 (0.154)   (0.054)   
DFi,t-1  0.109**   0.036**  
  (0.049)   (0.017)  
DF0100i,t-1   0.126**   0.039** 
   (0.054)   (0.019) 
DF100i,t-1   0.166*   0.043 
   (0.100)   (0.035) 
Control variables:       
Sizei,t-1 0.177*** 0.176*** 0.176*** 0.083*** 0.082*** 0.083*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Leveragei,t-1 -0.063* -0.064* -0.064* -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.035*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Collaterali,t-1 -0.250*** -0.248*** -0.248*** -0.094*** -0.094*** -0.094*** 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Expdumi,t 0.221*** 0.220*** 0.219*** 0.176*** 0.175*** 0.175*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Competei,t 3.268*** 3.266*** 3.266*** 1.448*** 1.446*** 1.448*** 
 (0.818) (0.818) (0.818) (0.303) (0.303) (0.303) 
Compete2i,t -2.608*** -2.606*** -2.606*** -1.190*** -1.189*** -1.190*** 
 (0.521) (0.521) (0.521) (0.191) (0.191) (0.191) 
Tech_gapi,t 1.977*** 1.977*** 1.978*** 1.058*** 1.058*** 1.058*** 
 (0.549) (0.549) (0.549) (0.196) (0.196) (0.196) 
Privatecapi,t-1 0.883*** 0.832*** 0.847*** 0.384*** 0.358*** 0.359*** 
 (0.180) (0.173) (0.176) (0.063) (0.061) (0.062) 
Privatecap2i,t-1 -0.522*** -0.470*** -0.485*** -0.251*** -0.225*** -0.227*** 
 (0.172) (0.166) (0.169) (0.060) (0.058) (0.059) 
       
Wald test of exogeneity (p-
value) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 170,766 170,766 170,766 170,766 170,766 170,766 
Note: The dependent variable dnp is a binary variable which takes value of one if the firm has new products, and 
zero otherwise. The dependent variable nps is a censored variable which is equal to zero if the firm does not 
innovate, and takes the value of the actual ratio of new products to total sales otherwise. Heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent 
level respectively. Time dummies and industry dummies are included in estimation. See the Appendix for 
complete definitions of all variables. The results in column 1 to 3 are estimated by using the IV probit estimator, 
and the results in column 4 to 6 are regressed based on the IV tobit estimator. 
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Table 5.7a: Robustness test: Summary statistics based on R&D expenditure 
Panel A: 
 
S = 0% 0% <S< 50% 50% ≤ S< 100% S = 100% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
drd 0.1264 0.2746 0.2494 0.1949 
rds 0.016 0.0035 0.0031 0.0027 
rda 0.0018 0.0030 0.0026 0.0018 
     
Observations 251,945 4,447 3,260 8,931 
 
 
Panel B: 
 
F = 0% 0% <F< 50% 50% ≤ F< 100% F = 100% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
drd 0.1337 0.1783 0.1750 0.0937 
rds 0.0017 0.0022 0.0022 0.0010 
rda 0.0019 0.0024 0.0024 0.0010 
     
Observations 202,516 17,238 10,854 37,975 
Notes: S represents the fraction of the firm’s capital paid in by state investors. F represents the fraction of the 
firm’s capital paid in by foreign investors. drd is a binary variable which takes value of one if the firm has 
positive R&D expenditure and zero otherwise; rds/rda is a censored variable which is equal to zero if the firm 
does not innovate, and takes the value of the actual ratio of R&D expenditure to total sales/assets otherwise. 
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Table 5.7b: Robustness test: Relationship between state/foreign ownership and 
firms’ innovation activity using R&D expenditure  
 dnp dnp dnp nps nps nps 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged dep. Variable 1.949*** 1.950*** 1.949*** 0.666*** 0.666*** 0.665*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
 [0.263] [0.263] [0.263] [0.118] [0.118] [0.118] 
Main variables:       
Statecapi,t-1 0.896*** 0.907*** 0.894*** 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 
 (0.141) (0.141) (0.141) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
 [0.105] [0.102] [0.101] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] 
Statecap2i,t-1 -0.492*** -0.503*** -0.491*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.021*** 
 (0.147) (0.147) (0.147) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
 [-0.090] [-0.088] [-0.086] [-0.004] [-0.004] [-0.004] 
Foreigncapi,t-1 -0.238 -0.112** -0.096* 0.004 -0.004*** -0.003** 
 (0.257) (0.045) (0.058) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
  [-0.015] [-0.013] [-0.001] [-0.001] [-0.001] 
Foreigncap2i,t-1 0.208   0.008**   
 (0.256)   (0.003)   
    [-0.001]   
DFi,t-1  0.091***   0.002**  
  (0.033)   (0.001)  
  [0.012]   [0.001]  
DF0100i,t-1   0.065*   0.001** 
   (0.036)   (0.001) 
   [0.009]   [0.001] 
DF100i,t-1   -0.015   -0.005*** 
   (0.064)   (0.002) 
      [-0.001] 
Control variables:       
Sizei,t-1 0.218*** 0.218*** 0.218*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Leveragei,t-1 -0.133*** -0.133*** -0.133*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 [-0.018] [-0.018] [-0.018] [-0.001] [-0.002] [-0.001] 
Collaterali,t-1 -0.217*** -0.218*** -0.217*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 [-0.029] [-0.029] [-0.029] [-0.002] [-0.002] [-0.002] 
Expdumi,t 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Competei,t 1.753*** 1.756*** 1.752*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.087*** 
 (0.400) (0.400) (0.400) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
 [0.236] [0.237] [0.236] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] 
Compete2i,t -1.469*** -1.471*** -1.468*** -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.072*** 
 (0.264) (0.264) (0.264) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
 [-0.198] [-0.198] [-0.198] [-0.013] [-0.013] [-0.013] 
Tech_gapi,t -0.379* -0.377* -0.380* -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.039*** 
 (0.200) (0.200) (0.200) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 [-0.051] [-0.051] [-0.051] [-0.007] [-0.007] [-0.007] 
Privatecapi,t-1 0.612*** 0.647*** 0.588*** 0.029*** 0.032*** 0.028*** 
 (0.106) (0.099) (0.102) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) 
 [0.083] [0.086] [0.079] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005] 
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Privatecap2i,t-1 -0.354*** -0.382*** -0.332*** -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.017*** 
 (0.101) (0.093) (0.097) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
 [-0.048] [-0.051] [-0.045] [-0.003] [-0.004] [-0.003] 
       
Pseudo R2 0.384 0.384 0.384 0.288 0.288 0.288 
Observations 162,125 162,125 162,125 162,125 162,125 162,125 
Note: The dependent variable drd is a binary variable which takes value of one if the firm has positive R&D 
expenditure, and zero otherwise. The dependent variable rds is a censored variable which is equal to zero if the 
firm does not innovate, and takes the value of the actual ratio of R&D expenditure to total sales otherwise. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 
5 and 10 percent level respectively. Time dummies and industry dummies are included in estimation. See 
Appendix for complete definitions of all variables. The results in column 1 to 3 are estimated by using the pooled 
probit estimator, and the results in column 4 to 6 are regressed based on the pooled tobit estimator. 
 
  
 
 
190 
 
Appendix 
 
Table 5.A1: Structure of our unbalanced panel 
Panel I. 
Year 
Number of 
observations 
Percent Cumulative 
2000 49,222 8.74 8.74 
2001 66,133 11.74 20.48 
2002 80,378 14.27 34.74 
2003 98,468 17.48 52.22 
2005 95,184 16.89 69.12 
2006 90,019 15.98 85.09 
2007 83,982 14.91 100.00 
Total 563,386 100.00  
Panel II. 
Number of obs. per 
firm 
Number of 
observations 
Percent Cumulative 
1 3,482 0.62 0.62 
2 10,146 1.80 2.42 
3 31,197 5.54 7.96 
4 118,000 20.94 28.90 
5 109,125 19.37 48.27 
6 124,668 22.13 70.40 
7 166,768 29.60 100.00 
Total 563,386 100.00  
 
 
Definition of the variables used 
JV (Joint-ventures): dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is owned by two or more 
agents, and 0 otherwise. 
Statecap: share of the firm’s capital paid in by the state. 
Foreigncap: share of the firm’s capital paid in by foreign investors (including 
investors from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan). 
Privatecap: share of the firm’s capital paid in by private investors. 
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Dnp: dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm reports a positive value of new product 
sales, and 0 otherwise. 
Nps:  ratio of new product sales to total sales. 
Npa:  ratio of new product sales to total assets. 
TFP: total factor productivity calculated using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
method, applied separately to different industrial groups. 
Size: natural logarithm of total real sales. 
Leverage: ratio of current liabilities plus non-current liabilities to total assets, where 
current liabilities include loans, accounts payable, and other current liabilities; and 
non-current liabilities include long-term debt and other non-current liabilities. 
Collateral: ratio of tangible fixed assets to total assets. 
Expdum: dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm reports a positive value of overseas 
sales, and 0 otherwise. 
Total assets: sum of the firm’s fixed and current assets, where fixed assets include 
tangible fixed assets, intangible fixed assets, and other fixed assets; and current 
assets include inventories, accounts receivable, and other current assets. 
Deflators: all variables (except tangible fixed assets) are deflated using provincial 
ex-factory producer price indices taken from various issues of the China Statistical 
Yearbook. Tangible fixed assets are deflated using a deflator for fixed capital 
formation. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
6.1. Summary of the findings 
This thesis, using the data from NBS (National Bureau of Statistics of China) over 
the period 2000−2007, investigates the innovation activities in Chinese enterprises. 
Specifically, this research examines the effects of financial constraints, herding 
behavior, and various ownerships on firms’ innovation activities form both 
macroeconomics and microeconomics perspectives. In this section, the author 
summarises the main findings of this thesis and discusses the implications of the 
findings. 
The first empirical chapter, Chapter 3, tests the impact of financial constraints 
on Chinese firms’ innovation activities. We use a very large firm-level dataset over 
the period 2000−2007, which consists of 120,753 unlisted firms from 31 provinces 
or province-equivalent municipal cities. Based on a wide range of specification and 
estimation methods, we document that Chinese firms’ innovation activities are 
subject to financial constraints. Private firms suffer the most, followed by foreign 
firms, while SOEs and collective firms are the least financially constrained. 
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Moreover, the availability of internal finance represents a binding constraint for 
small firms, coastal firms, and firms who have low political affiliation and fewer 
state shares. Last, joint-ventures are less likely to face financial constraints than sole 
proprietorships. 
In Chapter 4, making use of a panel of 19,722 Chinese innovative firms over 
the period 2000−2007, we explore the extent to which herding affects corporate 
innovation activities and investigate the impact of herding on firms’ productivity. 
We find strong evidence in favor of herding, which is more likely to affect private, 
small firms, with no political affiliation. We also find a negative impact of 
innovation herding on firm productivity. 
Chapter 5 uses data from 114,881 mainly unlisted Chinese firms over the 
period 2000−2007, and find a significant positive effect of joint ventures on 
innovation activity. Moreover, our results indicate an inverse U-shaped relationship 
between state ownership and product innovation. For foreign-affiliated firms, 
especially for foreign-affiliated joint-venture firms, they are more likely to innovate 
than domestic firms, but their innovation propensity and intensity both diminish as 
foreign ownership increases. We also report strong evidence that, conditional on 
absorptive capacity, the relationship between foreign ownership and product 
innovation becomes positive for foreign-affiliated joint-venture firms. These results 
are consistent with a variety of theories and are robust to a range of estimation 
methods. 
 
6.2. Implications of the study 
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The findings in Chapter 3 confirm the presence of “lending bias” and “political 
pecking order” in the Chinese capital market. Despite being the most active 
innovation participant over the period examined, private firms have been 
discriminated against by the Chinese capital market. As for foreign firms, their 
innovation activities have also been constrained by the imperfection and 
underdevelopment of the Chinese capital. By contrast, thanks to the support these 
firms get from state banks and local governments, SOEs and collective firms’ 
innovation activities are not constrained by the availability of internal finance. Our 
research complements “The National Medium- and Long-Term Program of Science 
and Technology Development (2006-2020)”. Specifically, our findings suggest that 
policies should be established to alleviate financing obstacles to support the 
development of innovation activities in small private firms, coastal firms, and firms 
with low political affiliation, fewer state shares, and sole proprietorship. To this end, 
non-banking financial institutions, such as securities, insurance, trust and finance 
companies, could be set up. 
Our findings in Chapter 4 suggest that relevant policies should be established 
to reduce herding behavior in Chinese firms’ innovation activities, especially for 
private, small firms, with no political affiliation. To this end, the Chinese 
government should endeavour to establish a sound protection of property rights, and 
a strong regulated patent legal system. At the same time, information disclosure and 
information exchange should be encouraged to reduce asymmetric information. 
Finally, Chinese firms should enhance shareholders’ protection and further improve 
corporate governance to reduce principal-agent problems.  
The findings in Chapter 5 suggest that relevant policies should be established 
to promote Chinese firms’ innovation activities. Specifically, joint ventures should 
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be encouraged in order to promote innovation activities. State ownership should also 
be recommended but should not go beyond a certain threshold (around 70%). 
Chinese enterprises, on the one hand, should continue introduce foreign investors as 
they are generally more likely to innovate than domestic investors. On the other hand, 
government should encourage the form of joint venture cooperation instead of fully 
foreign invested pattern. The negative impact of foreign ownership on innovation 
may also due to uncertain innovation projects, undeveloped stock market, unhealthy 
financial system, unsound intellectual property rights and shareholder rights 
protection, and unregulated patent legal system. Therefore, external incentives 
should be strengthened to change these situations, and to make foreign investors 
more confidence when participate in innovation activities in China. At last, Chinese 
firms themselves should strengthen their absorptive capacity to recognize the value 
of new, external information or technology, learn and assimilate it from their foreign 
partners, then internalize and exploit it, and finally create their own innovation and 
apply it to commercial ends. 
Overall, we find the significant impact of financial constraints, herding 
behavior, and various ownerships on Chinese firms’ innovation activities or 
productivity, and find how these results are different under different firms’ 
characteristics and different situations. These findings contribute to the 
understanding of firms’ corporate finance, behavior finance, corporate governance 
and the importance of firm heterogeneity in firms’ innovation activities, and help the 
government to complement the existing policy and establish new policy and finally 
promote innovation in China.     
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6.3. Limitations of the study  
Last but not least, a few limitations of the thesis and further research need to be 
addressed. Specifically, in Chapter 3, as our regressions are only based on the Euler 
equation model, it would be interesting to test whether the results are robust to using 
other models, such as the error-correction model (Bond et al., 2003; Guariglia, 2008). 
In Chapter 4, as our regressions are only based on production innovation, it would be 
interesting to test whether they are robust to using other innovation measures, such 
as R&D investment. And it would be interesting to test the extent to which Chinese 
firms herd following industry leaders instead of herding following the industry 
average. In Chapter 5, as our regressions are only based on the probit/tobit model, it 
would be prudent to examine whether these results are robust to using other methods, 
such as the propensity score matching method (Girma et al., 2012).  
 
6.4. Recommendations for future research 
Future work could test whether our results also hold for listed firms, as listed firms 
can obtain external fund using stock in the market, which is an important channel of 
financing. In October 2009, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) launched the 
growth enterprise board (GEB), like a NASDAQ board, which is separate from the 
main board with the aim to help innovative and fast-growing firms to raise capital 
more easily from the market. It is interesting to examine whether the effect of 
financing constraints have decreased after the announcement of GEB. In addition, 
one could investigate whether similar results are observed in other developing 
countries. Moreover, it is interesting to examine whether the nature experiment of 
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“The Medium- and Long-term Strategic Plan for the Development of Science and 
Technology (2006−2020)” introduces an exogenous shock to innovation activities. 
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